PROJECT MKULTRA, THE CIA'S PROGRAM OF RESEARCH IN BEHAVIORAL MODIFICATION

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BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
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CONTENTS

Statements of:
Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director, Central Intelligence Agency; accompanied by; Frank Laubinger, Office of Technical Services, Central Intelligence Agency; Al Brody, Office of Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency; Ernest Mayerfield, Office of General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, and George Cary, Legislative Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency................................. 8
Philip Goldman, former employee, Central Intelligence Agency........ 50
John Gittinger, former employee, Central Intelligence Agency........ 51

Appendix A.—XVII. Testing and Use of Chemical and Biological Agents by the Intelligence Community----------------------------- 65
Appendix B.—Documents Referring to Discovery of Additional MKULTRA Material ----------------------------------------------- 103
Appendix C.—Documents Referring to Subprojects------------------------ 109

Material Submitted for the Record:
'Psychological Assessments...................................................... 17
"Truth" Drugs in Interrogation................................................. 25
Construction of Gorman Annex................................................ 39
Subproject 54.................................................................... 41
Drug Testing in Foreign Countries............................................. 43
MKSEARCH, OFTEN/CHICKWIT.................................................. 169
Employees Terminated Because of Their Participation in MKULTRA Subproject 3.................................................................. 170
QKHILLTOP Definition................................................................ 171

(III)
PROJECT MKULTRA, THE CIA'S PROGRAM OF RESEARCH IN BEHAVIORAL MODIFICATION

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 3, 1977

U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
and Subcommittee on Health
and Scientific Research
of the Committee on Human Resources,
Washington, D.C.

The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 9:07 a.m. in room 1202, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Daniel K. Inouye (chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence) presiding.


Also present: William G. Miller, staff director, Select Committee on Intelligence; Dr. Lawrence Horowitz, staff director, Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research; and professional staff members of both committees.

Senator Inouye. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is meeting today and is joined by the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research chaired by Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts and Senator Richard Schweiker of Pennsylvania. Senator Hathaway and Senator Chafee are members of both committees. We are to hear testimony from the Director of Central Intelligence, Adm. Stansfield Turner, and from other Agency witnesses on issues concerning new documents supplied to the committee in the last week on drug testing conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency.

It should be made clear from the outset that in general, we are focusing on events that happened over 12 or as long as 25 years ago. It should be emphasized that the programs that are of greatest concern have stopped and that we are reviewing these past events in order to better understand what statutes and other guidelines might be necessary to prevent the recurrence of such abuses in the future. We also need to know and understand what is now being done by the CIA in the field of behavioral research to be certain that no current abuses are occurring.

I want to commend Admiral Turner for his full cooperation with this committee and with the Subcommittee on Health in recognizing that this issue needed our attention. The CIA has assisted our committees and staffs in their investigative efforts and in arriving at remedies which will serve the best interests of our country.
The reappearance of reports of the abuses of the drug testing program and reports of other previously unknown drug programs and projects for behavioral control underline the necessity for effective oversight procedures both in the executive branch and in the Congress. The Select Committee on Intelligence has been working very closely with President Carter, the Vice President, and Admiral Turner and his associates in developing basic concepts for statutory guidelines which will govern all activities of the intelligence agencies of the United States.

In fact, it is my expectation that the President will soon announce his decisions on how he has decided the intelligence agencies of the United States shall be organized. This committee will be working closely with the President and Admiral Turner in placing this new structure under the law and to develop effective oversight procedures.

It is clear that effective oversight requires that information must be full and forthcoming. Full and timely information is obviously necessary if the committee and the public is to be confident that any transgressions can be dealt with quickly and forcefully.

One purpose of this hearing is to give the committee and the public an understanding of what new information has been discovered that adds to the knowledge already available from previous Church and Kennedy inquiries, and to hear the reasons why these documents were not available to the Church and Kennedy committees. It is also the purpose of this hearing to address the issues raised by any additional illegal or improper activities that have emerged from the files and to develop remedies to prevent such improper activities from occurring again.

Finally, there is an obligation on the part of both this committee and the CIA to make every effort to help those individuals or institutions that may have been harmed by any of these improper or illegal activities. I am certain that Admiral Turner will work with this committee to see that this will be done.

I would now like to welcome the most distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, the chairman of the Health Subcommittee, Senator Kennedy.

Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We are delighted to join together in this very important area of public inquiry and public interest.

Some 2 years ago, the Senate Health Subcommittee heard chilling testimony about the human experimentation activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Deputy Director of the CIA revealed that over 30 universities and institutions were involved in an "extensive testing and experimentation" program which included covert drug tests on unwitting citizens "at all social levels, high and low, native Americans and foreign." Several of these tests involved the administration of LSD to "unwitting subjects in social situations."

At least one death, that of Dr. Olsen, resulted from these activities. The Agency itself acknowledged that these tests made little scientific sense. The agents doing the monitoring were not qualified scientific observers. The test subjects were seldom accessible beyond the first hours of the test. In a number of instances, the test subject became ill for hours or days, and effective followup was impossible.
Other experiments were equally offensive. For example, heroin addicts were enticed into participating in LSD experiments in order to get a ward—heroin.

Perhaps most disturbing of all was the fact that the extent of experimentation on human subjects was unknown. The records of all these activities were destroyed in January 1973, at the instruction of then CIA Director Richard Helms. In spite of persistent inquiries by both the Health Subcommittee and the Intelligence Committee, no additional records or information were forthcoming. And no one—no single individual—could be found who remembered the details, not the Director of the CIA, who ordered the documents destroyed, not the official responsible for the program, nor any of his associates.

We believed that the record, incomplete as it was, was as complete as it was going to be. Then one individual, through a Freedom of Information request, accomplished what two U.S. Senate committees could not. He spurred the agency into finding additional records pertaining to the CIA's program of experimentation with human subjects. These new records were discovered by the agency in March. Their existence was not made known to the Congress until July.

The records reveal a far more extensive series of experiments than had previously been thought. Eighty-six universities or institutions were involved. New instances of unethical behavior were revealed.

The intelligence community of this Nation, which requires a shroud of secrecy in order to operate, has a very sacred trust from the American people. The CIA's program of human experimentation of the fifties and sixties violated that trust. It was violated again on the day the bulk of the agency's records were destroyed in 1973. It is violated each time a responsible official refuses to recollect the details of the program. The best safeguard against abuses in the future is a complete public accounting of the abuses of the past.

I think this is illustrated, as Chairman Inouye pointed out. These are issues, are questions that happened in the fifties and sixties, and go back some 15, 20 years ago, but they are front page news today, as we see in the major newspapers and on the television and in the media of this country; and the reason they are, I think, is because it just continuously begins to trickle out, sort of, month after month, and the best way to put this period behind us, obviously, is to have the full information, and I think that is the desire of Admiral Turner and of the members of this committee.

The Central Intelligence Agency drugged American citizens without their knowledge or consent. It used university facilities and personnel without their knowledge. It funded leading researchers, often without their knowledge.

These institutes, these individuals, have a right to know who they are and how and when they were used. As of today, the Agency itself refuses to declassify the names of those institutions and individuals, quite appropriately, I might say, with regard to the individuals under the Privacy Act. It seems to me to be a fundamental responsibility to notify those individuals or institutions, rather. I think many of them were caught up in an unwitting manner to do research for the Agency. Many researchers, distinguished researchers, some of our most outstanding members of our scientific community, involved in
this network, now really do not know whether they were involved or not, and it seems to me that the whole health and climate in terms of our university and our scientific and health facilities are entitled to that response.

So, I intend to do all I can to persuade the Agency to, at the very least, officially inform those institutions and individuals involved.

Two years ago, when these abuses were first revealed, I introduced legislation, with Senator Schweiker and Senator Javits, designed to minimize the potential for any similar abuses in the future. That legislation expanded the jurisdiction of the National Commission on Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research to cover all federally funded research involving human subjects. The research initially was just directed toward HEW activities, but this legislation covered DOD as well as the CIA.

This Nation has a biomedical and behavioral research capability second to none. It has had for subjects of HEW funded research for the past 3 years a system for the protection of human subjects of biomedical and behavioral research second to none, and the Human Experimentation Commission has proven its value. Today's hearings and the record already established underscore the need to expand its jurisdiction.

The CIA supported that legislation in 1975, and it passed the Senate unanimously last year. I believe it is needed in order to assure all our people that they will have the degree of protection in human experimentation that they deserve and have every right to expect.

Senator Inouye. Thank you very much. Now we will proceed with the hearings. Admiral Turner?

[The prepared statement of Admiral Turner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Mr. Chairman: In my letter to you of July 15, 1977, I reported our recent discovery of seven boxes of documents related to Project MKULTRA, a closely held CIA project conducted from 1953-1964. As you may recall, MKULTRA was an "umbrella project" under which certain sensitive subprojects were funded, involving among other things research on drugs and behavioral modification. During the Rockefeller Commission and Church Committee investigations in 1975, the cryptonym became publicly known when details of the drug-related death of Dr. Frank Olson were publicized. In 1953 Dr. Olson, a civilian employee of the Army at Fort Detrick, leaped to his death from a hotel room window in New York City about a week after having unwittingly consumed LSD administered to him as an experiment at a meeting of LSD researchers called by CIA.

Most of what was known about the Agency's involvement with behavioral drugs during the investigations in 1975 was contained in a report on Project MKULTRA prepared by the Inspector General's office in 1963. As a result of that report's recommendations, unwitting testing of drugs on U.S. citizens was subsequently discontinued. The MKULTRA-related report was made available to the Church Committee investigators and to the staff of Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on Health. Until the recent discovery, it was believed that all of the MKULTRA files dealing with behavioral modification had been destroyed in 1973 on the orders of the then retiring Chief of the Office of Technical Service, with the authorization of the then DCI, as has been previously reported. Almost all of the people who had had any connection with the aspects of the project which interested Senate investigators in 1975 were no longer with the Agency at that time. Thus, there was little detailed knowledge of the MKULTRA subprojects available to CIA during the Church Committee Investigations. This lack of available details, moreover, was probably not wholly attributable to the
destruction of MKULTRA files in 1973; the 1963 report on MKULTRA by the Inspector General notes on page 14: "Present practice is to maintain no records of the planning and approval of test programs."

When I reported to you last on this matter, my staff had not yet had an opportunity to review the newly located material in depth. This has now been accomplished, and I am in a position to give you a description of the contents of the recovered material. I believe you will be most interested in the following aspects of the recent discovery:

How the material was discovered and why it was not previously found;
The nature of this recently located material;
How much new information there is in the material which may not have been previously known and reported to Senate Investigators; and
What we believe the most significant aspects of this find to be.

To begin, as to how we discovered these materials. The material had been sent to our Retired Records Center outside of Washington and was discovered as a result of the extensive search efforts of an employee charged with responsibility for maintaining our holdings on behavioral drugs and for responding to Freedom of Information Act requests on this subject. During the Church Committee investigation in 1975, searches for MKULTRA-related material were made by examining both the active and retired records of all branches of CIA considered at all likely to have had association with MKULTRA documents. The records of the Budget and Fiscal Section of the Branch responsible for such work were not searched, however. This was because financial papers associated with sensitive projects such as MKULTRA were normally maintained by the Branch itself under the project file, not by the Budget and Fiscal Section. In the case of the Budget and Fiscal Section, however, the newly located material was sent to the Retired Records Center in 1970 by the Budget and Fiscal Section as part of its own set of materials. The reason for this deviation from normal procedure is not known. As a result of it, however, the material escaped retrieval and destruction in 1973 by the then-retiring Director of the Office as well as discovery in 1975 by CIA officials responding to Senate Investigators.

The employee who located this material did so by leaving no stone unturned in his efforts to respond to FOIA requests. He reviewed all listings of material of this Branch stored at the Retired Records Center, including those of the Budget and Fiscal Section and, thus, discovered the MKULTRA-related documents which had been missed in the previous searches. In sum, the Agency failed to uncover these particular documents in 1973 in the process of attempting to destroy them; it similarly failed to locate them in 1975 in response to the Church Committee hearings. I am convinced that there was no attempt to conceal this material during the earlier searches.

Next, as to the nature of the recently located material, it is important to realize that the recovered folders are finance folders. The bulk of the material in them consists of approvals for advance of funds, vouchers, accountings, and the like—most of which are not very informative as to the nature of the activities that were undertaken. Occasional project proposals or memoranda commenting on some aspect of a subproject are scattered throughout this material. In general, however, the recovered material does not include status reports or other documents relating to operational considerations or progress in the various subprojects, though some elaboration of the activities contemplated does appear. The recovered documents fall roughly into three categories:

First, there are 149 MKULTRA subprojects, many of which appear to have some connection with research into behavioral modification, drug acquisition and testing or administering drugs surreptitiously.

Second, there are two boxes of miscellaneous MKULTRA papers, including audit reports and financial statements from "cut-out" (i.e., intermediary) funding mechanisms used to conceal CIA's sponsorship of various research projects.

Finally, there are 33 additional subprojects concerning certain intelligence activities previously funded under MKULTRA which have nothing to do either with behavioral modification, drugs, and toxins or with any other related matters.

We have attempted to group the activities covered by the 149 subprojects into categories under descriptive headings. In broad outline, at least, this presents the contents of these files. The activities are placed in the following 15 categories:
1. Research into the effects of behavioral drugs and/or alcohol:
   - 17 subprojects probably not involving human testing;
   - 14 subprojects definitely involving tests on human volunteers;
   - 10 subprojects probably including tests on human volunteers. While not
     known, some of these subprojects may have included tests on unwitting
     subjects as well;
   6 subprojects involving tests on unwitting subjects.
2. Research on hypnosis: 8 subprojects, including 2 involving hypnosis and drugs
   in combination.
3. Acquisition of chemicals or drugs: 7 subprojects.
4. Aspects of magicians' art useful in covert operations: e.g., surreptitious de-
   livery of drug-related materials: 4 subprojects.
5. Studies of human behavior, sleep research, and behavioral changes during
   psychotherapy: 3 subprojects.
6. Library searches and attendance at seminars and international conferences
   on behavioral modification: 0 subprojects.
7. Motivational studies, studies of defectors, assessment, and training tech-
   niques: 25 subprojects.
8. Polygraph research: 3 subprojects.
9. Funding mechanisms for MKULTRA external research activities: 0
   subprojects.
10. Research on drugs, toxins, and biologicals in human tissue: provision of
    exotic pathogens and the capability to incorporate them in effective delivery
    systems: 6 subprojects.
11. Activities whose objectives cannot be determined from available docu-
    mentation: 3 subprojects.
12. Subprojects involving funding support for unspecified activities connected
    with the Army's Special Operations Division at Ft. Detrick, Md. This activity is
    outline in Look I of the Church Committee Report, pp. 388-389. (See Appendix A,
    pp. 18-89. Under CIA's Project MK-UPM, the Army-Aided CIA in developing,
    testing, and maintaining biological agents and delivery systems for use
    against humans as well as against animals and crops. The objectives of these
    subprojects cannot be identified from the recovered material beyond the fact
    that the money was to be used where normal funding channels would require
    more written or oral justification than appeared desirable for security reasons
    or where operations considerations dictated short lead times for purchases.
    About $11,000 was involved during this period 1953-1960: 3 subprojects.
13. Single subprojects in such areas as effects of electro-shock, harassment tech-
    niques for offensive use, analysis of extrasensory perception, gas propelled sprays
    and aerosols, and four subprojects involving crop and material sabotage.
14. One or two subprojects on each of the following:
    "Blood Grouping" research, controlling the activity of animals, energy
    storage and transfer in organic systems; and
    stimulus and response in biological systems.
15. Three subprojects cancelled before any work was done on them having to do
    with laboratory drug screening, research on brain concussion, and research on
    biologically active materials to be tested through the skin on human volunteers.

Now, as to how much new the recovered material adds to what has previously
been reported to the Church Committee and to Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee
on Health on these topics, the answer is additional detail, for the most part: e.g.,
the names of previously unidentified researchers and institutions associated on
either a witting or unwitting basis with MKULTRA activities, and the names of
CIA officials who approved or monitored the various subprojects. Some new sub-
stantive material is also present: e.g., details concerning proposals for experimen-
tation and clinical testing associated with various research projects, and a
possibly improper contribution by CIA to a private institution. However, the
principal types of activities included have, for the most part, either been outlined
to some extent or generally described in what was previously available to CIA
in the way of documentation and was supplied by CIA to Senate investigators.
For example:

Financial disbursement records for the period 1960-1964 for 76 of the 149
numbered MKULTRA subprojects had been recovered from the Office of Finance
by CIA and were made available to the Church Committee Investigators in August
or September 1975.

The 1963 Inspector General report on MKULTRA made available to both the
Church Committee and Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee mentions electro-shock
and harassment substances (pp. 4, 16); covert testing on unwitting U.S. citizens (pp. 7, 10–12); the search for new materials through arrangements with specialists in universities, pharmaceutical houses, hospitals, state and federal institutions, and private research organizations (pp. 7, 9); and the fact that the Technical Service Division of CIA had initiated 144 subprojects related to the control of human behavior between 1953–1963 (p. 21).

The relevant section of a 1957 Inspector General report on the Technical Service Division was also made available to the Church Committee staff. That report discusses techniques for human assessment and unorthodox methods of communication (p. 201); discrediting and disabling materials which can be covertly administered (pp. 201–202); studies on magicians' arts as applied to covert operations (p. 202); specific funding mechanisms for research performed outside of CIA (pp. 202–203, 205); research being done on "K" (knockout) material, alcohol tolerance, and hypnosis (p. 203); research on LSD (p. 204); anti-personnel harassment and assassination delivery systems including aerosol generators and other spray devices (pp. 206–208); the role of Fort Detrick in support of CIA's Biological/Chemical Warfare capability (p. 206); and material sabotage research (p. 209). Much of this material is reflected in the Church Committee Report, Book I, pp. 385–422. (See Appendix A, pp. 65–102).

The most significant new data discovered are, first, the names of researchers and institutions who participated in the MKULTRA project and, secondly, a possibly improper contribution by CIA to a private institution. We are now in possession of the names of 185 non-government researchers and assistants who are identified in the recovered material dealing with the 149 subprojects. The names of 80 institutions where work was done or with which these people were affiliated are also mentioned.

The institutions include 44 colleges or universities, 15 research foundations or chemical or pharmaceutical companies and the like, 12 hospitals or clinics (in addition to those associated with universities), and 3 penal institutions. While the identities of some of these people and institutions were known previously, the discovery of the new identities adds to our knowledge of MKULTRA.

The facts as they pertain to the possibly improper contribution are as follows:

One project involves a contribution of $375,000 to a building fund of a private medical institution. The fact that a contribution was made was previously known; indeed it was mentioned in a 1957 Inspector General report on the Technical Service Division of CIA, pertinent portions of which had been reviewed by the Church Committee staff. The newly discovered material, however, makes it clear that this contribution was made through an intermediary, which made it appear to be a private donation. As a private donation, the contribution was then matched by federal funds. The institution was not made aware of the true source of the gift. This project was approved by the then DCI, and concurred in by CIA's top management at the time, including the then General Counsel who wrote an opinion supporting the legality of the contribution.

The recently discovered documents give a greater insight into the scope of the unwitting drug testing but contribute little more than that. We now have collaborating information that some of the unwitting drug testing was carried on in safehouses in San Francisco and New York City, and we have identified that three individuals were involved in this undertaking as opposed to the previously reported one person. We also know now that some unwitting testing took place on criminal sexual psychopaths confined at a State hospital and that, additionally, research was done on a knock-out or "K" drug in parallel with research to develop pain killers for cancer patients.

These, then are the principal findings identified to date in our review of the recovered material. As noted earlier, we believe the detail on the identities of researchers and institutions involved in CIA's sponsorship of drugs and behavioral modification is a new element and one which poses a considerable problem. Most of the people and institutions involved are not aware of Agency sponsorship. We should certainly assume that the researchers and institutions which cooperated with CIA on a willing basis acted in good faith and in the belief that they were aiding their government in a legitimate and proper purpose.

I believe we all have a moral obligation to these researchers and institutions to protect them from any unjustified embarrassment or damage to their reputations which revelation of their identities might bring. In addition, I have a legal obligation under the Privacy Act not to publicly disclose the names of the individual researchers without their consent. This is especially true, of course, for
those researchers and institutions which were unwitting participants in CIA-sponsored activities.

Nevertheless, recognizing the right and the need of both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Subcommittee on Health to investigate the circumstances of these activities in whatever detail they consider necessary, I am providing your Committee with all of the names on a classified basis. I hope that this will facilitate your investigation while protecting the individuals and institutions involved. Let me emphasize that the MKULTRA events are 12 to 23 years in the past. I assure you that the CIA is in no way engaged in either witting or unwitting testing of drugs today.

Finally, I am working closely with the Attorney General and with the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare on this matter. We are making available to the Attorney General whatever materials he may deem necessary to any investigation he may elect to undertake. We are working with both the Attorney General and the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to determine whether it is practicable from this new evidence to attempt to identify any of the persons to whom drugs may have been administered unwittingly. No such names are part of these records, but we are working to determine if there are adequate clues to lead to their identification; and if so, how to go about fulfilling the Government's responsibilities in the matter.

TESTIMONY OF ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, ACCOMPANIED BY FRANK LAUBINGER, OFFICE OF TECHNICAL SERVICES; AL BRODY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL; ERNEST MAYERFIELD, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL; AND GEORGE L. CARY, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Admiral Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to begin by thanking you and Senator Kennedy for having a joint hearing this morning. I hope this will expedite and facilitate our getting all the information that both of your committees need into the record quickly.

I would like also to thank you both for prefacing the remarks today by reminding us all that the events about which we are here to talk are 12- to 24-years old. They in no way represent the current activities or policies of the Central Intelligence Agency.

What we are here to do is to give you all the information that we now have and which we did not previously have on a subject known as Project MKULTRA, a project which took place from 1953 to 1964. It was an umbrella project under which there were numerous subprojects for research, among other things, on drugs and behavioral modification. What the new material that we offer today is a supplement to the considerable material that was made available in 1975, during the Church committee hearings, and also to the Senate Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research.

At that time, the CIA offered up all of the information and documents it believed it had available. The principal one available at that time that gave the greatest amount of information on this subject was a report of the CIA's Inspector General written in 1963, and which led directly to the termination of this activity in 1964, 18 years ago.

The information available in 1975 to the various investigating groups was indeed sparse, first because of the destruction of material that took place in 1973, as detailed by Senator Kennedy a minute ago, with the concurrence of the then Director of Central Intelligence and under the supervision of the Director of the Office of Technical Services that supervised Project MKULTRA.
The material in 1975 was also sparse because most of the CIA people who had been involved in 1953 to 1964 in this activity had retired from the Agency. I would further add that I think the material was sparse in part because it was the practice at that time not to keep detailed records in this category.

For instance, the 1963 report of the Inspector General notes:

Present practice is to maintain no records of the planning and approval of test programs.

In brief, there were few records to begin with and less after the destruction of 1973.

What I would like to do now, though, is to proceed and let you know what the new material adds to our knowledge of this topic, and I will start by describing how the material was discovered and why it was not previously discovered. The material in question, some seven boxes, had been sent to our Retired Records Center outside the Washington area. It was discovered there as the result of an extensive search by an employee charged with the responsibility for maintaining our holdings on behavioral drugs and for responding to Freedom of Information Act requests on this subject.

During the Church committee investigation of 1975, searches for MKULTRA-related material were made by examining both the active and the retired records of all of the branches of CIA considered likely to have had an association with MKULTRA documents. The retired records of the Budget and Fiscal Section of the branch that was responsible for such work were not searched, however. This was because the financial paper associated with sensitive projects such as MKULTRA were normally maintained by the branch itself under the project title, MKULTRA, not by the Budget and Fiscal Section under a special budget file.

In the case at hand, however, this newly located material had been sent to the Retired Records Center in 1970 by the Budget and Fiscal Section of this branch as part of its own retired holdings. In short, what should have been filed by the branch itself was filed by the Budget and Fiscal Section, and what should have been filed under the project title, MKULTRA, was filed under budget and fiscal matters. The reason for this departure from the normal procedure of that time is simply not known, and as a result of it, however, the material escaped retrieval and destruction in 1973, as well as discovery in 1975.

The employee who located this material did so by leaving no stone unturned in his efforts to respond to a Freedom of Information Act request, or several of them, in fact. He reviewed all of the listings of material of this branch, stored at the Retired Records Center, including those of the Budget and Fiscal Section, and thus discovered the MKULTRA-related documents, which had been missed in the previous searches.

In sum, the agency failed to uncover these particular documents in 1973, in the process of attempting to destroy them. It similarly failed to locate them in 1975, in response to the Church committee hearings. I am personally persuaded that there is no evidence of any attempt to conceal this material during the earlier searches. Moreover, as we will discuss as we proceed, I do not believe the material itself is such that
there would be a motive on the part of the CIA to withhold this, having disclosed what it did in 1975.

Next, let me move to the nature of this recently located material. It is important to remember what I have just noted, that these folders that were discovered are finance folders. The bulk of the material in them consists of approvals for the advance of funds, vouchers, and accountings and such, most of which are not very informative as to the nature of the activities that they were supporting. Occasional project proposals or memoranda commenting on some aspect of a subproject are scattered throughout this material. In general, however, the recovered material does not include overall status reports or other documents relating to operational considerations, or to the progress on various subprojects, though some elaboration of the activities contemplated does appear from time to time.

There are roughly three categories of projects. First, there are 149 MKULTRA subprojects, many of which appear to have some connection with research into behavioral modification, drug acquisition and testing, or administering drugs surreptitiously. Second, there are two boxes of miscellaneous MKULTRA papers, including audit reports and financial statements from intermediary funding mechanisms used to conceal CIA sponsorship of various research projects.

Finally, there are 33 additional subprojects concerning certain intelligence activities previously funded under MKULTRA but which have nothing to do either with behavioral modifications, drugs and toxins, or any closely related matter.

We have attempted to group the activities covered by the 149 subprojects into categories under descriptive headings. In broad outline, at least, this presents the contents of these files. The following 15 categories are the ones we have divided these into.

First, research into the effects of behavioral drugs and/or alcohol. Within this, there are 17 projects probably not involving human testing. There are 14 subprojects definitely involving testing on human volunteers. There are 18 subprojects probably including tests on human volunteers and 6 subprojects involving tests on unwitting human beings.

Second, there is research on hypnosis, eight subprojects, including two involving hypnosis and drugs in combination.

Third, there are seven projects on the acquisition of chemicals or drugs.

Fourth, four subprojects on the aspects of the magician's art, useful in covert operations, for instance, the surreptitious delivery of drug-related materials.

Fifth, there are nine projects on studies of human behavior, sleep research, and behavioral change during psychotherapy.

Sixth, there are projects on library searches and attendants at seminars and international conferences on behavioral modifications.

Seventh, there are 23 projects on motivational studies, studies of defectors, assessments of behavior and training techniques.

Eighth, there are three subprojects on polygraph research.

Ninth, there are three subprojects on funding mechanisms for MKULTRA's external research activities.
Tenth, there are six subprojects on research on drugs, toxins, and biologicals in human tissue, provision of exotic pathogens, and the capability to incorporate them in effective delivery systems.

Eleventh, there are three subprojects on activities whose nature simply cannot be determined.

Twelfth, there are subprojects involving funding support for unspecified activities conducted with the Army Special Operations Division at Fort Detrich, Md. This activity is outlined in Book I of the Church committee report, pages 388 to 389. (See Appendix A, pp. 68-69).

Under CIA’s Project MKNAOMI, the Army assisted the CIA in developing, testing, and maintaining biological agents and delivery systems for use against humans as well as against animals and crops.

Thirteenth, there are single subprojects in such areas as the effects of electroshock, harassment techniques for offensive use, analysis of extrasensory perception, gas propelled sprays and aerosols, and four subprojects involving crop and material sabotage.

Fourteenth, one or two subprojects on each of the following: blood grouping research; controlling the activities of animals; energy storage and transfer in organic systems; and stimulus and response in biological systems.

Finally, 15th, there are three subprojects canceled before any work was done on them having to do with laboratory drug screening, research on brain concussion, and research on biologically active materials.

Now, let me address how much this newly discovered material adds to what has previously been reported to the Church committee and to Senator Kennedy’s Subcommittee on Health. The answer is basically additional detail. The principal types of activities included in these documents have for the most part been outlined or to some extent generally described in what was previously available in the way of documentation and which was supplied by the CIA to the Senate investigators.

For example, financial disbursement records for the period of 1960 to 1964 for 76 of these 149 subprojects had been recovered by the Office of Finance at CIA and were made available to the Church committee investigators. For example, the 1963 Inspector General report on MKULTRA made available to both the Church committee and the Subcommittee on Health mentions electroshock and harassment substances, covert testing on unwitting U.S. citizens, the search for new materials through arrangements with specialists in hospitals and universities, and the fact that the Technical Service Division of CIA had initiated 144 subprojects related to the control of human behavior.

For instance also, the relevant section of a 1957 Inspector General report was also made available to the Church committee staff, and that report discusses the techniques for human assessment and unorthodox methods of communication, discrediting and disabling materials which can be covertly administered, studies on magicians’ arts as applied to covert operations, and other similar topics.

The most significant new data that has been discovered are, first, the names of researchers and institutions who participated in
MKULTRA projects, and second, a possibly improper contribution by the CIA to a private institution. We are now in the possession of the names of 185 nongovernment researchers and assistants who are identified in the recovered material dealing with these 149 subprojects.

There are also names of 80 institutions where work was done or with which these people were affiliated. The institutions include 44 colleges or universities, 15 research foundation or chemical or pharmaceutical companies or the like, 12 hospitals or clinics, in addition to those associated with the universities, and 3 penal institutions.

While the identities of some of these people and institutions were known previously, the discovery of the new identities adds to our knowledge of MKULTRA.

The facts as they pertain to the possibly improper contribution are as follows. One project involves a contribution of $375,000 to a building fund of a private medical institution. The fact that that contribution was made was previously known. Indeed, it was mentioned in the 1957 report of the Inspector General on the Technical Service Division of CIA that supervised MKULTRA, and pertinent portions of this had been reviewed by the Church committee staff.

The newly discovered material, however, makes it clear that this contribution was made through an intermediary, which made it appear to be a private donation. As a private donation, the contribution was then matched by Federal funds. The institution was not made aware of the true source of the gift. This project was approved by the then Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by CIA’s top management including the then General Counsel, who wrote an opinion supporting the legality of the contribution.

The recently discovered documents also give greater insight into the scope of the unwitting nature of the drug testing, but contribute little more than that. We now do have corroborating information that some of the unwitting drug testing was carried out in what is known in the intelligence trade as safe houses in San Francisco and in New York City, and we have identified that three individuals were involved in this undertaking, whereas we previously reported there was only one person.

We also know now that some unwitting testing took place on criminal sexual psychopaths confined at a State hospital, and that additionally research was done on a knockout or K drug in parallel with research to develop painkillers for cancer patients.

These, then, are the principal findings identified to date in our review of this recovered material. As noted earlier, we believe the detail on the identities of researchers and institutions involved in CIA sponsorship of drug and behavioral modification research is a new element and one which poses a considerable problem. Most of the people and institutions involved were not aware of CIA sponsorship. We should certainly assume that the researchers and institutions which cooperated with CIA on a witting basis acted in good faith and in the belief that they were aiding their Government in a legitimate and proper purpose.

I believe that we all have a moral obligation to these researchers and institutions to protect them from any unjustified embarrassment
or damage to their reputations which revelation of their identities might bring. In addition, I have a legal obligation under the Privacy Act not to publicly disclose the names of the individual researchers without their consent.

This is especially true, of course, for those researchers and institutions which were unwitting participants in CIA sponsored activities.

Nonetheless, Mr. Chairman, I certainly recognize the right and the need of both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research to investigate the circumstances of these activities in whatever detail you consider necessary. I am providing your committee with all of the documentation, including all of the names, on a classified basis. I hope that this will facilitate your investigation while still protecting the individuals and the institutions involved.

Let me emphasize again that the MKULTRA events are 12 to 24 years in the past, and I assure you that CIA is in no way engaged in either witting or unwitting testing of drugs today.

Finally, I am working closely with the Attorney General on this matter. We are making available to the Attorney General whatever materials he may deem necessary to any investigations that he may elect to undertake. Beyond that, we are also working with the Attorney General to determine whether it is practicable from this new evidence to identify any of the persons to whom drugs may have been administered unwittingly. No such names are part of these records. We have not identified the individuals to whom drugs were administered, but we are trying now to determine if there are adequate clues to lead to their identification, and if so how best to go about fulfilling the Government’s responsibilities in this matter.

Mr. Chairman, as we proceed with that process of attempting to identify the individuals and then determining what is our proper responsibility to them, I will keep both of these committees fully advised. I thank you, sir.

Senator Macy. Thank you very much, Admiral Turner. Your spirit of cooperation is much appreciated. I would like to announce to the committee that in order to give every member an opportunity to participate in this hearing, that we would set a time limit of 10 minutes per Senator.

Admiral Turner, please give this committee the genesis of MKULTRA. Who or what committee or commission or agency was responsible for dreaming up this grandiose and sinister project, and why was it necessary? What is the rationale or justification for such a project and was the President of the United States aware of this?

Admiral Turner, Mr. Chairman. I am going to ask Mr. Brody on my right, who is a long-time member of the CIA to address that in more detail. I believe everything that we know about the genesis was turned over to the Church committee and is contained in that material. Basically, it was a CIA-initiated project. It started out of a concern of our being taken advantage of by other powers who would use drugs against our personnel, and it was approved in the Agency. I have asked the question you just asked me, and have been assured that there is no evidence within the Agency of any involvement at higher echelons, the White House, for instance, or specific approval. That does not say there was not, but we have no such evidence.
Mr. Brody, would you amplify on my comments there, please?

Mr. Brody. Mr. Chairman, I really have very little to add to that.

To my knowledge, there was no Presidential knowledge of this project at the time. It was a CIA project, and as the admiral said, it was a project designed to attempt to counteract what was then thought to be a serious threat by our enemies of using drugs against us. Most of what else we know about it is in the Senate Church committee report.

Senator Inouye. Were the authorized members of the Congress made aware of this project through the budgetary process?

Mr. Brody. We have no knowledge of that, sir.

Senator Inouye. Are you suggesting that it was intentionally kept away from the Congress and the President of the United States?

Admiral Turner. No, sir. We are only saying that we have no evidence one way or the other as to whether the Congress was informed of this particular project. There are no records to indicate.

Senator Inouye. Admiral Turner, are you personally satisfied by actual investigation that this newly discovered information was not intentionally kept away from the Senate of the United States?

Admiral Turner. I have no way to prove that, sir. That is my conviction from everything I have seen of it.

Senator Inouye. Now, we have been advised that these documents were initially discovered in March of this year, and you were notified in July of this year, or June of this year, and the committee was notified in July. Can you tell us why the Director of Central Intelligence was notified 3 months after its initial discovery, why the delay?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. All this started with several Freedom of Information Act requests, and Mr. Laubinger on my left was the individual who took it upon himself to pursue these requests with great diligence, and got permission to go to the Retired Records Center, and then made the decision to look not only under what would be the expected subject files, but through every file with which the branch that conducted this type of activity had any conceivable connection.

Very late in March, he discovered these seven boxes. He arranged to have them shipped from the Retired Records Center to Washington, to our headquarters. They arrived in early April. He advised his appropriate superiors, who asked him how long he thought it would take him to go through these and screen them appropriately, clear them for Freedom of Information Act release.

There are, we originally estimated, 5,000 pages here. We now think that was an underestimation, and it may be closer to 8,000 pages. He estimated it would take about 45 days or into the middle of May to do that. He was told to proceed, and as he did so there was nothing uncovered in the beginning of these 149 cases that appeared particularly startling or particularly additive to the knowledge that had already been given to the Church committee, some details, but no major revelations.

He and his associates proceeded with deliberateness, but not a great sense of urgency. There were other interfering activities that came and demanded his time also. He was not able to put 100 percent of his time on it, and there did not appear to be cause for a great rush here. We were trying to be responsive to the Freedom of Information Act request within the limits of our manpower and our priorities.
In early June, however, he discovered two projects, the one related to K drugs and the one related to the funding at the institution, and realized immediately that he had substantial new information, and he immediately reported this to his superiors.

Two actions were taken. One was to notify the lawyers of the principal Freedom of Information Act requestor that we would have substantial new material and that it would be forthcoming as rapidly as possible, and the second was to start a memorandum up the chain that indicated his belief that we should notify the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence of this discovery because of the character at least of these two documents.

As that proceeded up from the 13th of June, at each echelon we had to go through the legal office, the legislative liaison office and at each echelon about the same question was asked of him: Have you gone through all of this, so that when we notify the Senate Select Committee we do not notify half of the important relevations and not the other half? The last thing I want, Mr. Chairman, is in any way to be on any topic, give the appearance on any topic of being recalcitrant, reluctant, or having to have you drag things out of me, and my superordinates, much to my pleasure, had each asked, have you really gone through these 8,000 pages enough to know that we are not going to uncover a bombshell down at the bottom?

By late June, about the 28th, this process reached my deputy. He notified me after his review of it on the 7th of July, which is the first I knew of it. I began reading into it. I asked the same probing question directly. I then notified my superiors, and on the 15th delivered to you my letter letting you know that we had this, and we have been working, many people, many hours since then, to be sure that what we are telling you today does include all the relevant material.

Senator Inouye. I would like to commend Mr. Laubinger for his diligence and expertise. But was that diligence the result of the Freedom of Information Act or could this diligence have been exercised during the Church hearings? Why was it not exercised?

Admiral Turner. There is no question that theoretically this diligence could have been exercised at any time, and it may well be that the Freedom of Information Act has made us more aware of this. Would you speak for yourself, please.

Mr. Laubinger. I really don't attribute it, Senator, to diligence so much as thoroughness. If you can imagine the pressures under an organization trying to respond, which I think the CIA did at the time of the Church committee hearings, the hallways of the floor I am on were full of boxes from our records center. Every box that anyone thought could possibly contain anything was called up for search. It was one of a frantic effort to comply.

When the pressure of that situation cools down, and you can start looking at things systematically, you are apt to find things that you wouldn't under the heat of a crash program, and that is what happened here.

Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, Senator Kennedy?

Senator Kennedy. Admiral Turner, this is an enormously distressing report that you give to the American Congress and to the American people today. Granted, it happened many years ago, but what we are
basically talking about is an activity which took place in the country that involved the perversion and the corruption of many of our outstanding research centers in this country, with CIA funds, where some of our top researchers were unwittingly involved in research sponsored by the Agency in which they had no knowledge of the background or the support for.

Much of it was done with American citizens who were completely unknowing in terms of taking various drugs, and there are perhaps any number of Americans who are walking around today on the east coast or west coast who were given drugs, with all the kinds of physical and psychological damage that can be caused. We have gone over that in very careful detail, and it is significant and severe indeed.

I do not know what could be done in a less democratic country that would be more alien to our own traditions than was really done in this narrow area, and as you give this report to the committee, I would like to get some sense of your own concern about this type of activity, and how you react, having assumed this important responsibility with the confidence of President Carter and the overwhelming support, obviously, of the Congress, under this set of circumstances.

I did not get much of a feeling in reviewing your statement here this morning of the kind of abhorrence to this type of past activity which I think the American people would certainly deplore and which I believe that you do, but could you comment upon that question, and also perhaps give us what ideas you have to insure that it cannot happen again?

Admiral Turner. Senator Kennedy, it is totally abhorrent to me to think of using a human being as a guinea pig and in any way jeopardizing his life and his health, no matter how great the cause. I am not here to pass judgment on my predecessors, but I can assure you that this is totally beyond the pale of my contemplation of activities that the CIA or any other of our intelligence agencies should undertake.

I am taking and have taken what I believe are adequate steps to insure that such things are not continuing today.

Senator Kennedy. Could you tell us a little bit about that?

Admiral Turner. I have asked for a special report assuring me that there are no drug activities extant, that is, drug activities that involve experimentation. Obviously, we collect intelligence about drugs and drug use in other countries, but there are no experimentations being conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency, and I have had a special check made because of another incident that was uncovered some years ago about the unauthorized retention of some toxic materials at the CIA. I have had an actual inspection made of the storage places and the certification from the people in charge of those that there are no such chemical biological materials present in our keeping, and I have issued express orders that that shall not be the case.

Beyond that, I have to rely in large measure on my sense of command and direction of the people and their knowledge of the attitude I have just expressed to you in this regard.

Senator Kennedy. I think that is very commendable.

Admiral Turner. Thank you, sir.

Senator Kennedy. I think it is important that the American people understand that.
You know, much of the research which is our area of interest that was being done by the Agency and the whole involved sequence of activities done by the Agency, I am convinced could have been done in a legitimate way through the research programs of the National Institutes of Mental Health, other sponsored activities. I mean, that is some other question, but I think you went to an awful lot of trouble, where these things could have been.

Let me ask you specifically, on the followup of MKULTRA, are there now—I think you have answered, but I want to get a complete answer about any experimentations that are being done on human beings, whether it is drugs or behavioral alterations or patterns or any support, either directly or indirectly, being provided by the Agency in terms of any experimentation on human beings.

Admiral Turner. There is no experimentation with drugs on human beings, witting or unwitting, being conducted in any way.

Senator Kennedy. All right. Or being supported indirectly? I mean, are you contracted out?

Admiral Turner. Or being in any way supported.

Senator Kennedy. All right. How about the nondrug experimentation our Committee has seen—psychosurgery, for example, or psychological research?

Admiral Turner. We are continually involved in what we call assessment of behavior. For instance, we are trying to continually improve our polygraph procedures to, you know, assess whether a person is lying or not. This does not involve any tampering with the individual body. This involves studying records of people's behavior under different circumstances, and so on, but it is not an experimental thing.

Have I described that accurately, Al?

Mr. Brody. Yes.

Senator Kennedy. Well, it is limited to those areas?

Admiral Turner. Yes; it does not involve attempting to modify behavior. It only involves studying behavior conditions, but not trying to actively modify it, as was one of the objectives of MKULTRA.

Senator Kennedy. Well, we are scarce on time, but I am interested in the other areas besides polygraph where you are doing it. Maybe you can either respond now or submit it for the record, if you would do that. Would you provide that for the record?

Admiral Turner. Yes.

[The material on psychological assessments follows:]

Psychological assessments are performed as a service to officers in the operations directorate who recruit and/or handle agents. Except for people involved in training courses, the subjects of the assessments are foreign nationals. The assessments are generally done to determine the most successful tactic to persuade the subject to accept covert employment by the CIA, and to make an appraisal of his reliability and truthfulness.

A majority of the work is done by a staff of trained psychologists, some of whom are stationed overseas. The assessments they do may be either direct or indirect. Direct assessments involve a personal interview of the subject by the psychologist. When possible the subject is asked to complete a formal "intelligence test" which is actually a disguised psychological test. Individuals being assessed are not given drugs, nor are they subjected to physical harassment or torture. When operating conditions are such that a face-to-face interview is not possible, the psychologist may do an indirect assessment, using as source materials descriptions of the subject by others, interviews with people who know him, specimens of his writings, etc.
The other psychological assessments involve handwriting analysis or graphological assessment. The work is done by a pair of trained graphologists, assisted by a small number of measurement technicians. They generally require at least a page of handwritten script by the subject. Measurements are made of about 30 different writing characteristics, and these are charted and furnished to the graphologist for assessments.

The psychologists also give courses in psychological assessment to group of operations officers, to sharpen their own capabilities to size up people. As part of the training course, the instructor does a psychological assessment of each student. The students are writing participants, and results are discussed with them.

It is important to reiterate that psychological assessments are only a service to the operations officers. In the final analysis, it is the responsibility of the operations officer to decide how a potential agent should be approached, or to make a judgement as to whether any agent is telling the truth.

Admiral Turner. The kind of thing we are interested in is, what will motivate a man to become an agent of the United States in a difficult situation. We have to be familiar with that kind of attitudinal response that we can expect from people we approach to for one reason or another become our spies, but I will be happy to submit a very specific listing of these.

Senator Kennedy. Would you do that for the committee?

In the followups, in the MKSEARCH, in the OFTEN, and the CHICKWIT, could you give us also a report on those particular programs?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Kennedy. Did they involve experimentation, human experimentation?

Admiral Turner. No, sir.

Senator Kennedy. None of them?

Admiral Turner. Let me say this, that CHICKWIT program is the code name for the CIA participation in what was basically a Department of Defense program. This program was summarized and reported to the Church committee, to the Congress, and I have since they have been rementioned in the press in the last 2 days here, I have not had time to go through and personally review them. I have ascertained that all of the files that we had made available before are intact, and I have put a special order out that nobody will enter those files or in any way touch them without my permission at this point, but they are in the Retired Records Center outside of Washington, and they are available.

I am not prepared to give you full details on it, because I simply haven’t read into that part of our history, but in addition I would suggest when you want to get into that we should get the Department of Defense in with us.

Senator Kennedy. Well, you will supply that information to the Intelligence Committee, the relevant, I mean, the health aspects, obviously, and the research we are interested in?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Kennedy. Will you let us know, Admiral Turner?

Admiral Turner. I will be happy to.

[See p. 169 for the material referred to.]

Senator Kennedy. Thank you. I am running out of time. Do you support the extension of the protection of human subjects legislation to include the CIA and the DOD? You commented favorably on that
before, and I am hopeful we can get that on the calendar early in September, and that is our strong interest.

Admiral Turner. The CIA certainly has no objection to that proposed legislation, sir. It is not my role in the administration to be the supporter of it or the endorser of it.

Senator Kennedy. As a personal matter, since you have reviewed these subjects, would you comment? I know it is maybe unusual, but you can understand what we are attempting to do.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Kennedy. From your own experience in the agency, you can understand the value of it.

Just finally, in your own testimony now with this additional information, it seems quite apparent to me that you can reconstruct in very careful detail this whole project in terms of the responsible CIA officials for the program. You have so indicated in your testimony. Now with the additional information, and the people, that have been revealed in the examination of the documents, it seems to be pretty clear that you can track that whole program in very careful detail, and I would hope, you know, that you would want to get to the bottom of it, as the Congress does as well. I will come back to that in my next round. Thank you very much.

Senator Inouye. Senator Goldwater?

Senator Goldwater. I have no questions.

Senator Inouye. Senator Schweiker?

Senator Schweiker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Turner, I would like to go back to your testimony on page 12, where you discuss the contribution to the building fund of a private medical institution. You state, "Indeed, it was mentioned in a 1957 Inspector General report on the Technical Service Division of CIA, pertinent portions of which had been reviewed by the Church committee staff." I would like to have you consider this question very carefully. I served as a member of the original Church committee. My staffer did a lot of the work that you are referring to here. He made notes on the IG's report. My question to you is, are you saying that the section that specifically delineates an improper contribution was in fact given to the Church committee staff to see?

Admiral Turner. The answer to your question is "Yes." The information that a contribution had been made was made available, to the best of my knowledge.

Senator Schweiker. Only certain sections of the report were made available. The report had to be reviewed out at Langley; it was not reviewed here, and copies were not given to us here. I just want you to carefully consider what you are saying, because the only record we have are the notes that the staff took on anything that was of significance.

Admiral Turner. My understanding was that Mr. Maxwell was shown the relevant portion of this report that disclosed that the contribution had been made.

Senator Schweiker. To follow this up further, I'd like to say that I think there was a serious flaw in the way that the IG report was handled and the Church committee was limited. I am not making any accusations, but because of limited access to the report, we have a situ-
ation where it is not even clear whether we actually saw that material or not, simply because we could not keep a copy of the report under the procedures we had to follow. We were limited by notetaking, and so it is rather ambiguous as to just what was seen and what was not seen. I certainly hope that the new Intelligence Committee will not be bound by procedures that so restrict its ability to exercise effective oversight.

I have a second question. Does it concern you, Admiral, that we used a subterfuge which resulted in the use of Federal construction grant funds to finance facilities for these sorts of experiments on our own people? Because as I understand what you are saying, while the CIA maybe only put up $375,000, this triggered a response on the part of the Federal Government to provide on a good faith basis matching hospital funds at the same level. We put up more than $1 million of matching funds, some based on an allegedly private donation which was really CIA money.

Isn't there something basically wrong with that?

Admiral Turner. I certainly believe there is. As I stated, the General Counsel of the CIA at that time rendered a legal opinion that this was a legal undertaking, and again I am hesitant to go back and revisit the atmosphere, the laws, the attitudes at that time, so whether the counsel was on good legal ground or not, I am not enough of a lawyer to be sure, but it certainly would occur to me if it happened today as a very questionable activity.

Senator Schweiker. Well, I think those of us who worked on and amended the Hill-Burton Act and other hospital construction assistance laws over the years, would have a rather different opinion on the legal intent or object of Congress in passing laws to provide hospital construction project money. These funds weren't intended for this.

It reminds me a little bit of the shellfish toxin situation which turned up when I was on the Church committee. The Public Health Service was used to produce a deadly poison with Public Health money. Here we are using general hospital construction money to carry on a series of drug experiments.

Admiral Turner. Excuse me, sir. If I could just be, I think, accurate, I don't think any of this $375,000 or the matching funds were used to conduct drug experiments. They were used to build the hospital. Now, the CIA then put more money into a foundation that was conducting research on the CIA's behalf supposedly in that hospital, so the intent was certainly there, but the money was not used for experimentation.

Senator Schweiker. Well, I understand it was used for bricks and mortar, but the bricks were used to build the facility where the experiments were carried on; were they not?

Admiral Turner. We do not have positive evidence that they were. It certainly would seem that that was the intent, but I do not want to draw inferences here—

Senator Schweiker. Well, why else would they give this money for the building fund if the building was not used for a purpose that benefited the CIA program?

Admiral Turner. I certainly draw the inference that the CIA expected to benefit from it, and some of the wording says the General
Counsel’s opinion was that this was legal only if the CIA was going to derive adequate benefit from it, but, sir, there is no evidence of what benefit was derived.

Senator Schweiker. There must have been some pretty good benefits at stake. The Atomic Energy Commission was to bear a share of the cost, and when they backed out for some reason or another, the CIA picked up part of their tab. So, at two different points there were indications that CIA decisionmakers thought there was great benefit to be derived from whatever happened within the brick and mortar walls of that facility.

Admiral Turner. You are absolutely right. I am only taking the position that I cannot substantiate that there was benefit derived.

Senator Schweiker. The agreement documents say that the CIA would have access to one-sixth of the space involved in the construction of the wing, so how would you enter into an agreement that specifically says that you will have access to and use of one-sixth of the space and not perform something in that space? I cannot believe it was empty.

Admiral Turner. Sir, I am not disputing you at all, but both of us are saying that the inference is that one-sixth of the space was used, that experimentation was done, and so on, but there is no factual evidence of what went on as a result of that payment or what went on in that hospital. It is just missing. It is not that it didn't happen.

Senator Schweiker. Admiral Turner, one other—

Senator Kennedy. Would the Senator yield on that point?

Senator Schweiker. I understand that in the agency’s documents on the agreement it was explicitly stated that one-sixth of the facility would be designated for CIA use and made available for CIA research. Are you familiar—

Mr. Brody. Senator, as I recall, you are right in that there is a mention of one-sixth, but any mention at all has to do with planning. There are no subsequent reports as to what happened after the construction took place.

Senator Schweiker. Admiral Turner, I read in the New York Times that part of this series of MKULTRA experiments involved an arrangement with the Federal Bureau of Narcotics to test LSD surreptitiously on unwitting patrons in bars in New York and San Francisco. Some of the subjects became violently ill and were hospitalized. I wonder if you would just briefly describe what we were doing there and how it was carried out? I assume it was through a safe house operation. I don’t believe your statement went into much detail.

Admiral Turner. I did mention the safe house operation in my statement, sir, and that is how these were carried out. What we have learned from the new documentation is the location and the dates at which the safe houses were run by the CIA and the identification of three individuals who were associated with running those safe houses. We know something about the construction work that was done in them because there were contracts for this. Beyond that, we are pretty much drawing inferences as to the things that went on as to what you are saying here.

Senator Schweiker. Well, the subjects were unwitting. You can infer that much, right?

Admiral Turner. Right.
Senator Schweiker. If you happened to be at the wrong bar at the wrong place and time, you got it.

Mr. Brody. Senator, that would be—contacts were made, as we understand it, in bars, et cetera, and then the people may have been invited to these safe houses. There really isn't any indication as to the fact that this took place in the bars.

Admiral Turner. We are trying to be very precise with you, sir, and not draw an inference here. There are 6 cases of these 149 where we have enough evidence in this new documentation to substantiate that there was unwitting testing and some of that involves these safe houses. There are other cases where it is ambiguous as to whether the testing was witting or voluntary. There are others where it was clearly voluntary.

Senator Schweiker. Of course, after a few drinks, it is questionable whether informed consent means anything to a person in a bar anyway.

Admiral Turner. Well, we don't have any indication that all these cases where it is ambiguous involved drinking of any kind. There are cases in penal institutions where it is not clear whether the prisoner was given a choice or not. I don't know that he wasn't given a choice, but I don't positively know that he was, and I classify that as an ambiguous incident.

Senator Inouye. Your time is up, Senator.

Senator Huddleston!

Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Turner, you stated in your testimony that you are convinced there was no attempt to conceal this recently discovered documentation during the earlier searches. Did you question the individuals connected with the earlier search before you made that judgment?

Admiral Turner. Yes; I haven't, I don't think, questioned everybody who looked in the files or is still on our payroll who looked in the files back in 1975, but Mr. Laubinger on my left is the best authority on this, and I have gone over it with him in some detail.

Senator Huddleston. But you have inquired, you think, sufficiently to assure yourself that there was no intent on the part of any person to conceal these records from the previous committee?

Admiral Turner. I am persuaded of that both by my questioning of people and by the circumstances and the way in which these documents were filed, by the fact which I did not and should have mentioned in my testimony, that these were not the official files. The ones that we have received or retrieved were copies of files that were working files that somebody had used, and therefore were slipped into a different location, and again I say to you, sir, I can't imagine their deliberately concealing these particular files and revealing the other things that they did reveal in 1975. I don't see the motive for that, because these are not that damning compared with the overall material that was provided.

Senator Huddleston. Is this the kind of operation that if it were continuing now or if there were anything similar to it, that you would feel compelled to report to the Select Committee on Intelligence?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. You mean, if I discovered that something like this were going on without my knowledge? Yes, I would feel absolutely the requirement to—
Senator Huddleston. But if it were going on with your knowledge, would you report it to the committee? I assume you would.

Admiral Turner. Yes. Well, it would not be going on with my knowledge, but theoretically the answer is yes, sir.

Senator Huddleston. Well, then, what suggestions would you have as we devise charters for the various intelligence agencies? What provision would you suggest to prohibit this kind of activity from taking place? Would you suggest that it ought to be specifically outlined in a statutory charter setting out the parameters of the permissible operation of the various agencies?

Admiral Turner. I think that certainly is something we must consider as we look at the legislation for charters. I am not on the face of it opposed to it. I think we would have to look at the particular wording as we are going to have to deal with the whole charter issue as to exactly how precise you want to be in delineating restraints and curbs on the intelligence activities.

Senator Huddleston. In the case of sensitive type operations, which this certainly was, which might be going on today, is the oversight activity of the agency more intensive now than it was at that time?

Admiral Turner. Much more so. I mean, I have briefed you, sir, and the committee on our sensitive operations. We have the Intelligence Oversight Board. We have a procedure in the National Security Council for approval of very sensitive operations. I think the amount of spotlight focused on these activities is many, manyfold what it was in these 12 to 24 years ago.

Senator Huddleston. How about the record keeping?

Admiral Turner. Yes; I can't imagine anyone having the gall to think that he can just blithely destroy records today with all of the attention that has come to this, and certainly we are emphasizing that that is not the case.

Senator Huddleston. Admiral, I was particularly interested in the activity that took place at the U.S. Public Health Service Hospital at Lexington, Ky., in which a Dr. Harris Isbell conducted experiments on people who were presumably patients there. There was a narcotics institution, I take it, and Dr. Isbell was, according to the New York Times story, carrying on a secret series of correspondence with an individual at the agency by the name of Ray. Have you identified who that person is?

Admiral Turner. Sir, I find myself in a difficult position here at a public hearing to confirm or deny these names in view of my legal responsibilities under the Privacy Act not to disclose the names of individuals here.

Senator Huddleston. I am just asking you if you have identified the person referred to in that article as Ray. I am not asking you who he was. I just want to know if you know who he is.

Admiral Turner. No. I am sorry, was this W-r-a-y or R-a-y?

Senator Huddleston. It is listed in the news article as R-a-y, in quotations.

Admiral Turner. No, sir, we have not identified him.

Senator Huddleston. So you have no knowledge of whether or not he is still a member of your staff or connected with the Agency in any way. Have you attempted to identify him?
[Pause.]

Admiral Turner. Senator, we have a former employee whose first name is Ray who may have had some connection with these activities.

Senator Huddleston. You suspect that but you have not verified that at this time, or at least you are not in a position to indicate that you have verified it?

Admiral Turner. That is correct.

Senator Huddleston. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Inouye. Senator Wallop?

Senator Wallop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Turner, not all of the—and in no way trying to excuse you of the hideous nature of some of these projects, but not all of the projects under MKULTRA are of a sinister or even a moral nature. Is that a fair statement?

Admiral Turner. That is correct.

Senator Wallop. Looking down through some of these 17 projects not involving human testing, aspects of the magician’s art, it doesn’t seem as though there is anything very sinister about that. Studies of human behavior and sleep research, library searches. Now, those things in their way are still of interest, are they not, to the process of intelligence gathering?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. I have not tried to indicate that we either are not doing or would not do any of the things that were involved in MKULTRA, but when it comes to the witting or unwitting testing of people with drugs, that is certainly verboten, but there are other things.

Senator Wallop. Even with volunteer patients? I mean, I am not trying to put you on the spot to say whether it is going on, but I mean, it is not an uncommon thing, is it, in the prisons of the United States for the Public Health Service to conduct various kinds of experiments with vaccines and, say, sunburn creams? I know in Arizona they have done so.

Admiral Turner. My understanding is, lots of that is authorized, but I am not of the opinion that this is not the CIA’s business, and that if we need some information in that category, I would prefer to go to the other appropriate authorities of the Government and ask them to get it for us rather than to in any way——

Senator Wallop. Well, you know, you have library searches and attendants at the national seminars. This is why I wanted to ask you if the bulk of these projects were in any way the kinds of things that the Agency might not do now. A President would not have been horrified by the list of the legitimate types of things. Isn’t that probably the case?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Wallop. And if it did in fact appear in the IG report, is there any reason to suppose that the President did not know of this project? You said there was no reason to suppose that he did, but let me reverse that. Is there any reason to suppose that they did not?

Admiral Turner. No.

Senator Wallop. Well, you know, I just cannot imagine you or literally anybody undertaking projects of the magnitude of dollars here and just not knowing about it, not informing your superior that
these were going on, especially when certain items of it appear in the Inspector General’s report on budget matters.

Admiral Turner. Well, I find it difficult when it is that far back to hypothesize what the procedures that the Director was using in terms of informing his superiors were. It is quite a different climate from today, and I think we do a lot more informing today than they did back then, but I find it very difficult to guess what the level of knowledge was.

Senator Wallop. I am really not asking you to second-guess it, but it just seems to me that, while the past is past, and thank goodness we are operating under different sets of circumstances, I think it is naïve for us to suppose that these things were conducted entirely without the knowledge of the Presidents of the United States during those times. It is just the kinds of research information that was being sought was vital to the United States, not the means, but the information that they were trying to find.

Admiral Turner. I am sorry. Your question is, was this vital? Did we view it as vital?

Senator Wallop. Well, your implication at the beginning was that it was a response to the kinds of behavior that were seen in Cardinal Mindszenty’s trial and other things. I mean, somebody must have thought that this was an important defensive reaction, if nothing else, on the part of the United States.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, I am sure they did, but again I just don’t know how high that permeated the executive branch.

Senator Wallop. But the kinds of information are still important to you. I mean, I am not suggesting that anyone go back and do that kind of thing again, but I’m certain it would be of use to you to know what was going to happen to one of your agents assuming someone had put one of these things into his bloodstream, or tried to modify his behavior.

Admiral Turner. Absolutely, and you know, we would be very concerned if we thought there were things like truth serums or other things that our agents or others could be subjected to by use or improper use of drugs by other powers against our people or agents.

Senator Wallop. Are there? I don’t ask you to name them, but are there such serums?

Admiral Turner. I don’t know of them if there are. I would have to answer that for the record, sir.

Senator Wallop. I would appreciate that.

[The material referred to follows:]

"Truth" Drugs in Interrogation

The search for effective aids to interrogation is probably as old as man’s need to obtain information from an uncooperative source and as persistent as his impatience to shortcut any tortuous path. In the annals of police investigation, physical coercion has at times been substituted for painstaking and time-consuming inquiry in the belief that direct methods produce quick results. Sir James Stephens, writing in 1883, rationalizes a grisly example of "third degree" practices by the police of India: "It is far pleasanter to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing red pepper in a poor devil’s eyes than to go about in the sun hunting up evidence."

More recently, police officials in some countries have turned to drugs for assistance in extracting confessions from accused persons, drugs which are resused
to relax the individual's defenses to the point that he unknowingly reveals truths he has been trying to conceal. This investigative technique, however humanitarian as an alternative to physical torture, still raises serious questions of individual rights and liberties. In this country, where drugs have gained only marginal acceptance in police work, their use has provoked cries of "psychological third degree" and has precipitated medico-legal controversies that after a quarter of a century still occasionally flare into the open.

The use of so-called "truth" drugs in police work is similar to the accepted psychiatric practice of narco-analysis; the difference in the two procedures lies in their different objectives. The police investigator is concerned with empirical truth that may be used against the suspect, and therefore almost solely with probative truth; the usefulness of the suspect's revelations depends ultimately on their acceptance in evidence by a court of law. The psychiatrist, on the other hand, using the same "truth" drugs in diagnosis and treatment of the mentally ill, is primarily concerned with psychological truth or psychological reality rather than empirical fact. A patient's aberrations are reality for him at the time they occur, and an accurate account of these fantasies and delusions, rather than reliable recollection of past events, can be the key to recovery.

The notion of drugs capable of illuminating hidden recesses of the mind, helping to heal the mentally ill and preventing or reversing the miscarriage of justice, has provided an exceedingly durable theme for the press and popular literature. While acknowledging that "truth serum" is a misnomer twice over—the drugs are not sera and they do not necessarily bring forth probative truth—journalistic accounts continue to exploit the appeal of the term. The formula is to play up a few spectacular "truth" drug successes and to imply that the drugs are more maligned than need be and more widely employed in criminal investigation than can officially be admitted.

Any technique that promises an increment of success in extracting information from an uncompliant source is ipso facto of interest in intelligence operations. If the ethical considerations which in Western countries inhibit the use of narco-interrogation in police work are felt also in intelligence, the Western services must at least be prepared against its possible employment by the adversary. An understanding of "truth" drugs, their characteristic actions, and their potentialities, positive and negative, for eliciting useful information is fundamental to an adequate defense against them.

This discussion, meant to help toward such an understanding, draws primarily upon openly published materials. It has the limitations of projecting from criminal investigative practices and from the permissive atmosphere of drug psychotherapy.

**Scopolamine as "Truth Serum"**

Early in this century physicians began to employ scopolamine, along with morphine and chloroform, to induce a state of "twilight sleep" during childbirth. A constituent of henbane, scopolamine was known to produce sedation and drowsiness, confusion and disorientation, incoordination, and amnesia for events experienced during intoxication. Yet physicians noted that women in twilight sleep answered questions accurately and often volunteered exceedingly candid remarks.

In 1922 it occurred to Robert House, a Dallas, Texas obstetrician, that a similar technique might be employed in the interrogation of suspected criminals, and he arranged to interview under scopolamine two prisoners in the Dallas county jail whose guilt seemed clearly confirmed. Under the drug, both men denied the charges on which they were held; and both, upon trial, were found not guilty. Enthusiastic at this success, House concluded that a patient under the influence of scopolamine "cannot create a lie ... and there is no power to think or reason." [14] His experiment and this conclusion attracted wide attention, and the idea of a "truth" drug was thus launched upon the public consciousness.

The phrase "truth serum" is believed to have appeared first in a news report of House's experiment in the Los Angeles Record, sometime in 1922. House resisted the term for a while but eventually came to employ it regularly himself. He published some eleven articles on scopolamine in the years 1921–1929, with a noticeable increase in polemical zeal as time went on. What had begun as something of a scientific statement turned finally into a dedicated crusade by the "father of truth serum" on behalf of his offspring, wherein he was "grossly indulgent of its wayward behavior and stubbornly proud of its minor achievements."[11]
Only a handful of cases in which scopolamine was used for police interrogation came to public notice, though there is evidence suggesting that some police forces may have used it extensively. [2, 16] One police writer claims that the threat of scopolamine interrogation has been effective in extracting confessions from criminal suspects, who are told they will first be rendered unconscious by chloral hydrate placed covertly in their coffee or drinking water.[16]
Because of a number of undesirable side effects, scopolamine was shortly disqualified as a "truth" drug. Among the most disabling of the side effects are hallucinations, disturbed perception, somnolence, and physiological phenomena such as headache, rapid heart, and blurred vision, which distract the subject from the central purpose of the interview. Furthermore, the physical action is long, far outlasting the psychological effects. Scopolamine continues, in some cases, to make anesthesia and surgery safer by drying the mouth and throat and reducing secretions that might obstruct the air passages. But the fantastically, almost painfully, dry "desert" mouth brought on by the drug is hardly conducive to free talking, even in a tractable subject.

THE BARBITURATES

The first suggestion that drugs might facilitate communication with emotionally disturbed patients came quite by accident in 1918. Arthur S. Lovenhart and his associates at the University of Wisconsin, experimenting with respiratory stimulants, were surprised when, after an injection of sodium cyanide, a catatonic patient who had long been mute and rigid suddenly relaxed, opened his eyes, and even answered a few questions. By the early 1930's a number of psychiatrists were experimenting with drugs as an adjunct to established methods of therapy.

At about this time police officials, still attracted by the possibility that drugs might help in the interrogation of suspects and witnesses, turned to a class of depressant drugs known as the barbiturates. By 1935 Clarence W. Muehlberger, head of the Michigan Crime Detection Laboratory at East Lansing, was using barbiturates on reluctant suspects, though police work continued to be hampered by the courts' rejection of drug-induced confessions except in a few carefully circumscribed instances.

The barbiturates, first synthesized in 1903, are among the oldest of modern drugs and the most versatile of all depressants. In this half-century some 2,500 have been prepared, and about two dozen of these have won an important place in medicine. An estimated three to four billion doses of barbiturates are prescribed by physicians in the United States each year, and they have come to be known by a variety of commercial names and colorful slang expressions: "goof-balls," Luminal, Nembutal, "red devils," "yellow jackets," "pink ladies," etc. Three of them which are used in narcoanalysis and have seen service as "truth" drugs are sodium amytal (amobarbital), pentothal sodium (thiopental), and to a lesser extent seconal (secobarbital).

As one pharmacologist explains it, a subject coming under the influence of a barbiturate injected intravenously goes through all the stages of progressive drunkenness, but the time scale is on the order of minutes instead of hours. Outwardly the sedation effect is dramatic, especially if the subject is a psychiatric patient in tension. His features slacken, his body relaxes. Some people are momentarily excited; a few become silly and giggly. This usually passes, and most subjects fall asleep, emerging later in disoriented semi-wakefulness.

The descent into narcosis and beyond with progressively larger doses can be divided as follows:

I. Sedative stage.
II. Unconsciousness, with exaggerated reflexes (hyperactive stage).
III. Unconsciousness, without reflex even to painful stimuli.
IV. Death.

Whether all these stages can be distinguished in any given subject depends largely on the dose and the rapidity with which the drug is induced. In anesthesia, stages I and II may last only two or three seconds.

The first or sedative stage can be further divided:

Plane 1. No evident effect, or slight sedative effect.
Plane 2. Cloudliness, calminess, amnesia. (Upon recovery, the subject will not remember what happened at this or "lower" planes or stages.)
Plane 3. Slurred speech, old thought patterns disrupted, inability to integrate or learn new patterns. Poor coordination. Subject becomes unaware of painful stimuli.
Plane 3 is the psychiatric “work” stage. It may last only a few minutes, but it can be extended by further slow injection of drug. The usual practice is to bring the subject quickly to Stage II and to conduct the interview as he passes back into the sedative stage on the way to full consciousness.

**CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES**

The general abhorrence in Western countries for the use of chemical agents “to make people do things against their will” has precluded serious systematic study (at least as published openly) of the potentialities of drugs for interrogation. Louis Gosschalk, surveying their use in interrogations,[13] cites 135 references; but only two touch upon the extraction of intelligence information, and one of these concludes merely that Russian techniques in interrogation and indoctrination are derived from age-old police methods and do not depend on the use of drugs. On the validity of confessions obtained with drugs, Gosschalk found only three published experimental studies that he deemed worth reporting.

One of these reported experiments by D. P. Morris in which intravenous sodium amytal was helpful in detecting malingerers.[12] The subjects, soldiers, were at first sullen, negativistic, and non-productive under amytal, but as the interview proceeded they revealed the facts and causes for their malinger ing. Usually the interviews turned up a neurotic or psychotic basis for the deception.

The other two confession studies, being more relevant to the highly specialized, untouched area of drugs in intelligence interrogation, deserve more detailed review.

Gerson and Victoroff[12] conducted amytal interviews with 17 neuropsychiatric patients, soldiers who had charges against them, at Tilton General Hospital, Fort Dix. First they were interviewed without amytal by a psychiatrist, who, neither ignoring nor stressing their situation as prisoners or suspects under scrutiny, urged each of them to discuss his social and family background, his army career, and his version of the charges pending against him.

The patients were told only a few minutes in advance that narcoanalysis would be performed. The doctor was considerate, but positive and forthright. He indicated that they had no choice but to submit to the procedure. Their attitudes varied from unquestioning compliance to downright refusal.

Each patient was brought to complete narcosis and permitted to sleep. As he became semiconscious and could be stimulated to speak, he was held in this stage with additional amytal while the questioning proceeded. He was questioned first about innocuous matters from his background that he had discussed before receiving the drug. Whenever possible, he was manipulated into bringing up himself the charges pending against him before being questioned about them. If he did this in a too fully conscious state, it proved more effective to ask him to “talk about that later” and to interpose a topic that would diminish suspicion, delaying the interrogation on his criminal activity until he was back in the proper stage of narcosis.

The procedure differed from therapeutic narcoanalysis in several ways: the setting, the type of patients, and the kind of “truth” sought. Also, the subjects were kept in twilight consciousness longer than usual. This state proved richest in yield of admissions prejudicial to the subject. In it the speech was thick, mumbling, and disconnected, but his discretion was markedly reduced. This valuable interrogation period, lasting only five to ten minutes at a time, could be reinduced by injecting more amytal and putting the patient back to sleep.

The interrogation technique varied from case to case according to background information about the patient, the seriousness of the charges, the patient’s attitude under narcosis, and his rapport with the doctor. Sometimes it was useful to pretend, as the patient grew more fully conscious, that he had already confessed during the amnestic period of the interrogation, and to urge him, while his memory and sense of self-protection were still limited, to continue to elaborate the details of what he had “already described.” When it was obvious that a subject was withstanding the truth, his denials were quickly passed over and ignored, and the key questions would be reworded in a new approach.

Several patients revealed fantasies, fears, and delusions approaching delirium, much of which could readily be distinguished from reality. But sometimes there was no way for the examiner to distinguish truth from fantasy except by reference to other sources. One subject claimed to have a child that did not exist,
another threatened to kill on sight a stepfather who had been dead a year, and yet another confessed to participating in a robbery when in fact he had only purchased goods from the participants. Testimony concerning dates and specific places was untrustworthy and often contradictory because of the patient's loss of time-sense. His veracity in citing names and events proved questionable. Because of this confusion about actual events and what he thought or feared had happened, the patient managed to conceal the truth unintentionally.

As the subject revived, he would become aware that he was being questioned about his secrets and, depending upon his personality, his fear of discovery, or the degree of his disillusionment with the doctor, grow negativistic, hostile, or physically aggressive. Occasionally patients had to be forcibly restrained during this period to prevent injury to themselves or others as the doctor continued to interrogate. Some patients, moved by fierce and diffuse anger, the assumption that they had already been tricked into confessing, and a still limited sense of discretion, defiantly acknowledged their guilt and challenged the observer to "do something about it." As the excitement passed, some fell back on their original stories and others verified the confessed material. During the follow-up interview nine of the 17 admitted the validity of their confessions; eight repudiated their confessions and reaffirmed their earlier accounts.

With respect to the reliability of the results of such interrogation, Gerson and Victoroff conclude that persistent, careful questioning can reduce ambiguities in drug interrogation, but cannot eliminate them altogether.

At least one experiment has shown that subjects are capable of maintaining a lie while under the influence of a barbiturate. Redlich and his associates at Yale[25] administered sodium amytal to nine volunteers, students and professionals, who had previously, for purposes of the experiment, revealed shameful and guilt-producing episodes of their past and then invented false self-protective stories to cover them. In nearly every case the cover story retained some elements of the guilt inherent in the true story.

Under the influence of the drug, the subjects were crossexamined on their cover stories by a second investigator. The results, though not definitive, showed that normal individuals who had good defenses and no overt pathological traits could stick to their invented stories and refuse confession. Neurotic individuals with strong unconscious self-punitive tendencies, on the other hand, both confessed more easily and were inclined to substitute fantasy for the truth, confessing to offenses never actually committed.

In recent years drug therapy has made some use of stimulants, most notably amphetamines (Benzedrine) and its relative methamphetamine (Methedrine). These drugs, used either alone or following intravenous barbiturates, produce an outpouring of ideas, emotions, and memories which has been of help in diagnosing mental disorders. The potential of stimulants in interrogation has received little attention, unless in unpublished work. In one study of their psychiatric use Brussel et al. [7] maintain that methedrine gives the liar no time to think or to organize his deceptions. Once the drug takes hold, they say, an insurmountable urge to pour out speech traps the malingerer. Gottschalk, on the other hand, says that this claim is extravagant, asserting without elaboration that the study lacked proper controls.[13] It is evident that the combined use of barbiturates and stimulants, perhaps along with ataractics (tranquilizers), should be further explored.

OBSERVATIONS FROM PRACTICE

J. M. MacDonald, who as a psychiatrist for the District Courts of Denver has had extensive experience with narcoanalysis, says that drug interrogation is of doubtful value in obtaining confessions to crimes. Criminal suspects under the influence of the drugs may deliberately withhold information, persist in giving untruthful answers, or falsely confess to crimes they did not commit. The psychopathic personality, in particular, appears to resist successfully the influence of drugs.

MacDonald tells of a criminal psychopath who, having agreed to narco-interrogation, received 1.5 grams of sodium amytal over a period of five hours. This man feigned amnesia and gave a false account of a murder. "He displayed little or no remorse as he (falsely) described the crime, including burial of the body. Indeed he was very self-possessed and he appeared almost to enjoy the examination. From time to time he would request that more amytal be injected."[21]

MacDonald concludes that a person who gives false information prior to re-
ceiling drugs is likely to give false information also under narcosis, that the
drugs are of little value for revealing deceptions, and that they are more effective
in releasing unconsciously repressed material than in evoking consciously sup-
pressed information.

Another psychiatrist known for his work with criminals, L. Z. Freedman, gave
sodium amytal to men accused of various civil and military antisocial acts.
The subjects were mentally unstable, their conditions ranging from character
disorders to neuroses and psychoses. The drug interviews proved psychically
beneficial to the patients, but Freedman found that his view of objective reality
was seldom improved by their revelations. He was unable to say on the basis of
the narco-interrogation whether a given act had or had not occurred. Like Mac-
Donald, he found that psychopathic individuals can deny to the point of uncon-
sciousness crimes that every objective sign indicates they have committed.[10]

F. G. Inbau, Professor of Law at Northwestern University, who has had con-
siderable experience observing and participating in “truth” drug tests, claims
that they are occasionally effective on persons who would have disclosed the
truth anyway had they been properly interrogated, but that a person deter-
mined to lie will usually be able to continue the deception under drugs.

The two military psychiatrists who made the most extensive use of narcoanaly-
sis during the war years, Roy R. Grinker and John C. Spiegel, concluded that
in almost all cases they could obtain from their patients essentially the same
material and give them the same emotional release by therapy without the use
of drugs, provided they had sufficient time.

The essence of these comments from professionals of long experience is that
drugs provide rapid access to information that is psychically useful but of
doubtful validity as empirical truth. The same psychological information and a
less adulterated empirical truth can be obtained from fully conscious subjects
through non-drug psychotherapy and skillful police interrogation.

APPLICATION TO CI INTERROGATION

The almost total absence of controlled experimental studies of “truth” drugs
and the spotty and anecdotal nature of psychiatric and police evidence require
that extrapolations to intelligence operations be made with care. Still, enough
is known about the drugs’ action to suggest certain considerations affecting the
possibilities for their use in interrogations.

It should be clear from the foregoing that at best a drug can only serve as
an aid to an interrogator who has a sure understanding of the psychology and
techniques of normal interrogation. In some respects, indeed, the demands on his
skill will be increased by the baffling mixture of truth and fantasy in drug-induced
output. And the tendency against which he must guard in the interrogator to give
the responses that seem to be wanted without regard for facts will be heightened
by drugs: the literature abounds with warnings that a subject in narcosis is
extremely suggestible.

It seems possible that this suggestibility and the lowered guard of the narcotic
state might be put to advantage in the case of a subject feigning ignorance of a
language or some other skill that had become automatic with him. Lipton[20]
found sodium amytal helpful in determining whether a foreign subject was merely
pretending not to understand English. By extension, one can guess that a drugged
interrogatee might have difficulty maintaining the pretense that he did not com-
prehend the idiom of a profession he was trying to hide.

There is the further problem of hostility in the interrogator’s relationship to
a resistance source. The accumulated knowledge about “truth” drug reaction
has come largely from patient-physician relationships of trust and confidence.
The subject in narcoanalysis is usually motivated a priori to cooperate with the
psychiatrist, either to obtain relief from mental suffering or to contribute to a
scientific study. Even in police work, where an atmosphere of anxiety and threat
may be dominant, a relationship of trust frequently asserts itself; the drug is
administered by a medical man bound by a strict code of ethics; the suspect
agreeing to undergo narcoanalysis in a desperate bid for corroboration of his
testimony trusts both drug and psychiatrist, however apprehensively; and finally,
as Freedman and MacDonald have indicated, the police psychiatrist frequently
deals with a “sick” criminal, and some order of patient-physician relationship
necessarily evolves.
Rarely has a drug interrogation involved "normal" individuals in a hostile or genuinely threatening milieu. It was from a non-threatening experimental setting that Eric Lindemann could say that his "normal" subjects "reported a general sense of euphoria, ease and confidence, and they exhibited a marked increase in talkativeness and communicability."[18] Gerson and Victoroff list poor doctor-patient rapport as one factor interfering with the completeness and authenticity of confessions by the Fort Dix soldiers, caught as they were in a command performance and told they had no choice but to submit to narc-interrogation.

From all indications, subject-interrogator rapport is usually crucial to obtaining the psychological release which may lead to unguarded disclosures. Role-playing on the part of the interrogator might be a possible solution to the problem of establishing rapport with a drugged subject. In therapy, the British narco-analyst William Sargent recommends that the therapist deliberately distort the facts of the patient's life-experience to achieve heightened emotional response and abreaction.[27] In the drunken state of narcoanalysis patients are prone to accept the therapist's false constructions. There is reason to expect that a drugged subject would communicate freely with an interrogator playing the role of relative, colleague, physician, immediate superior, or any other person to whom his background indicated he would be responsive.

Even when rapport is poor, however, there remains one facet of drug action eminently exploitable in interrogation—the fact that subjects emerge from narcosis feeling they have revealed a great deal, even when they have not. As Gerson and Victoroff demonstrated at Fort Dix, this psychological set provides a major opening for obtaining genuine confessions.

POSSIBLE VARIATIONS

In studies by Beecher and his associates,[3-6] one-third to one-half the individuals tested proved to be placebo reactors, subjects who respond with symptomatic relief to the administration of any syringe, pill, or capsule, regardless of what it contains. Although no studies are known to have been made of the placebo phenomenon as applied to narco-interrogation, it seems reasonable that when a subject's sense of guilt interferes with productive interrogation, a placebo for pseudo-narcosis could have the effect of absolving him of the responsibility for his acts and thus clear the way for free communication. It is notable that placebos are most likely to be effective in situations of stress. The individuals most likely to react to placebos are the more anxious, more self-centered, more dependent on outside stimulation, those who express their needs more freely socially, talkers who drain off anxiety by conversing with others. The non-reactors are those clinically more rigid and with better than average emotional control. No sex or I.Q. differences between reactors and non-reactors have been found.

Another possibility might be the combined use of drugs with hypnotic trance and post-hypnotic suggestion: hypnosis could presumably prevent any recollection of the drug experience. Whether a subject can be brought to trance against his will or unaware, however, is a matter of some disagreement. Orne, in a survey of the potential uses of hypnosis in interrogation,[23] asserts that it is doubtful, despite many apparent indications to the contrary, that trance can be induced in resistant subjects. It may be possible, he adds, to hypnotize a subject unaware, but this would require a positive relationship with the hypnotist not likely to be found in the interrogation setting.

In medical hypnosis, pentothal sodium is sometimes employed when only light trance has been induced and deeper narcosis is desired. This procedure is a possibility for interrogation, but if a satisfactory level of narcosis could be achieved through hypnotic trance there would appear to be no need for drugs.

DEFENSIVE MEASURES

There is no known way of building tolerance for a "truth" drug without creating a disabling addiction, or of arresting the action of a barbiturate once induced. The only full safeguard against narco-interrogation is to prevent the administration of the drug. Short of this, the best defense is to make use of the same knowledge that suggests drugs for offensive operations: if a subject knows that on emerging from narcosis he will have an exaggerated notion of how much he has revealed he can better resolve to deny he has said anything.
The disadvantages and shortcomings of drugs in offensive operations become positive features of the defense posture. A subject in narco-interrogation is intoxicated, wavering between deep sleep and semi-wakefulness. His speech is garbled and irrational, the amount of output drastically diminished. Drugs disrupt established thought patterns, including the will to resist, but they do so indiscriminately and thus also interfere with the patterns of substantive information the interrogator seeks. Even under the conditions most favorable for the interrogator, output will be contaminated by fantasy, distortion, and untruth.

Possibly the most effective way to arm oneself against narco-interrogation would be to undergo a "dry run." A trial drug interrogation with output taped for playback would familiarize an individual with his own reactions to "truth" drugs, and this familiarity would help to reduce the effects of harassment by the interrogator before and after the drug has been administered. From the viewpoint of the intelligence service, the trial exposure of a particular operative to drugs might provide a rough benchmark for assessing the kind and amount of information he would divulge in narcosis.

There may be concern over the possibility of drug addiction intentionally or accidentally induced by an adversary service. Most drugs will cause addiction with prolonged use, and the barbiturates are no exception. In recent studies at the U.S. Public Health Service Hospital for addicts in Lexington, Ky., subjects received large doses of barbiturates over a period of months. Upon removal of the drug, they experienced acute withdrawal symptoms and behaved in every respect like chronic alcoholics.

Because their action is extremely short, however, and because there is little likelihood that they would be administered regularly over a prolonged period, barbiturate "truth" drugs present slight risk of operational addiction. If the adversary service were intent on creating addiction in order to exploit withdrawal, it would have other, more rapid means of producing states as unpleasant as withdrawal symptoms.

The hallucinatory and psychotomimetic drugs such as mescaline, marihuana, LSD-25, and microline are sometimes mistakenly associated with narcoanalytic interrogation. These drugs distort the perception and interpretation of the sensory input to the central nervous system and affect vision, audition, smell, the sensation of the size of body parts and their position in space, etc. Mescaline and LSD-25 have been used to create experimental "psychotic states," and in a minor way as aids in psychotherapy.

Since information obtained from a person in a psychotic drug state would be unrealistic, bizarre, and extremely difficult to assess, the self-administration of LSD-25, which is effective in minute dosages, might in special circumstances offer an operative temporary protection against interrogation. Conceivably, on the other hand, an adversary service could use such drugs to produce anxiety or terror in medically unsophisticated subjects unable to distinguish drug-induced psychosis from actual insanity. An enlightened operative could not be thus frightened, however, knowing that the effect of these hallucinogenic agents is transient in normal individuals.

Most broadly, there is evidence that drugs have least effect on well-adjusted individuals with good defenses and good emotional control, and that anyone who can withstand the stress of competent interrogation in the waking state can do so in narcosis. The essential resources for resistance thus appear to lie within the individual.

CONCLUSIONS

The salient points that emerge from this discussion are the following. No such magic brew as the popular notion of truth serum exists. The barbiturates, by disrupting defensive patterns, may sometimes be helpful in interrogation, but even under the best conditions they will elicit an output contaminated by deception, fantasy, garbled speech, etc. A major vulnerability they produce in the subject is a tendency to believe he has revealed more than he has. It is possible, however, for both normal individuals and psychopaths to resist drug interrogation; it seems likely that any individual who can withstand ordinary intensive interrogation can hold out in narcosis. The best aid to a defense against narco-interrogation is foreknowledge of the process and its limitations. There is an acute need for controlled experimental studies of drug reaction, not only to depressants but also to stimulants and to combinations of depressants, stimulants, and ataraxes.
REFERENCES


Senator Wallop. If they are, I would assume that you would still try to find from either theirs or somebody else's information how to protect our people from that kind of activity.

Admiral Turner. Yes.

Senator Wallop. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Inouye. Senator Chafee?

Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Turner, I appreciate that these tawdry activities were taking place long before your watch, and I think you have correctly labeled them as abhorrent, but not only were they abhorrent, it seems to me they were rather bungled, amateurish experiments that don’t seem to have been handled in a very scientific way, at least from the scanty evidence we have.

It seems to me that there were the minimum of reports and the Agency didn’t have the ability to call it quits. It went on for some 12 years, as you mentioned. What I would like to get to is, are you convinced now in your Agency that those scientific experiments, legitimate ones that you were conducting with polygraph and so forth, were being conducted in a scientific manner and that you are handling it in a correct manner to get the best information that you are seeking in the end?

Admiral Turner. Yes, I am, and I also have a sense of confidence that we are limiting ourselves to the areas where we need to be involved as opposed to areas where we can rely on others.

Senator Chafee. I am convinced of that from your report. I just do hope that you have people who are trained in not only handling this type of experiment, but in preparing the proper reports and drawing the proper data from the reports. You are convinced that you have this type of people?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Chafee. The second point I am interested in was the final lines in your testimony here, which I believe are very important, and that is that the Agency is doing all it can in cooperation with other branches of the Government to go about tracking down the identity of those who were in some way adversely affected, and see what can be done to fulfill the government’s responsibilities in that respect. I might add that I commend you in that, and I hope you will pursue it vigorously.

A hospital in my State was involved in these proceedings, and it is unclear exactly what did take place, so I have both a parochial interest in this and a national interest as well, and I do hope you will press on with it. It involves not only you, I appreciate, but also HEW and perhaps the Attorney General.

Admiral Turner. Thank you, sir. We will.

Senator Chafee. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Inouye. Thank you very much.

Admiral Turner. MKULTRA subproject 3 was a project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD on unwitting persons, was it not?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Inouye. In February 1954, and this was in the very early stages of MKULTRA, the Director of Central Intelligence wrote to the technical services staff officials criticizing their judgment because they had participated in an experiment involving the administration of LSD on an unwitting basis to Dr. Frank Olson, who later committed suicide. Now, the individuals criticized were the same individuals who were responsible for this subproject 3, involving exactly the same practices. Even though these individuals were clearly aware of the dangers of surreptitious administration and had been criticized by the Director
of Central Intelligence, subproject 3 was not terminated immediately after Dr. Olson's death.

In fact, according to documents, it continued for a number of years. Can you provide this committee with any explanation of how such testing could have continued under these circumstances?

Admiral Turner. No, sir, I really can't.

Senator Inouye. Are the individuals in the technical services who carried on subproject 3 still on the CIA payroll?

Admiral Turner. I am sorry. Are you asking, are they today?

Senator Inouye. Yes.

Admiral Turner. No, sir.

Senator Inouye. What would you do if you criticized officials of the technical services staff and they continued to carry on experimentation for a number of years?

Admiral Turner. I would do two things, sir. One is, I would be sure at the beginning that I was explicit enough that they knew that I didn't want that to be continued anywhere else, and two, if I found it being continued, I would roll some heads.

Senator Inouye. Could you provide this committee with information as to whether the individuals involved had their heads rolled?

Admiral Turner. I don't believe there is any evidence they did, but I will double check that.

[See p. 170 for material referred to.]

Senator Inouye. As you know, Senator Huddleston and his subcommittee are deeply involved in the drafting of charters and guidelines for the intelligence community. We will be meeting with the President tomorrow. Our concern is, I think, a basic one. Can anything like this occur again?

Admiral Turner. I think it would be very, very unlikely, first, because we are all much more conscious of these issues than we were back in the fifties, second, because we have such thorough oversight procedures. I cannot imagine that this kind of activity could take place today without some member of the CIA itself bypassing me, if I were authorizing this, and writing to the Intelligence Oversight Board, and blowing the whistle on this kind of activity.

I am also doing my very best, sir, to encourage an openness with myself and a free communication in the Agency, so that I am the one who finds these things if they should happen. The fact is that we must keep you and your committee and now the new committee in the House informed of our sensitive activities. I think all of these add up to a degree of scrutiny such that this kind of extensive and flagrant activity could not happen today without it coming to the attention of the proper authorities to stop it.

Senator Inouye. A sad aspect of the MKULTRA project was that it naturally involved the people who unwittingly or willingly got involved in experimentation. I would appreciate it if you would report back to this committee in 3 months on what the Agency has done to notify these individuals and these institutions, and furthermore, to notify us as to what steps have been taken to identify victims, and if identified, what you have done to assist them, monetarily or otherwise.

Admiral Turner. All right, sir. I will be happy to.

Senator Goldwater. Will the Senator yield?
Senator INOUYE. Yes, sir.
Senator Goldwater. I wonder if he could include in that report for our information only a complete listing of the individuals and the experiments done on them, and whether they were witting or unwitting, volunteer or nonvolunteer, and what has been the result in each case. I think that would be interesting.

Senator INOUYE. Senator Kennedy?
Senator Kennedy. Thank you. It is your intention to notify the individuals who have been the subjects of the research, is that right, Admiral Turner? Do you intend to notify those individuals?
Admiral Turner. Yes.
Senator Kennedy. If you can identify them, you intend to notify them?
Admiral Turner. Yes.
Senator Kennedy. And you intend to notify the universities or research centers as well?
Admiral Turner. Senator, I am torn on that. I understand your opening statement. I put myself in the position of the president of one of those universities, let's say. If he were witting—if his university had been witting of this activity with us, he has access to all that information today. If he were not witting, I wonder if the process of informing him might put his institution's reputation in more jeopardy than letting them go on the way they are today, not knowing. I really don't know the equities here.

Senator Kennedy. Well, the problem is, all you have to do is pick up the newspapers and you see these universities mentioned. In many instances, I think you are putting the university people at an extraordinary disadvantage, where there is a complete change of administration, and they may for one reason or another not have information that they are under suspicion. There is innuendo; there is rumor. I cannot help but believe that it will just get smeared all over the newspapers in spite of all the security steps that have been taken.

It seems to me that those universities should be entitled to that information, so that the ones with other administrations can adapt procedures to protect those universities. The importance of preserving the independence of our research areas and the communities seems to me to be a very fundamental kind of question about the protection of the integrity of our universities and our research centers.

Admiral Turner. You are saying that you feel that if we identify them privately to themselves, we can benefit them in an adequate way to cover the risk that this will lead to a more public disclosure? There are lots of the 80 who have not been identified publicly at this point.

Senator Kennedy. I think the universities themselves should be notified. I think then the universities can take whatever steps in terms of their setting up the procedures to protect their own kinds of integrity in terms of the future. I would certainly hope that they would feel that they could make a public comment or a public statement on it. I think it is of general public interest, particularly for the people that are involved in those universities, to have some kind of awareness of whether they were used or were not used and how they were used.

I think they are entitled to it, and quite frankly, if there is a public official or an official of the university that you notify and he wants
for his own particular reasons not to have it public, I don't see why
those in a lesser echelon or lower echelon who have been effectively used
by it should not have the information as well.
So, I would hope that you would notify the universities and then
also indicate to the public. I can't conceive that this information will
not be put out in the newspapers, and it puts the university people at
an extraordinary disadvantage, and of course some of it is wrong,
which is the fact of the matter, and I think some university official
saying, well, it isn't so, is a lot different than if they know it is con-
firmed or it is not confirmed in terms of the Agency itself. I think that
there is a responsibility there.
Admiral Turner. I have great sympathy with what you are saying.
I have already notified one institution because the involvement was so
extensive that I thought they really needed to protect themselves, and
I am most anxious to do this in whatever way will help all of the
people who were perhaps unwitting participants in this, and the diffi-
culty I will have is, I can't quite do, I think, what you suggested, in
that I may not be able to tell an institution of the extent and nature of
its participation.
Senator Kennedy. Well, you can tell them to the best of your in-
formation, and it seems to me that just because the university or an
individual is going to be embarrassed is not a reason for classifying
the information. So, I would hope—I mean, I obviously speak as an
individual Senator, but I feel that that is an incredible disservice to
the innocent individuals and, I think, a disservice to the integrity of
the universities unless they are notified, to be able to develop pro-
cedures you are developing with regards to your own institution and
we are trying to in terms of the Congress. Certainly the universities
are entitled to the same.
Admiral Turner. Yes. Not all of these, of course, were unwitting.
Senator Kennedy. That's right.
Admiral Turner. Many of them were witting, and therefore they
can take all those precautionary steps on their own, but I am perfectly
open to doing this. I am only interested in doing it in a way that when
identifying a university it will not lead to the public disclosure of the
individuals, whom I am not allowed to disclose, and so on.
Senator Kennedy. That could be done, it seems to me.
Admiral Turner. So, we will see if we can devise a way of notifying
these institutions on a private basis so that they can then make their
own decision whether their equities are best served by their announc-
ing it publicly or their attempting to maintain it—
Senator Kennedy. Or you. I wonder. What if they were to ask you
to announce or indicate?
Admiral Turner. My personal conscience, sir, at this time, is that I
would be doing a disserve to these universities if I notified the public.
Senator Kennedy. Would you meet with some university officials
and ask what their views are or whether they feel that the preserva-
tion of the integrity of the universities would be better served or not?
I think that would be useful to find out from small, large, private, and
public universities' officials how they view the integrity—
Admiral Turner. Fine. I will phone several university presidents
today who are my friends and who are not involved in this, and ask
them what they think the equities would be.
Senator Kennedy. All right. You let us know, too.

Admiral Turner. But I am not sure that I see that there is any great benefit in my notifying the public as opposed to the university notifying them. Let him have his choice whether he wants—each institution wants to have it made public.

Senator Kennedy. Yes. The fact would remain that the institution's credibility would be better served if the institution's president were to deny it and the university indicated that it did not participate in that program than if the university were to deny it and the Agency says nothing. It seems to me that that would be the strongest, and the only way that that is going to be credible. I would value it if you would get some input from universities as to what they believe is the fairest way in terms of the preservation of the integrity of the universities.

Let me, if I could, ask on the question of the uses of these safe houses, as I understand from information that was provided to us in the course of our last committee, the testing of various drugs on individuals happened at all social levels, high and low, it happened on native Americans and also on foreign nationals. That is what I understand was the nature of the project itself.

Now, I am just wondering whether those tests were conducted at the two locations on the east coast and the west coast which were known as safe houses. To your knowledge, is that correct?

Admiral Turner. Yes.

Senator Kennedy. In terms of the research in this particular program, it did not go beyond the safe houses located on the east coast and the west coast? I believe I am correct on that.

Admiral Turner. That type of unwitting testing of sort of randomly selected individuals, yes.

Senator Kennedy. It was just located in those two places?

Admiral Turner. To the best of our knowledge, there were only two locations.

Senator Kennedy. Well, how do we interpret randomly selected?

Admiral Turner. Well, as opposed to prisoners in a prison who were somehow selected.

Senator Kennedy. All right. Do you know from this information how many people were recruited during this period?

Admiral Turner. No idea.

Senator Kennedy. Do you know approximately?

Admiral Turner. I asked that question the other day, and we just don't have—apparently we are very—well, either there were no records kept of the actual numbers and types of people tested or they were destroyed.

Senator Inouye. Senator Schweiker.

Senator Schweiker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Turner, I would like to come back to the experiments which may have been conducted at the hospital research facilities which the CIA helped to finance. It wasn't clear to me from your previous answers what kind of work was done there. I gather you are unclear on that, too, from your remarks, yet I find in the CIA documentation which you have supplied us, a list describing some of the advantages the Agency hoped to gain. It says:

(a) One-sixth of the total space in the new hospital wing will be available to the Chemical Division of TSS. * * * ; (b) Agency sponsorship of sensitive research
projects will be completely deniable; (c) Full professional cover will be provided for up to three biochemical employees of the Chemical Division; (d) Human patients and volunteers for experimental use will be available under controlled clinical conditions with the full supervision of

and there is a blank, something has been deleted.

It seems pretty clear to me what they intended to do in that particular wing. Doesn’t it to you? Why would you go to such elaborate preparations, to buy part of the wing, bring three of your own personnel there, give them a cover, and give them access to patients? Why would you go to such trouble and expense to arrange all that, if you weren’t planning to experiment on people in the hospital?

Admiral Turner. I agree with you 100 percent, sir. Those were clearly the intentions. I have no evidence that it was carried out in that way. I am not trying to be defensive, Senator. I am only trying to be absolutely precise here.

Senator Schiweker. Well, then, as to the nature of what was done there, the last paragraph on the same page of the document says, “The facilities of the hospital and the ability to conduct controlled experimentations under safe clinical conditions using materials with which any agency connection must be completely deniable will augment and complement other programs recently taken over by TSS, such as,” and then there’s another deletion.

Now, the words following “such as” have been deleted. That is still classified, or at least it was removed when this document was sanitized and released. It seems to be that whatever was deleted right there would give you a pretty good clue as to what they were doing, since it says that the activities would “augment and complement other programs” undertaken by TSS. So, I have trouble understanding why you don’t know what was contemplated. Just the fact that similar programs are referred to in the document, though what they are is still deleted, should enable you to check it out.

You could look at what went on in the similar programs mentioned following the “such as” in the classified version of this document.

Admiral Turner. Senator, I have not said that we don’t know what was contemplated being done there. We do not know what was done there.

Senator Schiweker. Why did you delete that reference? Why is that still classified, that particular project of whatever it is?

Admiral Turner. I don’t know this particular case. We will get you the exact answer to that one and inform you about it, but it is quite probable that that other case is unrelated to this in the—well, not unrelated, but that that was a project that still deserves to be classified.

[The material referred to follows:]

Construction of the Gorman Annex was begun in 1957 and the Annex was dedicated in March 1959. Of the several MKULTRA projects conducted at Georgetown only one involving human testing covered a time span subsequent to March 1959. Subproject 45 ran from 1955 to 1963,thus it is possible that the final four years (1959–1963) of the subproject could have been spent in the Gorman Annex. However, there is no reference to the Gorman Annex or a “new Annex” in Subproject 46 papers, neither is there any mention of the subproject moving to a new location in 1959 or later years.

Authorization to contribute CIA funds toward construction of the Gorman Annex is contained in Subproject 35 of MKULTRA. Recently discovered material indicated that Dr. Geschickter continued his research for sleep- and amnesiaproducing drugs under Project MKSEARCH through July 1967 at Georgetown University Hospital. But it is impossible to determine if the facilities of the Gorman Annex were involved.
Senator Schweiker. I think that would give us a pretty good clue as to what was going to be done in the wing the CIA helped to finance. Was there any indication at all in the records you found that the project ultimately used cancer patients or terminally ill patients in connection with this facility?

Admiral Turner. I'm sorry. I missed your question because I was trying to get the data on the last one. I will read you the blank.

Senator Schweiker. Go ahead.

Admiral Turner. QKhilltop. It doesn't help you, but—

Senator Schweiker. Can you tell us what that is, or is it still classified?

Admiral Turner. I don't know, and I assume from the fact that we deleted it, it is still classified, but I will get you that answer, sir.

Senator Schweiker. Thank you. I'd like to see that information.

[See p. 171 for material referred to.]

Now my next question was: Is there any indication, Admiral, that projects in that particular center involved experimentation on terminally ill cancer patients?

Admiral Turner. I missed the first part of your question, sir. I am very sorry.

Senator Schweiker. Do you have any indication that some experiments in the facility used terminally ill cancer patients as subjects? You do acknowledge in your statement and it is clear from other documents that these kinds of experiments were at some point being done somewhere. My question is, is there any indication that cancer patients or terminally ill patients were experimented with in this wing?

Admiral Turner. Yes, it does appear there is a connection here, sir.

Senator Schweiker. The other question I had relates to the development of something which has been called the perfect concussion. A series of experiments toward that end were described in the CIA documents. I wonder if you would just tell us what your understanding of perfect concussion is.

Admiral Turner. Is that in my testimony, sir, or in some other document?

Senator Schweiker. Subproject 54, MKULTRA, which involved examination of techniques to cause brain concussions and amnesia by using weapons or sound waves to strike individuals without giving warning and without leaving any clear physical marks. Someone dubbed it "perfect concussion"—maybe that was poetic license on the part of our staff rather than your poets over there. I wonder if you could just tell us what brain concussion experiments were about?

Admiral Turner. This project, No. 54, was canceled, and never carried out.

Senator Schweiker. Well, I do believe the first year of the project in 1955 was carried out by the Office of Naval Research, according to the information that you supplied us. The CIA seems to have been participating in some way at that point, because the records go on to say that the experimenter at ONR found out about CIA's role, discovered that it was a cover, and then the project was transferred to MKULTRA in 1956. Again, this is all from the backup material you have given us. So, it was canceled at some time. I am not disagreeing
with that, but apparently for at least a year or two, somebody was investigating the production of brain concussions with special blackjacks, sound waves, and other methods as detailed in the backup material.

Admiral Turner. The data available to me is that this project was never funded by the CIA, but I will double-check that and furnish the information for the record for you as to whether there was ever any connection here and if so, what the nature of the work was.

[The material referred to follows.]

Mr. Laubinger corrected his testimony regarding Subproject 54 during the September 21, 1977 hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Human Resources Committee. The relevant portion is reproduced below:

Mr. Laubinger. On project 54, it has got a rather sensational proposal in there, in terms of the work that they propose to do, and you asked about the proposal and I said, in fact, it was never funded under MKULTRA. Now, I overlooked—at least, my memory did not serve me correctly when I went through that file folder to see one memorandum dated January 10, 1956, which makes it quite clear, as a matter of fact, that that proposal was based on prior work that was funded by the Agency.

Senator Schweiker. By what?

Mr. Laubinger. By the CIA. So, that information was in their file folder. It did not happen to be in my head when I testified.

Senator Schweiker. I think I might have read you that, and that is why I argued at the time with you, because I think I had in front of me, as I recall, some indication that it was funded there. I did read that to you. So, you did supply it to us; there is no argument about that information.

Mr. Laubinger. Perhaps I am sort of headstrong, myself, and in my own view, I am reading under the ULTRA project, that if it had been funded under ULTRA, it would have had a project number and identified as such. The thing that threw me was that it was funded, apparently, outside of any MKULTRA activity and it was under the normal contracting process so that it was not included in MKULTRA as any work done under that funding umbrella.

The file folder that you have and I have, right here, makes it quite clear, however, that a year’s work was done through naval funding—a naval funding mechanism—on which the proposal was based that ultimately came into the MKULTRA program. That second proposal was never funded. So, there was conflict and I, personally, think, introduced a little bit of confusion in that in my testimony.

Senator Schweiker. Well, do you agree or not agree with DOD’s statement here that even though the initial funding was naval, it was really a conduit for the CIA?

Mr. Laubinger. I think that is correct.

Senator Schweiker. Yes; I would appreciate that. I would like to know how it went from ONR to CIA after a year. Somebody made a decision to make that transfer, and to make this an MKULTRA subject. There had to be some sort of review that led to a decision to continue that kind of concussion—total blackout, maximum amnesia, and whatever else it was you were interested in—study and testing.

Mr. Laubinger. Senator, if I may try to say a few words on that, the files that were available to us for inspection, which are limited, indicated that there was a project being carried on by the Navy having to do with the effects of brain concussion. The CIA developed an interest in that, and considered funding it, but actually never did, and as the admiral testified, the MKULTRA is merely a funding mechanism, a place they go for money to do such things, but there is no evidence that I know of that that project was ever funded.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, I am confused, because here again is another quote from a document that we have seen, which you have released and supplied to us:

Following is the technical progress made under the current [deleted] contract:
(a) Specialized instrumentation and numerous testing techniques have been developed to obtain the desired dynamic data; (b) considerable data has now been obtained supporting the resonance-cavitation theory of brain concussion; and (c) preliminary acceleration threshold data has been obtained for a fluid-filled glass simulated skull.

It goes on to talk about a blast range and a 2,500-square-foot laboratory. The document notes that “Three blast test series have been run to date.” It describes a special blackjack device, “a pancake-type blackjack giving a high peak impact force with a low unit surface pressure.”

I agree the records are inconclusive as to the results of this work, but it certainly seems that some testing was done.

Mr. LAUBINGER. Senator, you are putting us in the same position I think you were stating that you were in earlier in referring to documents not before us, but I believe you are quoting from a proposal that someone sent to the Agency to fund this work, and he is referring to past work. The past work would have encompassed a lot of things like that, but CIA was not involved with that.

Senator SCHWEIKER. What do you mean, Admiral, on page 6 of your testimony when you mention projects using magician's art? How do magicians get into the spook business?

Admiral TURNER. I have interpreted this as to how to slip the mickey into the finn, but I would like to ask my advisers here to comment.

Mr. Brody. I think that is essentially it, Senator. It is surreptitious administration of material to someone, deceptive practices, how to distract someone's attention while you are doing something else, as I understand it. It was also some type of a covert communication project involved with the study of how magicians and their assistants perhaps communicate information to one another without having other people know it. This is the type of thing that was involved, sir.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator IHOTY. Senator Huddleston?

Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, in your checking these newly discovered documents and interviewing members of the CIA staff, did you find information that would confirm the contention described by the reporters for the New York Times that this type of experimentation was begun out of a fear at the Agency that foreign powers might have had drugs which would allow them to alter the behavior of American citizens or agents or members of the Armed Forces who were taken into custody, and which would have resulted in false confessions and the like? Is my question clear?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. I haven't personally read the documentation on that. In my discussions with the people who are well informed in this area at the Agency, I am told that that is the case.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Was there any evidence or any indication that there were other motives that the Agency might also be looking for drugs that could be applied for other purposes, such as debilitating an individual or even killing another person? Was this part of this kind of experimentation?
Admiral Turner. Yes; I think there is. I have not seen in this series of documentation evidence of desire to kill, but I think the project turned its character from a defensive to an offensive one as it went along, and there certainly was an intention here to develop drugs that could be of use.

Senator Huddleston. The project continued for some time after it was learned that, in fact, foreign powers did not have such a drug as was at first feared, didn’t it?

Admiral Turner. That is my understanding. Yes, sir.

Senator Huddleston. Is there any indication that knowledge gained as a result of these experiments has been useful or is being applied in any way to present operations?

Mr. Brody. Senator, I am not sure if there is any body of knowledge. A great deal of what there was, I gather, was destroyed in 1973. I would like to defer to Frank here. Do you know of any?

Mr. Laubinger. I know of no drugs or anything like that developed under this program that ever reached operational use or are in use today.

Senator Huddleston. So apparently any information that was gathered was apparently useless and not worth continuing, not worth further development on the part of the Agency.

Mr. Laubinger. I am having difficulty hearing your questions.

Senator Huddleston. I can hardly hear myself.

Admiral Turner. I think the answer to your question is that we have no evidence of great usefulness on this, and yet I think we should remember——

Senator Huddleston. Well, is it accurate to say that this experimentation produced few useful results or had little application at all to the operations of the Agency or anybody else as far as we know?

Admiral Turner. I think that is basically correct. At the same time, I would point out that we had two CIA prisoners in China and one in the Soviet Union at this time, and we were concerned as to what kinds of things might be done to them, but I am not saying that——

Senator Huddleston. Have you detected any sign that any other nation is continuing or has in the past conducted experiments similar to this or with a similar objective?

Admiral Turner. I am not prepared to answer that one off the top of my head, sir, but I will get it to you.

[The material referred to follows:]

We maintain no files of up-to-date information on the testing of drugs in foreign countries. Some years ago we occasionally would review foreign research on antibiotics and pharmaceuticals in connection with public health and civil defense assessments. For a few years beginning in 1949 we assessed foreign research on LSD under Project ARTICHOKE because of concern that such drugs might be employed against Agency and other U.S. personnel. Information relative to this work has already been provided to relevant Committees. In this early work we also occasionally looked at foreign human experimentation; we long ago eliminated our holdings on this subject and no collection requirements are any longer served. As consumer interest in this area has dropped off and higher priority areas need attention, we have virtually no present coverage with the possible exception of an occasional scanning of the literature for a specific program. To the best of our knowledge no other unit in the Intelligence Community is tracking this subject now.
Senator Huddleston. You don't know whether any of your agents anywhere in the world have been subjected to any kind of procedure like this?

Admiral Turner. We certainly know of other powers conducting research in these areas, yes.

Senator Huddleston. Do you know how they go about that research?

Admiral Turner. It is pretty sketchy, the information we have.

Senator Huddleston. Do you know of any other organization in this country or any institution that has conducted extensive research on unwitting individuals and through unwitting institutions?

Admiral Turner. Well, I have read something in the newspapers about this, but I have not familiarized myself with it in specifics.

Senator Huddleston. It is not a normal mode of operation for human research, is it?

Admiral Turner. No, sir.

Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Inouye. Senator Wallop?

Senator Wallop. Mr. Chairman, I only have one to follow up on Senator Huddleston's questions and my earlier ones. You are not really saying, are you, Admiral Turner, that there are no mind-altering drugs or behavior modification procedures which have been used by foreign powers?

Admiral Turner. No, sir, I am not.

Senator Wallop. I drew that inference partly in answer to my question that you knew of no truth serum. Maybe that is a misnomer, but surely there are relaxants that make tongues looser than they would otherwise be. Isn't that true?

Admiral Turner. Yes.

Senator Wallop. So I think it is fair to say, too, that the experience of many American prisoners of war in the Korean conflict would indicate that there are behavior modification procedures in use by foreign powers of a fairly advanced degree of sophistication.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Wallop. Again, I will just go back and say I think this must have been part of the motivation. I don't think you would have mentioned Cardinal Mindszenty had you thought his behavior was normal at the time or had anybody else. So, I would just again say I think it is a little bit scapegoating. I don't think the object of this hearing is in any way to lay blame on those passed or those dead or otherwise, but I think it is a little bit scapegoating to say that it stopped with the directors of the CIA or the DCI's of the time. Also I think it is a little bit scapegoating to say they didn't even know it, but that it was some lower echelon acting alone.

I think this was a behavior pattern that was prevalent in those years, and I think the object lesson is that we have discovered, we think and we hope, through your assurances and other activities of the Congress, means of avoiding future incidents of that kind. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Inouye. Senator Chafee?

Senator Chafee. No questions.

Senator Inouye. Senator Kennedy, I think you have another question.
Senator KENNEDY. Just talking about the two safe houses on the east and west coast as being the sources for the unwitting trials, now, the importance of this and the magnitude of it, I think, is of significance, because we have seen from your records that these were used over a period of 8 or 9 years, and the numbers could have been considerable. You are unable to determine, at least in your own research, what the numbers would be and what the drugs were, how many people were involved, but it could have been considerable during this period of time.

It would certainly appear to me in examining the documents and the flow charts of cash slips that were expended in these areas that it was considerable, but that is a judgmental factor on it, but I think it is important to try and find out what the Agency is attempting to do to get to the bottom of it.

Now, the principal agent that was involved as I understand it is deceased and has been deceased for 2 years. The overall agent, Mr. Gottlieb, has indicated a fuzzy memory about this whole area. He has testified before the Intelligence Committee. Yet he was responsible for the whole program. Then, the Director had indicated the destruction of the various materials and unfamiliarity with the project.

Now, you have indicated in your testimony today that there are two additional agents on page 9 of your testimony, you indicated there are two additional agents which you have uncovered at the bottom of it, and you say, the names of CIA officials who approved or monitored the various projects. You talk about the two additional agents in your testimony.

Now, I am just wondering if you intend to interview those agents to find out exactly what is being done. I suppose, first of all, shouldn’t the project manager know what was being done?

Admiral TURNER. Our first problem, Senator, is that we have been unable to associate an individual with those names at this point. We are still burrowing to find out who these people are. We haven’t identified them as having been CIA employees, and we don’t know whether these were false names.

Senator KENNEDY. You are tracking that down, as I understand it?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. You are tracking that down, and you have every intention of interviewing those people to find out whatever you can about the program and project?

Admiral TURNER. My only hesitation here is whether I will do this or the Justice Department.

Senator KENNEDY. It will be pursued, though, I understand?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. Either through the Agency or through the Justice Department?

Admiral TURNER. [Nods in the affirmative.]

Senator KENNEDY. Is it plausible that the director of the program would not understand or know about the details of the program? Is it plausible that Dr. Gottlieb would not understand the full range of activities in those particular safe houses?
Admiral Turner. Let me say it is unlikely. I don't know Mr. Gottlieb.

Senator Kennedy. Has anybody in the Agency talked with Mr. Gottlieb to find out about this?

Admiral Turner. Not since this revelation has come out.

Senator Kennedy. Not since this revelation? Well, why not?

Admiral Turner. He has left our employ, Senator.

Senator Kennedy. Does that mean that anybody who leaves is, you know, covered for lifetime?

Admiral Turner. No, sir.

Senator Kennedy. Why wouldn't you talk with him and find out? You have new information about this program. It has been a matter of considerable interest both to our committee and to the Intelligence Committee. Why wouldn't you talk to Mr. Gottlieb?

Admiral Turner. Well, again, I think the issue is whether this should be done by the Justice Department or ourselves.

Senator Kennedy. Well, are we wrestling around because you and Attorney General Bell can't agree—

Admiral Turner. No, sir.

Senator Kennedy [continuing]. On who ought to do it?

Admiral Turner. We are proceeding together in complete agreement as to how to go. I have, in connection with trying to find all of these Americans or others who were unwittingly tested, I have some considerable concern about the CIA running around this country interviewing and interrogating people, because I don't want to give any impression that we are doing domestic intelligence.

Senator Kennedy. I am just talking about one, in this case. That was the man who was responsible for the whole program, and to find out whether anyone within the Agency since you have had this new material has talked to Gottlieb since 1975, and if the answer is no, I want to know why not.

Admiral Turner. The reason he was not interviewed in connection with the 1975 hearings was that he had left the employ of the CIA and there was a concern on the part of the Agency that it would appear to the investigators that the CIA was in some way trying to influence him and influence his testimony before the committee. If these committees have no objection, we would be happy to contact Dr. Gottlieb and see if he can augment anything here in this new information, though I don't think there is much in this new information that he can add to as opposed to what was available in 1975.

Senator Kennedy. Well, you see, Admiral Turner, you come to the two committees this morning and indicate that now at last we have the information. We don't have to be concerned about anything in the future on it. Now, I don't know how you can give those assurances to the members of these committees as well as to the American people when you haven't since 1975 even talked to the principal person that was in charge of the program, and the records were destroyed. He is the fellow that was running the program, and the Agency has not talked to him since the development of this new material.

Admiral Turner. Our only concern here is the proprieties involved, and we will dig into this and work with the Justice Department on
who, if either of us, should get into discussions with Dr. Gottlieb so as not to prejudice any legal rights that may be involved here, or to appear in any way to be improper.

Senator Kennedy. Well, do I understand you have not contacted the Justice Department about this particular case since the development of this new material about Gottlieb?

Admiral Turner. Not about Gottlieb specifically. We have contacted him.

Senator Kennedy. Well, it is amazing to me. I mean, can you understand the difficulty that any of us might have in terms of comprehending that when you develop a whole new series of materials that are on the front page of every newspaper in the country and are on every television, I mean, that means something, but it does not mean nearly as much as the interest that we have in the fact about the testing of unwitting Americans, and every single document that the staff reviews has Mr. Gottlieb's name on it and you come up to tell us that we don't have to worry any more, we have these other final facts, and Mr. Gottlieb has not been talked to?

Admiral Turner. Sir, I am not saying that these are in any way the final facts. I am saying these are all the facts we have available.

Senator Kennedy. And you have not talked to the person who was in charge of the program, so what kind of value or what kind of weight can we give it?

Admiral Turner. We are happy to talk to him. I think the issue here again is one of propriety and how to go about this. We have not, I believe, enough new information about Gottlieb's participation here to signal that his interview would be that much more revealing than what was revealed in 1975.

Senator Kennedy. The importance of it, I think, from our point of view, is, he would know the drugs that were administered, the volume of drugs, how it was administered, and in terms of your ability to follow up to protect these people and their health, to the extent that it can be done, that opportunity is being lost.

I want to get on to some others, but will you give us the assurance that you will get ahold of Gottlieb or that you will talk to Attorney General Bell and talk with Gottlieb?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Kennedy. And let us know as to the extent of it. I don't see how we can fulfill our responsibility in this area on the drug testing without our hearing from Gottlieb as well, but I think it is important that you do so, particularly since all of the materials have been destroyed.

These other two agents, have they talked to them?

Admiral Turner. We don't know who they are, sir. We are trying to track down and see whether these names can be related to anybody.

Senator Kennedy. That is under active investigation by the Agency?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Kennedy. And you have the intention of talking to those people when you locate them. Is that correct?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, under the same circumstances as Gottlieb.

Senator Kennedy. And you have people working on it?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. With regards to the activities that took place in these safe houses, as I understand from the records, two-way mirrors were used. Is that your understanding?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. We have records that construction was done to put in two-way mirrors.

Senator Kennedy. And they were placed in the bedroom, as I understand.

[Pause.]

Senator Kennedy. Well, we have documents—

Admiral Turner. I believe that was in the Church record, but I don't have the details.

Senator Kennedy. And rather elaborate decorations were added, as I understand, at least, to the one in San Francisco, in the bedroom, which are French can-can dancers, floral pictures, drapery, including installation of bedroom mirrors, three framed Toulouse Lautrec posters with black silk mats, and a number of other—red bedroom curtains and recording equipment, and then a series of documents which were provided to the committee which indicate a wide proliferation of different cash for $100, generally in the $100 range over any period of time on the particular checks. Even the names are blocked out, as to the person who is receiving it. Cash for undercover agents, operating expenses, drinks, entertainment while administering, and then it is dashed out, and then the other documents, that would suggest, at least with the signature of your principal agent out there, that—“called to the operation, midnight, and climax.”

What can you tell us that it might suggest to you about what techniques were being used by the Agency in terms of reaching that sort of broad-based group of Americans that were being evidently enticed for testing in terms of drugs and others? Do you draw any kind of conclusion about what might have been going on out there in these safe houses?

Admiral Turner. No, sir.

[General laughter.]

Senator Kennedy. There is a light side to it, but there is also an enormously serious side. And that is that at least the techniques which are used or were used in terms of testing, and trying to find out exactly the range of drugs used and the numbers of people involved and exactly what that operation was about, as well as the constant reiteration of the use of small sums of cash at irregular intervals. A variety of different techniques were employed but there is an awful lot of documentation putting these matters together.

When you look at the fact that it is a broad range population that has been tested, tested in these two areas, with the kind of cash slips that were used in this, payment mechanisms and decorations and all of the rest, we are not able to put a bottom line on it but one thing is for sure, and that is, Gottlieb knows. That is one thing for sure, because his name appears on just about every one of these documents, and it is, I think, very important to find out what his understanding is of the nature of that. So, we will hear more about that.

Admiral Turner. I believe Gottlieb has been interviewed by the Congress.

Senator Kennedy. That's right, he has, and in reviewing the record, it is not very satisfactory, and it just seems with the new information
and the new documentation and the new memoranda—and he did not have the checks at that time—and with the wide variety of different memoranda with his name on it, his memory could be stimulated on that.

Thank you.

Senator Inouye. I would like to thank the admiral and his staff for participating in this hearing. I believe the record should show that this hearing was held at the request of the Agency and the admiral. It was not held because we insisted upon it. It was a volunteer effort on the part of the Agency. I think the record should also indicate that Admiral Turner has forwarded to this committee a classified file including all of the names of the institutions and the persons involved as the experimentors.

I should also indicate that this hearing is just one step involved in the committee's investigation of drug abuse. Just as you have had much work in going over the 8,000 pages, the staff of this committee has had equal problems, but I would like the record to show that you have made these papers and documents available to the committee. I thank you for that.

As part of the ongoing investigation, we had intended to call upon many dozens of others, experimentors, or those officials in charge, and one of those will be Dr. Gottlieb.

In thanking you, I would like to say this to the American people, that what we have experienced this morning in this committee room is not being duplicated in any other committee room in any other part of the world. I doubt that very much. Our Agency and our intelligence community has been under much criticism and has been subjected to much abuse, in many cases justified, but this is the most open society that I can think of. For example, in Great Britain there are about six people who are aware of the identity of the man in charge of intelligence. In other countries, similar conditions exist. Here in the United States we not only know Admiral Turner, we have had open hearings with him, such as this. The confirmation hearings were all open.

In a few weeks, the Senate of the United States will debate a resolution to decide upon whether we should disclose the amounts and funds being used for counterintelligence and national intelligence. I would hope that in presenting this issue to the public, the media will take note that the Agency has cooperated and will continue to. The abuse that we have learned about this morning is one I hope will never happen again, but without constant oversight on the part of the Executive Office, on the part of the Congress, it could happen again. It is important therefore that we continue in this oversight activity.

So, once again, Admiral, I thank you very much for helping us. We will continue to call upon you for your assistance. We would like to submit to you several questions that the members and staff have prepared. We hope you will look them over carefully and prepare responses for the record, sir.

Senator Kennedy. Mr. Chairman?

Senator Inouye. Yes, sir?

Senator Kennedy. I, too, want to thank Admiral Turner for his responsiveness. I have had meetings with him in the committees and also conversations, telephone conversations, and private meetings, and
I have found him personally to be extremely responsive, and it is a very difficult challenge which he has accepted in heading this Agency. I want you to know; personally, I, too, would like to see this put behind us. I don't think we are quite there yet in terms of this particular area that we are interested in. I think the Intelligence Committee has special responsibilities in this area of the testing, so we look forward to working with you in expediting the time that we can put it behind, but it does seem to me that we have to dig in and finish the chapter. So, I want to personally express my appreciation to you, Admiral Turner, and thank you for your cooperation and your help, and I look forward to working with you.

Admiral Turner. Thank you.

Senator Huddleston. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure you emphasized this enough, but I think the record ought to show that Admiral Turner informed the Select Committee on his own initiative when the new documentation was found. The documentation has been made available to us voluntarily, in a spirit of cooperation.

I think this shows a vast difference from the mode of operation that existed prior to the formation at least of the Church committee, and a difference that is very helpful.

Senator Inouye. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Admiral.

We would now like to call upon Mr. Philip Goldman and Mr. John Gittinger.

Mr. Goldman and Mr. Gittinger, will you please rise and take the oath.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?

Mr. Goldman. I do.

Mr. Gittinger. I do.

Senator Inouye. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Goldman, will you identify yourself, and after that, Mr. Gittinger.

Senator Kennedy. Before we start in, we had a third witness, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Pasternac, who planned to testify, traveled to Washington—he lives in Washington, and was contacted recently—with the intention of testifying this morning. And something—he called us late this morning and indicated that he wanted to get a counsel before he would wish to testify.

Senator Inouye. Mr. Goldman.

Mr. Goldman, will you identify yourself, sir.

TESTIMONY OF PHILIP GOLDMAN, FORMER EMPLOYEE, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. Goldman. I am Philip Goldman.

Senator Inouye. And you are a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. Goldman. Over 10 years ago.

Senator Inouye. And you were employed at the time when MKULTRA was in operation?

Mr. Goldman. There were some MKULTRA's in operation at the time I was there.
Senator Inouye. And Mr. John Gittinger, are you a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency?

TESTIMONY OF JOHN GITTINGER, FORMER EMPLOYEE, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. Gittinger. I am.

Senator Inouye. Are you still an employee?

Mr. Gittinger. No.

Senator Inouye. Were you a member of the Agency at the time MKULTRA was in operation?

Mr. Gittinger. Yes.

Senator Inouye. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.

Senator Kennedy. I want to welcome both of you to the committee.

If we could start with Mr. Goldman. Were you the project engineer for the safe houses in either San Francisco or New York?

Mr. Goldman. I know of no safe house in San Francisco.

Senator Kennedy. How about in New York?

Mr. Goldman. I knew of one facility that was established there, but I didn't know anything of its operation.

Senator Kennedy. Were you a monitor on any testing of drugs on unwitting persons in San Francisco?

Mr. Goldman. No.

Senator Kennedy. Well, we have a classified document here that was provided by the Agency that lists your name as a monitor of the program and I would appreciate it if you would look—

Mr. Goldman. I think the misunderstanding arises because I was project officer.

Senator Kennedy. Well, would you take a look at that?

[Mr. Goldman inspected the document.]

Mr. Goldman. This document as it states is correct. However, my—

Senator Kennedy. That document is correct?

Mr. Goldman. As far as I see on the first page, the project. But my—

Senator Kennedy. Well, could I get it back, please.

That would indicate that you were a monitor of the program.

Mr. Goldman. I was in charge of disbursing the moneys to Morgan Hall.

Senator Kennedy. To whom was that?

Mr. Goldman. To the individual whose name was listed at the top of that document.

Senator Kennedy. And you knew that he was running the project in San Francisco?

Mr. Goldman. I knew he was the person who was in charge out there.

Senator Kennedy. All right.

Mr. Goldman. But I had no knowledge nor did I seek knowledge of actually what he was doing, because there would be other things involved.

I did receive—

Senator Kennedy. What were you doing?
Mr. Goldman. I was collecting—I had to be sure that all the receipts that ever were turned in balanced with the moneys that were paid out to see that everything was run all right. There was no illegal use of funds as far as we could determine by the receipts and cash.

Senator Kennedy. So even though the Agency document indicates that you were a monitor for the program, one of the few monitors of that particular program which you mentioned for San Francisco and Mill Valley, Calif., you described your responsibility only as a carrier of money; is that correct?

Mr. Goldman. I would say as a disburser or carrying out—seeing that the moneys were handled properly. There was within that—I don’t know what’s done or what he did do in conjunction with other people.

Senator Kennedy. Were you responsible for the disbursement of all the funds?

Mr. Goldman. I was responsible for turning over the check to him.

Senator Kennedy. And what did you know of the program itself?

Mr. Goldman. The only thing I knew of the program was what he furnished us in terms of receipts and that sort of thing. I didn’t indulge or concern myself in that.

Senator Kennedy. You still wrote, and I’ll let you examine it—it’s a classified document—but you wrote a rather substantive review of the program in May of 1963, talking about the experiments, the factual data that had been collected, covert and realistic field trials, about the necessity of those particular—and talked about the effectiveness of the various programs, the efficiency of various delivery systems. That doesn’t sound to me like someone who is only—

Mr. Goldman. Well, if you would refresh my memory, if I could read this I would certainly agree with whatever is said there, if it was written.

Senator Kennedy. I am trying to gather what your role was. You’ve indicated first of all that you didn’t know about—you knew about a safe house in New York; now we find out that you’re the carrier for the resources as well and the agent in San Francisco. We find out now that the CIA put you as a monitor. You’re testifying that you only were the courier, and here we have just one document, and there are many others that talk about the substance of that program with your name on it and I am just trying to find out exactly what role you were playing.

Mr. Goldman. The only thing I can tell you about this and I am drawing completely on my memory is that this individual who was in charge out there conducted these things and reported them back to the Agency. I didn’t participate in any of them. All I know was that he furnished me with receipts for things that were done and told of the work that they had done.

Senator Kennedy. Well, that document covers more than receipts.

Mr. Goldman. Yes, it tells of what—they had conducted work out there.

Senator Kennedy. It describes, does it not? Read the paragraph 2.

Mr. Goldman. “A number of covert”—

Senator Kennedy. Well, you can’t read it. it’s a classified document, and I don’t know why, quite frankly, but it relates to the substance
of those programs and your name is signed to the memorandums on it. I am not interested in you trying to review for us now what is in the document, but I think it would be unfortunate if we were left with the opinion that all you were was a courier of resources when we see a document with your name on it, signed, that talks about the substance of the program. And what we're interested in is the substance of the program. We have the recent documents that were provided by the Agency, which do indicate that you were at least involved in the substance, and I'm just trying to find out whether you're willing to tell us about that.

Mr. Goldman. I am perfectly willing to tell you everything that I can remember.

Senator Kennedy. But you can't remember anything.

Mr. Goldman. I can't remember the substantive parts of these things, I really can't.

Senator Kennedy. Of the program that was taking place.

Do you have any greater familiarity with what was happening in New York?

Mr. Goldman. No, no.

Senator Kennedy. And you have the same function with regards to New York?

Mr. Goldman. The same function with regard to New York.

Senator Kennedy. Did you ever go to San Francisco?

Mr. Goldman. Yes.

Senator Kennedy. Did you meet with the agent in charge?

Mr. Goldman. Yes.

Senator Kennedy. And why did you meet with him?

Mr. Goldman. To discuss some of the receipts and things that were there to find out if these were indeed true expenditures and to find out if everything was going along all right for the work that was being done.

Senator Kennedy. What work was being done?

Mr. Goldman. No, the reports of these things and whatever was being done. I don't know who he reported to but he did report to somebody.

Senator Kennedy. You travel out there to find out about the work that's being done, and what does he tell you, that the work is being done well and—

Mr. Goldman. He told me that the work that they were doing was going along, progressing satisfactorily, but to be very frank with you—

Senator Kennedy. But he didn't tell you what the work was?

Mr. Goldman. To be very frank with you, Senator, I cannot remember the things that happened back in those days. I've been away from the company—from the Agency for over 10 years, and that is even farther back than that, and that was just about the time when I first engaged in this, so it was my first—

Senator Kennedy. Did they disburse a series of $100 checks, to your recollection?

Mr. Goldman. I don't recollect it, but if you have it there, then they did.

Senator Kennedy. Did you know Dr. Gottlieb?

Mr. Goldman. Yes.
Senator Kennedy. How did you know Dr. Gottlieb?

Mr. Goldman. He had been head of the division when I was recruited.

Senator Kennedy. Did you talk to him about these programs? Did you have anything to do with him during this period of time?

Mr. Goldman. I didn't have anything to do with him until I would say probably in the sixties.

Senator Kennedy. And can you tell us what you had to do with him then?

Mr. Goldman. Just what you see there on the papers.

Senator Kennedy. Well, that is the request for the money and he approves it.

Mr. Goldman. That is the request for money and he approves it, and I am quite sure that I probably discussed with him whether the work was going along all right, whether his reports were being turned in, and whether he was satisfied with the way things were going and did he have any complaints about the way other people were requesting him, but I did not engage myself in anything he was doing.

Senator Kennedy. Well, did you get the impression that Gottlieb knew what was going on?

Mr. Goldman. I didn’t ask.

Senator Kennedy. But you told him that your impression that what was going on even though you didn’t know what was going on, was going on well, I guess? [Laughter.]

Mr. Goldman. I told Gottlieb what you saw in there was that the things appeared to be going along all right. I was repeating and parroting back the words that were given to me while I was there.

Senator Kennedy. What was the money being spent for, do you know?

Mr. Goldman. No; I can’t recall that, sir.

Senator Kennedy. Would you remember if we told you it was red curtains and can-can pictures——

Mr. Goldman. No, sir.

Senator Kennedy. Floral pictures and the rest.

Mr. Goldman. No, sir.

Senator Kennedy. Recorders.

Mr. Goldman. No, sir.

Senator Kennedy. Recorders and two-way mirrors.

Mr. Goldman. Wait, hold on. You’re slipping a word in there now.

Senator Kennedy. But you would have authorized those funds, would you not, since you were the——

Mr. Goldman. Did you say two-way mirrors?

Senator Kennedy. Yes.

Mr. Goldman. Where?

Senator Kennedy. In the safe houses.

Mr. Goldman. Where?

Senator Kennedy. San Francisco.

Mr. Goldman. No.

Senator Kennedy. How about New York?

Mr. Goldman. Yes.

Senator Kennedy. You remember now that you approved expenditures for New York?
Mr. Goldman. Yes.

Senator Kennedy. What were those expenditures for?

Mr. Goldman. That was a transfer of money over for the use in an apartment in New York by the Bureau of Narcotics. It was for their use.

Senator Kennedy. Do you have any knowledge of what was going on in the apartment?

Mr. Goldman. No, sir, other than I know that it had been used, according to the information that I have been given, it was used by the Bureau of Narcotics to make meetings with individuals who they were interested in with regard to pushing dope—not pushing dope, but selling narcotics and that sort of thing.

Senator Kennedy. Well, I am sure you had many responsibilities and it's a long time ago, but the Agency does indicate that you were project monitor for that particular program.

Mr. Goldman. That's correct.

Senator Kennedy. Your own testimony indicates you went out to review the expenditures of funds to find out whether they were being wisely used, that you came back and talked to the project director, Mr. Gottlieb, to give him a progress report about what was going on out there.

Mr. Goldman. Yes, sir, I did.

Senator Kennedy. All those things are true, and yet you draw a complete blank in terms of what was the project itself. That's where the record is now.

Mr. Goldman. I did not go out there to review the projects nor did I come back and talk with Mr. Gottlieb and review what I had observed in terms of any projects that they—that is, other parts of the Agency might have in operation there. I simply reported back those things which were told to me by the individual out there who—and I carried them back and they are contained in the report that you have in front of you, word for word, just as it was given to me.

Senator Kennedy. The report that you examined here is a substantive report on the particular program and project. And I don't think anyone who wasn't familiar with the project—this is a personal evaluation—could write a report on the substance of it without knowing about it. Now, that's mine. Maybe you can't remember and recollect, and that's—

Mr. Goldman. No; everything I put down in there is things that I was told while I was out there, and if there was any ancillary information involved in there I can tell you I just don't remember that. I really don't.

At the time—that was some years ago. At the time—a lot of time has passed since then and I have made quite sure that if I could recollect it at all, I would do it. If you have some papers and you want me to certify whether yes, this is so or that is so, I can do that, but I can't recall it mentally.

Senator Kennedy. You just certified the principal. There are others up here.

I would like to go to Dr. Gittinger.

Mr. Gittinger. It's Mr. Gittinger.

Senator Kennedy. How long did you serve with the Agency?
Mr. Gittinger. Twenty-six years.
Senator Kennedy. Excuse me?
Mr. Gittinger. Twenty-six years.
Senator Kennedy. Twenty-six years.
And at some point you moved into the operational support side, is that correct?
Mr. Gittinger. Yes.
Senator Kennedy. And did you know Sidney Gottlieb?
Mr. Gittinger. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. And did he inform you about the research projects involving LSD?
Mr. Gittinger. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. It is my understanding that you were also aware of some of the drug testing projects conducted on unwitting subjects on the west coast using the Bureau of Narcotics people in the operation. Is that true?
Mr. Gittinger. I was.
Mr. Gittinger. Sorry.
Senator Kennedy. Do you know which drugs were involved in those tests?
Mr. Gittinger. LSD. And I can't remember for sure much of the others. What is the substance of marihuana, cannabis, is that right, that can be delivered by other than smoking?
Senator Kennedy. Cannabis?
Mr. Gittinger. There had been some discussion of that; yes.
Senator Kennedy. And was heroin also used?
Mr. Gittinger. Heroin used by CIA?
Senator Kennedy. No. In the west coast operation.
Mr. Gittinger. Absolutely not.
Senator Kennedy. Now, to your knowledge, how were the drugs administered to the unwitting subjects?
Mr. Gittinger. I have no direct knowledge.
Senator Kennedy. Why did you go to the safe houses?
Mr. Gittinger. It's a very complicated story. Just in justification of myself, this came up just day before yesterday. I have not really had enough time to get it all straightened in my mind, so I ramble.
Senator Kennedy. Well, you take your time and tell us in your own words. We've got some time here.
Mr. Gittinger. My responsibilities which would involve any of the period of time that you were talking about really was not directly related to drugs at all. I was a psychologist charged with the responsibility of trying to develop as much information as I could on various cultures, overseas cultures, anthropological type data, if you follow what I mean. I was also engaged in trying to work out ways and means of assessing people and understanding people.
I originally became involved in this through working on Chinese culture, and over a series of time I was introduced to the problem of brainwashing, which is the thing that really was the most compelling thing in relationship to this, and became charged with the responsibility of trying to find out a little bit about interrogation techniques.
And among other things, we decided or I decided that one of the best sources of interrogation techniques would be trying to locate and interview and become involved with experienced police interrogators in the country and experienced people who had real practical knowledge of interrogation. The reason for this is that we had become pretty well convinced after the experience of the brainwashing problems coming out of China, that it was the techniques of the interrogators that were causing the individuals to make confessions and so forth in relationship to this, rather than any kind of drugging and so forth. So we were very much interested in interrogation techniques, and this led to me being introduced to the agent in the west coast, and I began to talk to him in connection with these interrogation techniques.

Senator Kennedy. OK. Now, that is the agent that ran the tests on the west coast on the unwitting people. That's where you come in, correct?

Mr. Gittinger. If I understand—would you say that again?

Senator Kennedy. The name Morgan Hall has been—that is the name that has been used.

Mr. Gittinger. Yes.

Senator Kennedy. And that is the agent that you met with.

Mr. Gittinger. That is right.

Senator Kennedy. And you met at the safe house.

Mr. Gittinger. Yes, sir.

Senator Kennedy. Whom did you meet with in the safe house?

Mr. Gittinger. This is the part that is hard for me to say, and I am sorry that I have to. In connection with some work that we were doing, we needed to have some information on sexual habits. Morgan Hall provided informants for me to talk to in connection with the sex habits that I was interested in trying to find information. During one period of time the safe house, as far as I was concerned, was used for just these particular type of interviews. And I didn't see the red curtains.

Senator Kennedy. Those were prostitutes, were they?

Mr. Gittinger. Yes, sir.

Senator Kennedy. How many different times were you there that you had similar—

Mr. Gittinger. I couldn't possibly say with any certainty on that.

Four or five times.

Senator Kennedy. Four or five times.

Mr. Gittinger. Over—you remember now, the period that I'm talking about when I would have any involvement in this is from about 1956 to 1961. So it's about a 4- or 5-year period which is the only time that I know anything about what you are talking about here today.

Senator Kennedy. Did Morgan Hall make the arrangements for the prostitutes to meet with you?

Mr. Gittinger. Yes, sir.

Senator Kennedy. Did the interviews that you had have anything to do with drugs?

Mr. Gittinger. Well, as I tried to explain earlier when this was being discussed a little bit beforehand, again I think it is pretty hard for most people now to recognize how little there was known about drugs at the period of time that we are talking about, because the
drug age or the drug culture comes later on. Consequently, those of
us who had any responsibility in this area were interested in trying to
get as much information as we could on the subculture, the subculture
drug groups, and obviously the Bureau of Narcotics represented a
means of doing this. Consequently, other types of things that were
involved in discussions at that time would have to do with the under-
ground use of drugs. When I am talking about this I am talking about
the folkways in terms of unwitting use of drugs. Did these people that
I was talking to have any information about this and on rare instances
they were able to tell me about their use, and in most cases this would
largely turn out to be a Mickey Finn or something of that sort rather
than anything esoteric.

I also was very much interested because we had relatively little
information, believe it or not, at that time, in terms of the various
reactions that people were having to drugs. Therefore, these people
were very informative in terms of they knew a great deal of informa-
tion about reactions.

Senator Kennedy. At least you gathered—or am I correct in assum-
ing that you gathered the impression that the prostitutes that you had
talked to were able to slip the drugs to people as I understand it. Did
you form any impression on that?

Mr. Gittinger. I certainly did not form the impression that they
did this as a rule or—

Senator Kennedy. But they had the knowledge.

Mr. Gittinger. They had the knowledge or some of them had had
knowledge of this being done. But again, as it turned out, it was largely
in this area of knockout drops.

Senator Kennedy. Looking back now did you form any impression
about how the Agency was actually testing the broad spectrum of social
classes in these safe houses? With the large disbursal of cash in
small quantities, $100 bills and the kinds of elaborate decorations and
two-way mirrors in the bedrooms and all the rest, is there any question
in your own mind what was going on in the safe houses, or the tech-
niques that were being used to administer these drugs?

Mr. Gittinger. I find it very difficult to answer that question, sir. I
had absolutely no direct knowledge there was a large number of this. I
had no knowledge that anyone other than—than Morgan Hall was in
any way involved in the unwitting administration of drugs.

Senator Kennedy. But Gottlieb would know, would he not?

Mr. Gittinger. I believe so, yes, sir.

Senator Kennedy. Could we go into the Human Ecology Founda-
tion and talk about that and how it was used as an instrument in terms
of the support of research?

Mr. Gittinger. Yes, sir.

Senator Kennedy. Could you describe it to us? Could you describe
the Human Ecology Foundation, how it functioned and how it worked?

Mr. Gittinger. May I tell something about how it evolved, which I
think is important?

Senator Kennedy. Sure.

Mr. Gittinger. The Society for the Investigation of Human Ecol-
y, so-called, was actually a—I am confused here now as to whether
I should name you names.
Senator Kennedy. Well, we're not interested in names or institutions, so we prefer that you do not. That has to be worked out in arrangements between Admiral Turner and the individuals and the institutions.

But we're interested in what the Foundation really was and how it functioned and what its purpose was.

Mr. Gittinger. Well, it was established to undertake research in the general area of the behavioral sciences. It definitely had almost no focus or interest in, say, drug-related type of activities except in a very minor way, because it was largely set up to attempt to gain a certain amount of information and to fund projects which were psychological, sociological, anthropological in character. It was established in the sense of a period of time that a lot of us who are in it wish we could do it over again, but we were interested in trying to get together a panel of the most representative high-level behavioral scientists we could to oversee and help in terms of developing the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology type of program.

The Agency in effect provided the money. They did not direct the projects. Now, the fact of the matter is, there are a lot of innocent people who received the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology money which I know for a fact they were never asked to do anything for the CIA but they did get through this indirectly. They had no knowledge that they were getting CIA money.

Senator Kennedy. Over what period of time did this take place?

Mr. Gittinger. As far as I was concerned, it was the period of time ending in 1961. I believe the Human Ecology fund finally phased out in 1965, but I was not involved in this phasing out.

Senator Kennedy. Can you give the range of the different sort of individual projects of the universities in which it was active?

Mr. Gittinger. Well, it would have as many as—I am very fuzzy on my memory on the number of projects. It is over 10, 20, 30.

Senator Kennedy. After it made the grants, what was the relationship of the Agency with the results of the studies? The Foundation acquired the money to make the grants from the Agency, and then it made the grants to these various research programs.

Mr. Gittinger. Yes, sir.

Senator Kennedy. And that included eight universities as well as individual researchers?

Mr. Gittinger. Yes, sir.

Senator Kennedy. Then what follow-up was there to that, sir?

Mr. Gittinger. Well, in every sense of the word, the organization was run exactly like any other foundation, and it carried with it the same thing in terms of making certain that the people that they had given money to used it for the purpose for which it had been granted, that they had access to any of the reports that they had put out, but there were no strings attached to anybody. There wasn't any reason they couldn't publish anything that they put out.

Senator Kennedy. What sort of budget are we talking about here?

Mr. Gittinger. I honestly do not remember. I would guess we are talking in the realm of about $150,000 a year, but don't hold me to that, because I don't know.
Senator Kennedy. What is your view about such funding as a professional person, in terms of compromising the integrity of a university, sir?

Mr. Gittinger. Well, obviously, sir, insofar as today there is no question about it. I will have to say at the time that we were doing this there was quite an entirely different kind of an attitude, and I do know for a fact that we moved to start towards phasing out the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology and the Human Ecology Fund for the very reason that we were beginning to recognize that it was moving into an area but this would be compromised.

Senator Kennedy. Well, that is commendable, both your attitude and the reasons for it, but during that period of time it still was involved in behavior research programs, as I understand it.

Mr. Gittinger. Yes, sir. On its own, in connection with this, it participated again, and these again were not CIA-directed projects, but these were all things which would theoretically contribute to the general knowledge at the time where the things like the study of the Hungarian refugees—obviously, the study of the Hungarian refugees who came to this country after the Hungarian revolt was a very useful exercise to try to get information about the personality characteristics of the Communists and so forth.

Senator Kennedy. Were there other foundations that were doing similar kinds of work?

Mr. Gittinger. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Senator Kennedy. You believe—

Mr. Gittinger. You mean, CIA, other CIA?

Senator Kennedy. Right.

Mr. Gittinger. Well, my answer is in the sense that I know of no other CIA foundations, no. There were, of course, other foundations doing similar kinds of work in the United States.

Senator Kennedy. Have you heard of the Psychological Assessments Foundation?

Mr. Gittinger. I certainly have.

Senator Kennedy. What was that? What function did that have?

Mr. Gittinger. Now, this was bringing us up to a different era. I believe the functions of that organization have nothing whatsoever to do with the things that are being talked about here while I was associated with it.

Senator Kennedy. Rather than getting into the work, it was another foundation, was it not? It was another foundation supported by the Agency?

Mr. Gittinger. What, the Psychological Assessment?

Senator Kennedy. Yes.

Mr. Gittinger. No, sir, it was not.

Senator Kennedy. It did not get any support at all from the Agency?

Mr. Gittinger. Oh, yes, sir. It did get support, but it was a business firm.

Senator Kennedy. It was a business but it got support from the Agency?

Mr. Gittinger. It got money from it, but it definitely was not in MKULTRA or in any way associated with this.
Senator KENNEDY. All right. I want to thank you for your helpful testimony, Mr. Gittinger. It is not easy to go back into the past. If you have been very fair in your characterizations, and I think it is quite appropriately indicated that there are different standards now from what they were 25 years ago, and I think you have responded very fairly and completely to the inquiries, and I think with a good deal of feeling about it.

You are a person who is obviously attempting to serve the country's interest, so I want to thank you very much for your statement and for your helpful timeliness.

Mr. Gittinger. Thank you, sir.

Senator INOUYE. Senator Case?

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have another colleague that I had to complete the hearing with this morning before I got here.

I shall read the testimony with very great interest, and I appreciate your testimony as I have heard it. I would like to comment just on one point, and that is, it relates to a story in the press yesterday about part of this program involving the funding of a grant at a foreign university. I would like to elicit from you a comment as to the additional sensitivity and difficulty that that practice involves from your standpoint as a scientist, as well as a citizen, if you will.

Mr. Gittinger. I will say it was after the fact thinking. It was utter stupidity the way things worked out to have used some of this money outside the United States when it was CIA money. I can categorically state to my knowledge and I don't claim a complete knowledge all the way across of the human ecology functions, but to my knowledge, and this is unfortunate, those people did not know that they were getting money from CIA, and they were not asked to contribute anything to CIA as such.

Senator Case. It would be interesting to try to examine this by turning the thing around and thinking what we would think if this happened from a foreign official agency to our own university. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator INOUYE. Senator Schweiker.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Goldman, I wonder if you would tell us what your training and educational background is?

Dr. Goldman. I have already given a biography for the record.

Senator Schweiker. I have not seen it. Who has it? Is it classified? We may have it for the record, but may I ask you to briefly describe your training and background for us now? I hope it is no secret.

Dr. Goldman. Well, I was told if I was asked this to say that I was told that by your staff people, but I have no objection to telling you. I am a resident from Pennsylvania, southwest Pennsylvania, Lancaster County. I went to Penn State, and I am in nutrition.

Senator Schweiker. In what?

Dr. Goldman. Nutrition.

Senator Schweiker. Were you in charge of a section or segment of the CIA in your past capacity?

Dr. Goldman. During the time I was with that organization, I was in charge of one small section of it, one small segment of it; yes.
Senator Schweiker. What was the function or purpose of that section that you headed?

Dr. Goldman. To provide support for the other parts of the division.

Senator Schweiker. Where in the chain of command would that put you in relation to Dr. Gottlieb?

Dr. Goldman. Pretty far down the line.

Senator Schweiker. Mr. Gittinger, I would just like to ask you a few questions. We appreciate your frankness and candor with the committee, and we realize this is a very difficult area to go into. I am not quite clear on two matters that were raised earlier. First, were the safe houses we were talking about here used on occasion by the prostitutes you referred to?

Mr. Gittinger. I really have not the slightest idea.

Senator Schweiker. Were the prostitutes used in any way to slip the customers drugs for observation purposes?

Mr. Gittinger. Not to my direct knowledge.

Senator Schweiker. Would you have been in a position to know the answer to either of those questions?

Mr. Gittinger. May I say, probably not, and may I make an aside to explain a little bit of this, please, sir?

Senator Schweiker. Mr. Gittinger, a moment ago you mentioned brainwashing techniques, as one area that you had, I guess, done some work in. How would you characterize the state of the art of brainwashing today? Who has the most expertise in this field, and who is or is not doing it in terms of other governments?

During the Korean war there was a lot of serious discussion about brainwashing techniques being used by the North Koreans, and I am interested in finding out what the state of the art is today, as you see it.

Mr. Gittinger. Well, of course, there has been a great deal of work on this, and there is still a great deal of controversy. I can tell you that as far as I knew, by 1961, 1962, it was at least proven to my satisfaction that brainwashing, so called, is some kind of an esoteric device where drugs or mind-altering kinds of conditions and so forth were used, did not exist even though “The Manchurian Candidate” as a movie really set us back a long time, because it made something impossible look plausible. Do you follow what I mean? But by 1962 and 1963, the general idea that we were able to come up with is that brainwashing was largely a process of isolating a human being, keeping him out of contact, putting him under long stress in relationship to interviewing and interrogation, and that they could produce any change that way without having to resort to any kind of esoteric means.

Senator Schweiker. Are there ways that we can ascertain this from a distance when we see a captive prisoner either go on television, in a photograph, or at a press conference? In other words, are there certain signs that you have learned to recognize from your technical background, to tell when brainwashing has occurred? Or is that very difficult to do?

Mr. Gittinger. It is difficult to do. I think it is possible now in terms of looking at a picture of somebody who has been in enemy hands for a long period of time. We can get some pretty good ideas of what kind of circumstances he has been under, if that is what you mean.
Senator Schweiker. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much.
Before adjourning the hearings, I would like to have the record show that Dr. Goldman and Mr. Gittinger have voluntarily cooperated with the committee in staff interviews, that they appear this morning voluntarily, and they are not under subpoena.
Gentlemen, I realize that this experience may have been an unhappy one and possibly a painful one. Therefore, we thank you very much for participating this morning. We also realize that the circumstances of that time differed very much from this day, and possibly the national attitude, the national political attitude condoned this type of activity. So, we have not asked you to come here as persons who have committed crimes, but rather in hope that you can assist us in studying this problem so that it will not occur once again. In that spirit we thank you for your participation, and we look forward to working with you further in this case.
Thank you very much.
Senator Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, I would like also to thank the witnesses. These are difficult matters, and I think all of us are very grateful.
Senator Schweiker. I think the witnesses should know that though it may not always seem that way, what we are trying to do is to probe the past and look at the policies of the past to affect the future. I think our emphasis really is on the future, not the past, but it is important that we learn from the past as we formulate policies and legislation for the future, I hope that all of the witnesses who did come before us voluntarily this morning, including Admiral Turner respect the fact that we are questioning the past to learn about the future. I think it should be looked at in that light.
Senator Kennedy. I think that is the spirit in which we have had these hearings. It seems to me that from both these witnesses and others, Gottlieb knows the information and can best respond, and we are going to make every effort in the Senate Health Committee to get Mr. Gottlieb to appear, and we obviously look forward to cooperating with Senator Inouye and the other members of the committee in getting the final chapter written on this, but we want to thank you very much for your appearance here.
Senator Inouye. The hearing will stand in recess, subject to the call of the Chair.
[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the hearing was recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.]
APPENDIX A

XVII. TESTING AND USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AGENTS BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Under its mandate the Select Committee has studied the testing and use of chemical and biological agents by intelligence agencies. Detailed descriptions of the programs conducted by intelligence agencies involving chemical and biological agents will be included in a separately published appendix to the Senate Select Committee's report. This section of the report will discuss the rationale for the programs, their monitoring and control, and what the Committee's investigation has revealed about the relationships among the intelligence agencies and about their relations with other government agencies and private institutions and individuals.

Fears that countries hostile to the United States would use chemical and biological agents against Americans or America's allies led to the development of a defensive program designed to discover techniques for American intelligence agencies to detect and counteract chemical and biological agents. The defensive orientation soon became secondary as the possible use of these agents to obtain information from, or gain control over, enemy agents became apparent.

Research and development programs to find materials which could be used to alter human behavior were initiated in the late 1940s and early 1950s. These experimental programs originally included testing of drugs involving witting human subjects, and culminated in tests using unwitting, nonvolunteer human subjects. These tests were designed to determine the potential effects of chemical or biological agents when used operationally against individuals unaware that they had received a drug.

The testing programs were considered highly sensitive by the intelligence agencies administering them. Few people, even within the agencies, knew of the programs and there is no evidence that either the executive branch or Congress were ever informed of them. The highly compartmented nature of these programs may be explained in part by an observation made by the CIA Inspector General that, "the knowledge that the Agency is engaging in unethical and illicit activi-

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1 Senate Resolution 21 directs the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities to investigate a number of issues:

"(a) Whether agencies within the intelligence community conducted illegal domestic activities (Section 2(1) and (2));

"(b) The extent to which agencies within the intelligence community cooperate (Section 2(4) and (8));

"(c) The adequacy of executive branch and congressional oversight of intelligence activities (Section 2(7) and (11));

"(d) The adequacy of existing laws to safeguard the rights of American citizens (Section 2(13))."

2 The details of these programs may never be known. The programs were highly compartmented. Few records were kept. What little documentation existed for the CIA's principal program was destroyed early in 1973.

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(45)
ties would have serious repercussions in political and diplomatic circles 
and would be detrimental to the accomplishment of its missions."

The research and development program, and particularly the co-
vert testing programs, resulted in massive abridgments of the rights 
of American citizens, sometimes with tragic consequences. The deaths 
of two Americans 4 can be attributed to these programs; other partici-
pants in the testing programs may still suffer from the residual ef-
facts. While some controlled testing of these substances might be de-
defended, the nature of the tests, their scale, and the fact that they were 
continued for years after the danger of surreptitious administration 
of LSD to unwitting individuals was known, demonstrate a funda-
mental disregard for the value of human life.

The Select Committee’s investigation of the testing and use of chemi-
cal and biological agents also raise serious questions about the ade-
quacy of command and control procedures within the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and military intelligence, and about the relationships 
among the intelligence agencies, other governmental agencies, and 
private institutions and individuals. The CIA’s normal administrative 
controls were waived for programs involving chemical and biological 
agents to protect their security. According to the head of the Audit 
Branch of the CIA, these waivers produced “gross administrative 
failures.” They prevented the CIA’s internal review mechanisms (the 
Office of General Counsel, the Inspector General, and the Audit Staff) 
from adequately supervising the programs. In general, the waivers had 
the paradoxical effect of providing less restrictive administrative con-
trols and less effective internal review for controversial and highly 
sensitive projects than those governing normal Agency activities.

The security of the programs was protected not only by waivers of 
normal administrative controls, but also by a high degree of com-
partmentation within the CIA. This compartmentation excluded the 
CIA’s Medical Staff from the principal research and testing program 
employing chemical and biological agents.

It also may have led to agency policymakers receiving differing 
and inconsistent responses when they posed questions to the CIA 
component involved.

Jurisdictional uncertainty within the CIA was matched by juris-
dictional conflict among the various intelligence agencies. A spirit of 
cooperation and reciprocal exchanges of information which initially 
characterized the programs disappeared. Military testers withheld in-
formation from the CIA, ignoring suggestions for coordination from 
their superiors. The CIA similarly failed to provide information to 
the military on the CIA’s testing program. This failure to cooperate 
was conspicuously manifested in an attempt by the Army to conceal 

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4 On January 8, 1953, Mr. Harold Blauer died of circulatory collapse and heart 
failure following an intravenous injection of a synthetic mescaline derivative 
while a subject of tests conducted by New York State Psychiatric Institute under 
a contract let by the U.S. Army Chemical Corps. The Committee’s investigation 
into drug testing by U.S. intelligence agencies focused on the testing of LSD, how-
ever, the committee did receive a copy of the U.S. Army Inspector General’s 
Report, issued on October 1975, on the events and circumstances of Mr. Blauer’s 
death. His death was directly attributable to the administration of the synthetic 
mescaline derivative.
their overseas testing program, which included surreptitious administration of LSD, from the CIA. Learning of the Army’s program, the Agency surreptitiously attempted to obtain details of it.

The decision to institute one of the Army’s LSD field testing projects had been based, at least in part, on the finding that no long-term residual effects had ever resulted from the drug’s administration. The CIA’s failure to inform the Army of a death which resulted from the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting Americans, may well have resulted in the institution of an unnecessary and potentially lethal program.

The development, testing, and use of chemical and biological agents by intelligence agencies raises serious questions about the relationship between the intelligence community and foreign governments, other agencies of the Federal Government, and other institutions and individuals. The questions raised range from the legitimacy of American complicity in actions abroad which violate American and foreign laws to the possible compromise of the integrity of public and private institutions used as cover by intelligence agencies.

A. The Programs Investigated

1. Project CHATTER

Project CHATTER was a Navy program that began in the fall of 1947. Responding to reports of “amazing results” achieved by the Soviets in using “truth drugs,” the program focused on the identification and testing of such drugs for use in interrogations and in the recruitment of agents. The research included laboratory experiments on animals and human subjects involving Anabasis asphylla, scopolamine, and mescaline in order to determine their speech-inducing qualities. Overseas experiments were conducted as part of the project.

The project expanded substantially during the Korean War, and ended shortly after the war, in 1953.

2. Project BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE

The earliest of the CIA’s major programs involving the use of chemical and biological agents, Project BLUEBIRD, was approved by the Director in 1950. Its objectives were:

(a) discovering means of conditioning personnel to prevent unauthorized extraction of information from them by known means, (b) investigating the possibility of control of an individual by application of special interrogation techniques, (c) memory enhancement, and (d) establishing defensive means for preventing hostile control of Agency personnel.

As a result of interrogations conducted overseas during the project, another goal was added—the evaluation of offensive uses of unconventional interrogation techniques, including hypnosis and drugs. In August 1951, the project was renamed ARTICHOKE. Project ARTICHOKE included in-house experiments on interrogation techniques, conducted “under medical and security controls which would ensure

4 CIA memorandum to the Select Committee, “Behavioral Drugs and Testing,” 2/11/75.
that no damage was done to individuals who volunteer for the experiments." Overseas interrogations utilizing a combination of sodium pentothal and hypnosis after physical and psychiatric examinations of the subjects were also part of ARTICHOKE.

The Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), which studied scientific advances by hostile powers, initially led BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE efforts. In 1952, overall responsibility for ARTICHOKE was transferred from OSI to the Inspection and Security Office (I&SO), predecessor to the present Office of Security. The CIA's Technical Services and Medical Staffs were to be called upon as needed; OSI would retain liaison function with other government agencies. The change in leadership from an intelligence unit to an operating unit apparently reflected a change in emphasis; from the study of actions by hostile powers to the use, both for offensive and defensive purposes, of special interrogation techniques—primarily hypnosis and truth serums.

Representatives from each Agency unit involved in ARTICHOKE met almost monthly to discuss their progress. These discussions included the planning of overseas interrogations as well as further experimentation in the U.S.

Information about project ARTICHOKE after the fall of 1953 is scarce. The CIA maintains that the project ended in 1956, but evidence suggests that Office of Security and Office of Medical Services use of "special interrogation" techniques continued for several years thereafter.

3. MKNAOMI

MKNAOMI was another major CIA program in this area. In 1967, the CIA summarized the purposes of MKNAOMI:

(a) To provide for a covert support base to meet clandestine operational requirements.

(b) To stockpile severely incapacitating and lethal materials for the specific use of TSD [Technical Services Division].

(c) To maintain in operational readiness special and unique items for the dissemination of biological and chemical materials.

(d) To provide for the required surveillance, testing, upgrading, and evaluation of materials and items in order to assure absence of defects and complete predictability of results to be expected under operational conditions.

Under an agreement reached with the Army in 1952, the Special Operations Division (SOD) at Fort Detrick was to assist CIA in developing, testing, and maintaining biological agents and delivery

* Memorandum from Robert Taylor, O/DD/P to the Assistant Deputy (Inspection and Security) and Chief of the Medical Staff, 3/22/52.
* Memorandum from H. Marshall Chadwell, Assistant Director, Scientific Intelligence, to the Deputy Director/Plans (DDP) "Project ARTICHOKE," 8/23/52.
* "Progress Report, Project ARTICHOKE," 1/12/53.
* Memorandum from Chief, TSD/Biological Branch to Chief, TSD "MKNAOMI: Funding, Objectives, and Accomplishments," 10/18/67, p. 1. For a fuller description of MKNAOMI and the relationship between CIA and SOD, see p. 380 ff.
systems. By this agreement, CIA acquired the knowledge, skill, and facilities of the Army to develop biological weapons suited for CIA use.

SOD developed darts coated with biological agents and pills containing several different biological agents which could remain potent for weeks or months. SOD also developed a special gun for firing darts coated with a chemical which could allow CIA agents to incapacitate a guard dog, enter an installation secretly, and return the dog to consciousness when leaving. SOD scientists were unable to develop a similar incapacitant for humans. SOD also physically transferred to CIA personnel biological agents in "bulk" form, and delivery devices, including some containing biological agents.

In addition to the CIA's interest in biological weapons for use against humans, it also asked SOD to study use of biological agents against crops and animals. In its 1967 memorandum, the CIA stated:

Three methods and systems for carrying out a covert attack against crops and causing severe crop loss have been developed and evaluated under field conditions. This was accomplished in anticipation of a requirement which was later developed but was subsequently scrubbed just prior to putting into action.  

MKNAOMI was terminated in 1970. On November 25, 1969, President Nixon renounced the use of any form of biological weapons that kill or incapacitate and ordered the disposal of existing stocks of bacteriological weapons. On February 14, 1970, the President clarified the extent of his earlier order and indicated that toxins—chemicals that are not living organisms but are produced by living organisms—were considered biological weapons subject to his previous directive and were to be destroyed. Although instructed to relinquish control of material held for the CIA by SOD, a CIA scientist acquired approximately 11 grams of shellfish toxin from SOD personnel at Fort Detrick which were stored in a little-used CIA laboratory where it went undetected for five years.  

4. MKULTRA  

MKULTRA was the principal CIA program involving the research and development of chemical and biological agents. It was "concerned with the research and development of chemical, biological, and radiological materials capable of employment in clandestine operations to control human behavior."  

In January 1973, MKULTRA records were destroyed by Technical Services Division personnel acting on the verbal orders of Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, Chief of TSD. Dr. Gottlieb has testified, and former Director Helms has confirmed, that in ordering the records destroyed, Dr. Gottlieb was carrying out the verbal order of then DCI Helms.

MKULTRA began with a proposal from the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Helms, to the DCI, outlining a special

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84 Ibid. p. 2.
85 Senate Select Committee, 9/19/75, Hearings, Vol. 1.
86 Memorandum from the CIA Inspector General to the Director, 7/26/65.
funding mechanism for highly sensitive CIA research and development projects that studied the use of biological and chemical materials in altering human behavior. The projects involved:

Research to develop a capability in the covert use of biological and chemical materials. This area involves the production of various physiological conditions which could support present or future clandestine operations. Aside from the offensive potential, the development of a comprehensive capability in this field of covert chemical and biological warfare gives us a thorough knowledge of the enemy’s theoretical potential, thus enabling us to defend ourselves against a foe who might not be as restrained in the use of these techniques as we are.12

MKULTRA was approved by the DCI on April 13, 1953 along the lines proposed by ADDP Helms.

Part of the rationale for the establishment of this special funding mechanism was its extreme sensitivity. The Inspector General’s survey of MKULTRA in 1963 noted the following reasons for this sensitivity:

a. Research in the manipulation of human behavior is considered by many authorities in medicine and related fields to be professionally unethical, therefore the reputation of professional participants in the MKULTRA program are on occasion in jeopardy.

b. Some MKULTRA activities raise questions of legality implicit in the original charter.

c. A final phase of the testing of MKULTRA products places the rights and interests of U.S. citizens in jeopardy.

d. Public disclosure of some aspects of MKULTRA activity could induce serious adverse reaction in U.S. public opinion, as well as stimulate offensive and defensive action in this field on the part of foreign intelligence services.13

Over the ten-year life of the program, many “additional avenues to the control of human behavior” were designated as appropriate for investigation under the MKULTRA charter. These include “radiation, electroshock, various fields of psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and anthropology, graphology, harassment substances, and paramilitary devices and materials.”14

The research and development of materials to be used for altering human behavior consisted of three phases: first, the search for materials suitable for study; second, laboratory testing on voluntary human subjects in various types of institutions; third, the application of MKULTRA materials in normal life settings.

The search for suitable materials was conducted through standing arrangements with specialists in universities, pharmaceutical houses, hospitals, state and federal institutions, and private research organi-

14 Ibid, p. 4.
zations. The annual grants of funds to these specialists were made under ostensible research foundation auspices, thereby concealing the CIA's interest from the specialist's institution.

The next phase of the MKULTRA program involved physicians, toxicologists, and other specialists in mental, narcotics, and general hospitals, and in prisons. Utilizing the products and findings of the basic research phase, they conducted intensive tests on human subjects.

One of the first studies was conducted by the National Institute of Mental Health. This study was intended to test various drugs, including hallucinogens, at the NIMH Addiction Research Center in Lexington, Kentucky. The "Lexington Rehabilitation Center," as it was then called, was a prison for drug addicts serving sentences for drug violations.

The test subjects were volunteer prisoners who, after taking a brief physical examination and signing a general consent form, were administered hallucinogenic drugs. As a reward for participation in the program, the addicts were provided with the drug of their addiction.

LSD was one of the materials tested in the MKULTRA program. The final phase of LSD testing involved surreptitious administration to unwitting nonvolunteer subjects in normal life settings by undercover officers of the Bureau of Narcotics acting for the CIA.

The rationale for such testing was "that testing of materials under accepted scientific procedures fails to disclose the full pattern of reactions and attributions that may occur in operational situations." 15

According to the CIA, the advantage of the relationship with the Bureau was that

test subjects could be sought and cultivated within the setting of narcotics control. Some subjects have been informers or members of suspect criminal elements from whom the [Bureau of Narcotics] has obtained results of operational value through the tests. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the substances on individuals at all social levels, high and low, native American and foreign, is of great significance and testing has been performed on a variety of individuals within these categories. [Emphasis added.] 16

A special procedure, designated MKDELTA, was established to govern the use of MKULTRA materials abroad. Such materials were used on a number of occasions. Because MKULTRA records were destroyed, it is impossible to reconstruct the operational use of MKULTRA materials by the CIA overseas; it has been determined that the use of these materials abroad began in 1953, and possibly as early as 1950.

Drugs were used primarily as an aid to interrogations, but MKULTRA/MKDELTA materials were also used for harassment, discrediting, or disabling purposes. According to an Inspector General Survey of the Technical Services Division of the CIA in 1957—an inspection which did not discover the MKULTRA project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting, nonvolunteer

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16 Ibid., pp. 11-12.
subjects—the CIA had developed six drugs for operational use and they had been used in six different operations on a total of thirty-three subjects. By 1963 the number of operations and subjects had increased substantially.

In the spring of 1963, during a wide-ranging Inspector General survey of the Technical Services Division, a member of the Inspector General's staff, John Vance, learned about MKULTRA and about the project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting, nonvoluntary human subjects. As a result of the discovery and the Inspector General's subsequent report, this testing was halted and much tighter administrative controls were imposed on the program. According to the CIA, the project was decreased significantly each budget year until its complete termination in the late 1960s.

5. The Testing of LSD by the Army

There were three major phases in the Army's testing of LSD. In the first, LSD was administered to more than 1,000 American soldiers who volunteered to be subjects in chemical warfare experiments. In the second phase, Material Testing Program EA 1729, 95 volunteers received LSD in clinical experiments designed to evaluate potential intelligence uses of the drug. In the third phase, Projects THIRD CHANCE and DERBY HAT, 16 unwitting nonvolunteer subjects were interrogated after receiving LSD as part of operational field tests.

B. CIA Drug Testing Programs

1. The Rationale for the Testing Programs

The late 1940s and early 1950s were marked by concern over the threat posed by the activities of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and other Communist bloc countries. United States concern over the use of chemical and biological agents by these powers was acute. The belief that hostile powers had used chemical and biological agents in interrogations, brainwashing, and in attacks designed to harass, disable, or kill Allied personnel created considerable pressure for a "defensive" program to investigate chemical and biological agents so that the intelligence community could understand the mechanisms by which these substances worked and how their effects could be defeated.18

Of particular concern was the drug LSD. The CIA had received reports that the Soviet Union was engaged in intensive efforts to produce LSD; and that the Soviet Union had attempted to purchase the world's supply of the chemical. As one CIA officer who was deeply involved in work with this drug described the climate of the times: "It is awfully hard in this day and age to reproduce how frightening all of this was to us at the time, particularly after the drug scene has become as widespread and as knowledgeable in this country as it did. But we were literally terrified, because this was the one material that we

18 "Ibid., 1957, p. 201.

18 Thus an officer in the Office of Security of the CIA stressed the "urgency of the discovery of techniques and method that would permit our personnel, in the event of their capture by the enemy, to resist or defeat enemy interrogation." (Minutes of the ARTICHOKE conference of 10/22/53.)
had ever been able to locate that really had potential fantastic possibilities if used wrongly." 10

But the defensive orientation soon became secondary. Chemical and biological agents were to be studied in order "to perfect techniques . . . for the abstraction of information from individuals whether willing or not" and in order to "develop means for the control of the activities and mental capacities of individuals whether willing or not." 20 One Agency official noted that drugs would be useful in order to "gain control of bodies whether they were willing or not" in the process of removing personnel from Europe in the event of a Soviet attack. 21 In other programs, the CIA began to develop, produce, stockpile, and maintain in operational readiness materials which could be used to harass, disable, or kill specific targets. 22

Reports of research and development in the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and the Communist Bloc countries provided the basis for the transmutation of American programs from a defensive to an offensive orientation. As the Chief of the Medical Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency wrote in 1952:

There is ample evidence in the reports of innumerable interrogations that the Communists were utilizing drugs, physical duress, electric shock, and possibly hypnosis against their enemies. With such evidence it is difficult not to keep from becoming rabid about our apparent laxity. We are forced by this mounting evidence to assume a more aggressive role in the development of these techniques, but must be cautious to maintain strict inviolable control because of the havoc that could be wrought by such techniques in unscrupulous hands. 23

In order to meet the perceived threat to the national security, substantial programs for the testing and use of chemical and biological agents—including projects involving the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting nonvolunteer subjects "at all social levels, high and low, native American and foreign"—were conceived, and implemented. These programs resulted in substantial violations of the rights of individuals within the United States.

10 Testimony of CIA officer, 11/21/75, p. 33.
20 Memorandum from the Director of Security to ARTICHOKE representatives. Subject: "ARTICHOKE Restatement of Program."
21 ARTICHOKE memorandum, 7/30/53.
22 The Inspector General's Report of 1957 on the Technical Services Division noted that "Six specific products have been developed and are available for operational use. Three of them are discrediting and disablur materials which can be administered unwittingly and permit the exercise of a measure of control over the actions of the subject."
23 A memorandum for the Chief, TSD, Biological Branch to the Chief, TSD, 10/19/67, described two of the objectives of the CIA's Project MKNAOMI as: "to stockpile severely incapacitating and lethal materials for the specific use of TSD" and "to maintain in operational readiness special and unique items for the dissemination of biological and chemical materials."
24 Memorandum from the Chief of the Medical Staff, 1/25/52.
Although the CIA recognized these effects of LSD to unwitting individuals within the United States, the project continued.\textsuperscript{24} As the Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Helms, wrote the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence during discussions which led to the cessation of unwitting testing:

While I share your uneasiness and distaste for any program which tends to intrude upon an individual's private and legal prerogatives, I believe it is necessary that the Agency maintain a central role in this activity, keep current on enemy capabilities the manipulation of human behavior, and maintain an offensive capability.\textsuperscript{25}

There were no attempts to secure approval for the most controversial aspects of these programs from the executive branch or Congress. The nature and extent of the programs were closely held secrets; even DCI McConne was not briefed on all the details of the program involving the surreptitious administration of LSD until 1963. It was deemed imperative that these programs be concealed from the American people. As the CIA's Inspector General wrote in 1957:

Precautions must be taken not only to protect operations from exposure to enemy forces but also to conceal these activities from the American public in general. The knowledge that the Agency is engaging in unethical and illicit activities would have serious repercussions in political and diplomatic circles and would be detrimental to the accomplishment of its mission.\textsuperscript{26}

2. The Death of Dr. Frank Olson

The most tragic result of the testing of LSD by the CIA was the death of Dr. Frank Olson, a civilian employee of the Army, who died on November 27, 1953. His death followed his participation in a CIA experiment with LSD. As part of this experiment, Olson unwittingly received approximately 70 micrograms of LSD in a glass of Cointreau he drank on November 19, 1953. The drug had been placed in the bottle by a CIA officer, Dr. Robert Lashbrook, as part of an experiment he and Dr. Sidney Gottlieb performed at a meeting of Army and CIA scientists.

Shortly after this experiment, Olson exhibited symptoms of paranoia and schizophrenia. Accompanied by Dr. Lashbrook, Olson sought psychiatric assistance in New York City from a physician, Dr. Harold Abramson, whose research on LSD had been funded indirectly by the CIA. While in New York for treatment, Olson fell to his death from a tenth story window in the Statler Hotel.

\textsuperscript{24} Even during the discussions which led to the termination of the unwitting testing, the DDP turned down the option of halting such tests within the U.S. and continuing them abroad despite the fact that the Technical Services Division had conducted numerous operations abroad making use of LSD. The DDP made this decision on the basis of security noting that the post efforts overseas had resulted in "making an inordinate number of foreign nationals witting of our role in the very sensitive activity." (Memorandum for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from the Deputy Director for Plans, 12/17/63, p. 2.)

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., pp. 2-3.

\textsuperscript{26} I.G. survey of TSD, 1957, p. 217.
a. Background.—Olson, an expert in aerobiology who was assigned to the Special Operations Division (SOD) of the U.S. Army Biological Center at Camp Detrick, Maryland. This Division had three primary functions:

1. assessing the vulnerability of American installations to biological attack;
2. developing techniques for offensive use of biological weapons; and
3. biological research for the CIA.27

Professionally, Olson was well respected by his colleagues in both the Army and the CIA. Colonel Vincent Ruwet, Olson’s immediate superior at the time of his death, was in almost daily contact with Olson. According to Colonel Ruwet: “As a professional man . . . his ability . . . was outstanding.”28 Colonel Ruwet stated that “during the period prior to the experiment . . . I noticed nothing which would lead me to believe that he was of unsound mind.”29 Dr. Lashbrook, who had monthly contacts with Olson from early 1952 until the time of his death, stated publicly that before Olson received LSD, “as far as I know, he was perfectly normal.”30 This assessment is in direct contradiction to certain statements evaluating Olson’s emotional stability made in CIA internal memoranda written after Olson’s death.

b. The Experiment.—On November 18, 1953, a group of ten scientists from the CIA and Camp Detrick attended a semi-annual review and analysis conference at a cabin located at Deep Creek Lake, Maryland. Three of the participants were from the CIA’s Technical Services Staff. The Detrick representatives were all from the Special Operations Division.

According to one CIA official, the Special Operations Division participants “agreed that an unwitting experiment would be desirable.”31 This account directly contradicts Vincent Ruwet’s recollection. Ruwet recalls no such discussion, and has asserted that he would remember any such discussion because the SOD participants would have strenuously objected to testing on unwitting subjects.32

In May, 1953, Richard Helms, Assistant DDP, held a staff meeting which the Chief of Technical Services Staff attended. At this meeting Helms “indicated that the drug [LSD] was dynamite and that he should be advised at all times when it was intended to use it.”33 In addition, the then DDP, Frank Wisner, sent a memorandum to TSS stating the requirement that the DDP personally approve the use of LSD. Gottlieb went ahead with the experiment,34 securing the ap-

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27 Staff summary of Vincent Ruwet Interview, 8/13/75, p. 3.
28 Memorandum of Col. Vincent Ruwet, To Whom It May Concern, no date, p. 2.
29 Ruwet Memorandum, p. 3.
31 Memorandum for the Record from Lyman Kirkpatrick, 12/1/53, p. 1.
32 Ruwet (staff summary), 8/13/75, p. 6.
33 Inspector General Diary, 12/2/53.
34 Ibid. Dr. Gottlieb has testified that he does not remember either the meeting with Helms nor the Wisner memorandum. (Gottlieb, 10/18/75, p. 18.)
proval of his immediate supervisor. Neither the Chief of TSS nor the DDP specifically authorized the experiment in which Dr. Olson participated.28

According to Gottlieb,24 a “very small dose” of LSD was placed in a bottle of Cointreau which was served after dinner on Thursday, November 19. The drug was placed in the liqueur by Robert Lashbrook. All but two of the SOD participants received LSD. One did not drink; the other had a heart condition.27 About twenty minutes after they finished their Cointreau, Gottlieb informed the other participants that they had received LSD.

Dr. Gottlieb stated that “up to the time of the experiment,” he observed nothing unusual in Olson’s behavior.27 Once the experiment was underway, Gottlieb recalled that “the drug had a definite effect on the group to the point that they were boisterous and laughing and they could not continue the meeting or engage in sensible conversation.” The meeting continued until about 1:00 a.m., when the participants retired for the evening. Gottlieb recalled that Olson, among others, complained of “wakeness” during the night.28 According to Gottlieb on Friday morning “aside from some evidence of fatigue, I observed nothing unusual in [Olson’s] actions, conversation, or general behavior.”29 Ruwet recalls that Olson “appeared to be agitated” at breakfast, but that he “did not consider this to be abnormal under the circumstances.”30

c. The Treatment.—The following Monday, November 23, Olson was waiting for Ruwet when he came in to work at 7:30 a.m. For the next two days Olson’s friends and family attempted to reassure him and help him “snap out” of what appeared to be a serious depression. On Tuesday, Olson again came to Ruwet and, after an hour long con-
versation, it was decided that medical assistance for Dr. Olson was desirable.

Ruwet then called Lashbrook and informed him that "Dr. Olson was in serious trouble and needed immediate professional attention." Lashbrook agreed to make appropriate arrangements and told Ruwet to bring Olson to Washington, D.C. Ruwet and Olson proceeded to Washington to meet with Lashbrook, and the three left for New York at about 2:30 p.m. to meet with Dr. Harold Abramson.

At that time Dr. Abramson was an allergist and immunologist practicing medicine in New York City. He held no degree in psychiatry, but was associated with research projects supported indirectly by the CIA. Gottlieb and Dr. Lashbrook both followed his work closely in the early 1950s. Since Olson needed medical help, they turned to Dr. Abramson as the doctor closest to Washington who was experienced with LSD and cleared by the CIA.

Ruwet, Lashbrook, and Olson remained in New York for two days of consultations with Abramson. On Thursday, November 26, 1953, the three flew back to Washington so that Olson could spend Thanksgiving with his family. En route from the airport Olson told Ruwet that he was afraid to face his family. After a lengthy discussion, it was decided that Olson and Lashbrook would return to New York, and that Ruwet would go to Frederick to explain these events to Mrs. Olson.

Lashbrook and Olson flew back to New York the same day, again for consultations with Abramson. They spent Thursday night in a Long Island hotel and the next morning returned to the city with Abramson. In further discussions with Abramson, it was agreed that Olson should be placed under regular psychiatric care at an institution closer to his home.

d. The Death.—Because they could not obtain air transportation for a return trip on Friday night, Lashbrook and Olson made reservations for Saturday morning and checked into the Statler Hotel. Between the time they checked in and 10:00 p.m.; they watched television, visited the cocktail lounge, where each had two martinis, and dinner. According to Lashbrook, Olson "was cheerful and appeared to enjoy the entertainment." He "appeared no longer particularly depressed, and almost the Dr. Olson I knew prior to the experiment."

After dinner Lashbrook and Olson watched television for about an hour, and at 11:00, Olson suggested that they go to bed, saying that "he felt more relaxed and contented than he had since [they] came to New York." Olson then left a call with the hotel operator to wake them in the morning. At approximately 2:30 a.m. Saturday, November 28, Lashbrook was awakened by a loud "crash of glass." In his report on the incident, he stated only that Olson "had crashed through the closed window blind and the closed window and he fell to his death from the window of our room on the 10th floor."

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41 Ibid., p. 4.
42 Lashbrook memorandum, 12/7/63, p. 1.
43 Staff summary of Dr. Harold Abramson interview, 7/29/75, p. 2.
44 Lashbrook memorandum, 12/7/63, p. 3.
45 Abramson memorandum, 12/4/63.
46 Lashbrook memorandum, 12/7/63, p. 3.
47 Ibid., p. 4.
48 Ibid.
Immediately after finding that Olson had leapt to his death, Lashbrook telephoned Gottlieb at his home and informed him of the incident. Gottlieb called Ruwet and informed him of Olson’s death at approximately 2:45 a.m. Lashbrook then called the hotel desk and reported the incident to the operator there. Lashbrook called Abramson and informed him of the occurrence. Abramson told Lashbrook he “wanted to be kept out of the thing completely,” but later changed his mind and agreed to assist Lashbrook.

Shortly thereafter, uniformed police officers and some hotel employees came to Lashbrook’s room. Lashbrook told the police he didn’t know why Olson had committed suicide, but he did know that Olson “suffered from ulcers.”

e. The Aftermath.—Following Dr. Olson’s death, the CIA made a substantial effort to ensure that his family received death benefits, but did not notify the Olsons of the circumstances surrounding his demise. The Agency also made considerable efforts to prevent the death being connected with the CIA, and supplied complete cover for Lashbrook so that his association with the CIA would remain a secret. After Dr. Olson’s death the CIA conducted an internal investigation of the incident. As part of his responsibilities in this investigation, the General Counsel wrote the Inspector General, stating:

I’m not happy with what seems to be a very casual attitude on the part of TSS representatives to the way this experiment was conducted and the remarks that this is just one of the risks running with scientific experimentation. I do not eliminate the need for taking risks, but I do believe, especially when human health or life is at stake, that at least the prudent, reasonable measures which can be taken to minimize the risk must be taken and failure to do so was culpable negligence. The actions of the various individuals concerned after effects of the experiment on Dr. Olson became manifest also revealed the failure to observe normal and reasonable precautions.

As a result of the investigation DCI Allen Dulles sent a personal letter to the Chief of Technical Operations of the Technical Services Staff who had approved the experiment criticizing him for “poor judgment... in authorizing the use of this drug on such an unwitting basis and without proximate medical safeguards.” Dulles also sent a letter to Dr. Gottlieb, Chief of the Chemical Division of the Technical Services Staff, criticizing him for recommending the “unwitting application of the drug” in that the proposal “did not give sufficient emphasis for medical collaboration and for the proper consideration of the rights of the individual to whom it was being administered.”

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* CIA Field Office Report, 12/3/53, p. 3.
* Ruwet Memorandum, p. 11.
* CIA Field Office Report, 12/3/53, p. 3.
* Ibid.
* Memorandum from the General Counsel to the Inspector General, 1/4/54.
* Memorandum from DCI to Chief, Technical Operations, TSS, 2/12/54.
* Memorandum from DCI to Sidney Gottlieb, 2/12/54.
The letters were hand carried to the individuals to be read and returned. Although the letters were critical, a note from the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence to Mr. Helms instructed him to inform the individuals that: "These are not reprimands and no personnel file notation are being made." Thus, although the Rockefeller Commission has characterized them as such, these notes were explicitly not reprimands. Nor did participation in the events which led to Dr. Olson’s death have any apparent effect on the advancement within the CIA of the individuals involved.

3. The Surreptitious Administration of LSD to Unwitting Non-Volunteer Human Subjects by the CIA After the Death of Dr. Olson

The death of Dr. Olson could be viewed, as some argued at the time, as a tragic accident, one of the risks inherent in the testing of new substances. It might be argued that LSD was thought to be benign. After the death of Dr. Olson the dangers of the surreptitious administration of LSD were clear, yet the CIA continued or initiated a project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD to non-volunteer human subjects. This program exposed numerous individuals in the United States to the risk of death or serious injury without their informed consent, without medical supervision, and without necessary follow-up to determine any long-term effects.

Prior to the Olson experiment, the Director of Central Intelligence had approved MKULTRA, a research program designed to develop a "capability in the covert use of biological and chemical agent materials." In the proposal describing MKULTRA Mr. Helms, then ADDP, wrote the Director that:

we intend to investigate the development of a chemical material which causes a reversible non-toxic aberrant mental state, the specific nature of which can be reasonably well predicted for each individual. This material could potentially aid in discrediting individuals, eliciting information, and implanting suggestions and other forms of mental control.

On February 12, 1954, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency wrote TSS officials criticizing them for "poor judgment" in administering LSD on "an unwitting basis and without proximate medical safeguards" to Dr. Olson and for the lack of "proper consideration of the rights of the individual to whom it was being administered." On the same day, the Inspector General reviewed a report on Subproject Number 3 of MKULTRA, in which the same TSS officers who had just received letters from the Director were quoted as stating that one of the purposes of Subproject Number 3 was to

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*Note from DDCI to Richard Helms, 2/13/54.
*The 1963 IG Report, which described the project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD, placed the project beginning in 1955. Other CIA documents reveal that it was in existence as early as February 1954. The CIA has told the Committee that the project began in 1953 and that the experiment which led to Dr. Olson's death was part of the project.
*Memorandum from ADDP items to DCI Dulles, 4/3/53, tab A. p. 2.
*Memorandum from DCI to Sidney Gottlieb, 2/12/54; and memorandum from DCI to Chief of Operations, TSS, 2/12/54.
“observe the behavior of unwitting persons being questioned after having been given a drug.” There is no evidence that Subproject Number 3 was terminated even though these officers were unequivocally aware of the dangers of the surreptitious administration of LSD and the necessity of obtaining informed consent and providing medical safeguards. Subproject Number 3, in fact, used methods which showed even less concern than did the OLSON experiment for the safety and security of the participants. Yet the evidence indicates the project continued until 1963.

In the project, the individual conducting the test might make initial contact with a prospective subject selected at random in a bar. He would then invite the person to a “safehouse” where the test drug was administered to the subject through drink or in food. CIA personnel might debrief the individual conducting the test, or observe the test by using a one-way mirror and tape recorder in an adjoining room.

Prior consent was obviously not obtained from any of the subjects. There was also, obviously, no medical prescreening. In addition, the tests were conducted by individuals who were not qualified scientific observers. There were no medical personnel on hand either to administer the drugs or to observe their effects, and no follow-up was conducted on the test subjects.

As the Inspector General noted in 1963:

A significant limitation on the effectiveness of such testing is the infeasibility of performing scientific observation of results. The [individuals conducting the test] are not qualified scientific observers. Their subjects are seldom accessible beyond the first hours of the test. The testing may be useful in perfecting delivery techniques, and in identifying surface characteristics of onset, reaction, attribution, and side-effect.

This was particularly troublesome as in a number of instances, . . . the test subject has become ill for hours or days, including hospitalization in at least one case, and the agent could only follow up by guarded inquiry after the test subject’s return to normal life. Possible sickness and attendant economic loss are inherent contingent effects of the testing.

Paradoxically, greater care seems to have been taken for the safety of foreign nationals against whom LSD was used abroad. In several cases medical examinations were performed prior to the use of LSD.

Memorandum to Inspector General from Chief, Inspection and Review, on Subproject #3 of MKULTRA, 2/10/54.
* Ibid., p. 12.
* Ibid. According to the IG’s survey in 1963, physicians associated with MKULTRA could be made available in an emergency.
* The Technical Services Division which was responsible for the operational use of LSD abroad took the position that “no physical examination of the subject is required prior to administration of [LSD] by TSS trained personnel. A physi-
Moreover, the administration abroad was marked by constant observation made possible because the material was being used against prisoners of foreign intelligence or security organizations. Finally, during certain of the LSD interrogations abroad, local physicians were on call, though these physicians had had no experience with LSD and would not be told that hallucinogens had been administered.  

The CIA's project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting human subjects in the United States was finally halted in 1963, as a result of its discovery during the course of an Inspector General survey of the Technical Services Division. When the Inspector General learned of the project, he spoke to the Deputy Director for Plans, who agreed that the Director should be briefed. The DDP made it clear that the DCI and his Deputy were generally familiar with MK ULTRA. He indicated, however, that he was not sure it was necessary to brief the DDCI at that point.

On May 24, 1963, the DDP advised the Inspector General that he had briefed the Director on the MK ULTRA program and in particular had covered the question of the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting human subjects. According to the Inspector General, the DDP said that "the Director indicated no disagreement and therefore the 'testing' will continue." 

One copy of an "Eyes Only" draft report on MK ULTRA was prepared by the Inspector General who recommended the termination of the surreptitious administration project. The project was suspended following the Inspector General's report.

On December 17, 1963, Deputy Director for Plans Helms wrote a memo to the DDCI, who with the Inspector General and the Executive Director-Comptroller had opposed the covert testing. He noted two aspects of the problem: (1) "for over a decade the Clandestine Services has had the mission of maintaining a capability for influencing human behavior;" and (2) "testing arrangements in furtherance of this mission should be as operationally realistic and yet as controllable as possible." Helms argued that the individuals must be "unwitting" as this was "the only realistic method of maintaining the capability, considering the intended operational use of materials to influence human behavior as the operational targets will certainly be unwitting. Should the subjects of the testing not be unwitting, the program would only be "pro forma" resulting in a "false sense of accomplishment and readiness." Helms continued:

"there need not be present. There is no danger medically in the use of this material as handled by TSS trained personnel." The Office of Medical Services had taken the position that LSD was "medically dangerous." Both the Office of Security and the Office of Medical Services agreed that LSD "should not be administered unless preceded by a medical examination... and should be administered only by or in the presence of a physician who had studied it and its effect." (Memorandum from James Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff to Chief of Operations, 12/12/63, pp. 1-2. 

Physicians might be called with the hope that they would make a diagnosis of mental breakdown which would be useful in discrediting the individual who was the subject of the CIA interest.

Ibid., p. 2.
If one grants the validity of the mission of maintaining this unusual capability and the necessity for unwitting testing, there is only then the question of how best to do it. Obviously, the testing should be conducted in such a manner as to permit the opportunity to observe the results of the administration on the target. It also goes without saying that whatever testing arrangement we adopt must afford maximum safeguards for the protection of the Agency's role in this activity, as well as minimizing the possibility of physical or emotional damage to the individual tested.\footnote{Memorandum from DDP Helms to DDCI Carter, 12/17/63.}

In another memo to the Director of Central Intelligence in June, 1964, Helms again raised the issue of unwitting testing. At that time General Carter, then acting DCI, approved several changes in the MKULTRA program proposed by Mr. Helms as a result of negotiations between the Inspector General and the DDP. In a handwritten note, however, Director Carter added that "unwitting testing will be subject to a separate decision."\footnote{Ibid., 11/9/64, p. 1.}

No specific decision was made then or soon after. The testing had been halted and, according to Walter Elder, Executive Assistant to DCI McCone, the DCI was not inclined to take the positive step of authorizing a resumption of the testing. At least through the summer, the DDP did not press the issue. On November 9, 1964, the DDP raised the issue again in a memo to the DCI, calling the Director's attention to what he described as "several other indications during the past year of an apparent Soviet aggressiveness in the field of covertly administered chemicals which are, to say the least, inexplicable and disturbing."\footnote{Ibid., pp. 1-2.}

Helms noted that because of the suspension of covert testing, the Agency's "positive operational capability to use drugs is diminishing, owing to a lack of realistic testing. With increasing knowledge of the state of the art, we are less capable of staying up with Soviet advances in this field. This in turn results in a waning capability on our part to restrain others in the intelligence community (such as the Department of Defense) from pursuing operations in this area."\footnote{Ibid., 6/9/64, p. 3.}

Helms attributed the cessation of the unwitting testing to the high risk of embarrassment to the Agency as well as the "moral problem." He noted that no better covert situation had been devised than that which had been used, and that "we have no answer to the moral issue."\footnote{Ibid., p. 2.}

Helms asked for either resumption of the testing project or its definitive cancellation. He argued that the status quo of a research and development program without a realistic testing program was causing the Agency to live "with the illusion of a capability which is becoming minimal and furthermore is expensive."\footnote{Ibid.} Once again no formal action was taken in response to the Helms' request.
From its beginning in the early 1950's until its termination in 1963, the program of surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting non-volunteer human subjects demonstrates a failure of the CIA's leadership to pay adequate attention to the rights of individuals and to provide effective guidance to CIA employees. Though it was known that the testing was dangerous, the lives of subjects were placed in jeopardy and their rights were ignored during the ten years of testing which followed Dr. Olson's death. Although it was clear that the laws of the United States were being violated, the testing continued. While the individuals involved in the Olson experiment were admonished by the Director, at the same time they were also told that they were not being reprimanded and that their "bad judgment" would not be made part of their personnel records. When the covert testing project was terminated in 1963, none of the individuals involved were subject to any disciplinary action.

4. Monitoring and Control of the Testing and Use of Chemical and Biological Agents by the CIA

The Select Committee found numerous failures in the monitoring and control of the testing and use of chemical and biological agents within the CIA. An analysis of the failures can be divided into four sections: (a) the waiver of normal regulations or requirements; (b) the problems in authorization procedures; (c) the failure of internal review mechanisms such as the Office of General Counsel, the Inspector General, and the Audit Staff; and (d) the effect of compartmentation and competition within the CIA.

a. The Waiver of Administrative Controls.—The internal controls within any agency rest on: (1) clear and coherent regulations; (2) clear lines of authority; and (3) clear rewards for those who conduct themselves in accord with agency regulations and understandable and immediate sanctions against those who do not. In the case of the testing and use of chemical and biological agents, normal CIA administrative controls were waived. The destruction of the documents on the largest CIA program in this area constituted a prominent example of the waiver of normal Agency procedures by the Director.

These documents were destroyed in early 1973 at the order of then DCI Richard Helms. According to Helms, Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, then Director of TSD:

... came to me and said that he was retiring and that I was retiring and he thought it would be a good idea if these files were destroyed. And I also believe part of the reason for our thinking this was advisable was there had been relationships with outsiders in government agencies and other organizations and that these would be sensitive in this kind of a thing but that since the program was over and finished and done with, we thought we would just get rid of the files as

"Section 2(9) of S. Res. 21 instructs the Committee to examine: the "extent to which United States intelligence agencies are governed by Executive Orders, rules, or regulations either published or secret."
well, so that anybody who assisted us in the past would not be subject to follow-up or questions, embarrassment, if you will. 73

The destruction was based on a waiver of an internal CIA regulation, CSI 70-10, which regulated the "retirement of inactive records." As Thomas Karamessines, then Deputy Director of Plans, wrote in regulation CSI-70-10: "Retirement is not a matter of convenience of storage but of conscious judgment in the application of the rules modified by knowledge of individual component needs. The heart of this judgment is to ensure that the complete story can be reconstructed in later years and by people who may be unfamiliar with the events." 74

The destruction of the MKULTRA documents made it impossible for the Select Committee to determine the full range and extent of the largest CIA research program involving chemical and biological agents. The destruction also prevented the CIA from locating and providing medical assistance to the individuals who were subjects in the program. Finally, it prevented the Committee from determining the full extent of the operations which made use of materials developed in the MKULTRA program. 75

From the inception of MKULTRA normal Agency procedures were waived. In 1953, Mr. Helms, then Assistant Deputy Director for Plans, proposed the establishment of MKULTRA. Under the proposal six percent of the research and development budget of TSD would be expended "without the establishment of formal contractual relations" because contracts would reveal government interest. Helms also voted that qualified individuals in the field "are most reluctant to enter into signed agreements of any sort which connect them with this activity since such a connection would jeopardize their professional reputa-

73 Richard Helms testimony, 9/11/75, p. 5.

Many Agency documents recording confidential relationships with individuals and organizations are retained without public disclosure. Moreover, in the case of MKULTRA the CIA had spent millions of dollars developing both materials and delivery systems which could be used by the Clandestine Services; the reconstruction of the research and development program would be difficult if not impossible, without the documents, and at least one assistant to Dr. Gottlieb protested against the document destruction on those grounds.

74 Clandestine Services Institution (CSI) 70-10. When asked by the Select Committee about the regularity of the procedure by which he authorized Dr. Gottlieb to destroy the MKULTRA records, Helms responded:

"Well, that's hard to say whether it would be part of the regular procedure or not, because the record destruction program is conducted according to a certain pattern. There's a regular record destruction pattern in the Agency monitored by certain people and done a certain way. So that anything outside of that, I suppose, would have been unusual. In other words, there were documents being destroyed because somebody had raised this specific issue rather than because they were encompassed in the regular records destruction program. So I think the answer to your question is probably yes." (Helms testimony, 9/11/75, p. 6.)

75 Even prior to the destruction of documents, the MKULTRA records were far from complete. As the Inspector General noted in 1963:

"Files are notably incomplete, poorly organized, and lacking in evaluative statements that might give perspective to management policies over time. A substantial portion of the MKULTRA record appears to rest in the memories of the principal officers and is therefore almost certain to be lost with their departures." (IG Report on MKULTRA, p. 23.)
Other Agency procedures, i.e., the forwarding of documents in support of invoices and the provision for regular audit procedures, were also to be waived. On April 13, 1953, then DCI Allen Dulles approved MKULTRA, noting that security considerations precluded handling the project through usual contractual agreements.

Ten years later investigations of MKULTRA by both the Inspector General and the Audit Staff noted substantial deficiencies which resulted from the waivers. Because TSD had not reserved the right to audit the books of contractors in MKULTRA, the CIA had been unable to verify the use of Agency grants by a contractor. Another firm had failed to establish controls and safeguards which would assure "proper accountability" in use of government funds with the result that "funds have been used for purposes not contemplated by grants or allowable under usual contract relationship." The entire MKULTRA arrangement was condemned for having administrative lines which were unclear, overly permissive controls, and irresponsible supervision.

The head of the Audit Branch noted that inspections and audits led us to see MKULTRA as frequently having provided a device to escape normal administrative controls for research that is not especially sensitive, as having allowed practices that produce gross administrative failures, as having permitted the establishment of special relationships with unreliable organizations on an unacceptable basis, and as having produced, on at least one occasion, a cavalier treatment of a bona fide contracting organization.

While admitting that there may be a need for special mechanisms for handling sensitive projects, the Chief of the Audit Branch wrote that "both the terms of reference and the ground rules for handling such special projects should be spelled out in advance so that diversion from normal channels does not mean abandonment of controls.

Special procedures may be necessary to ensure the security of highly sensitive operations. To prevent the erosion of normal internal control mechanisms, such waivers should not be extended to less sensitive operations. Moreover, only those regulations which would endanger security should be waived; to waive regulations generally would result in highly sensitive and controversial projects having looser rather than stricter administrative controls. MKNAOMI, the Fort Detrick CIA project for research and development of chemical and biological agents, provides another example where efforts to protect the security of agency activities overwhelmed administrative controls.

No written records of the transfer of agents such as anthrax or shellfish toxin were kept, "because of the sensitivity of the area and the desire to keep any possible use of materials like this recordless." The

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9 Memorandum from IG to Chief, TSD, 11/8/63, as quoted in memorandum from Chief, Audit Branch.
10 The memorandum suggested that administrative exclusions, because of the importance of such decisions, should require the personal approval of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on an individual case basis. Present CIA policy is that only the DCI can authorize certain exemptions from regulations.
result was that the Agency had no way of determining what materials were on hand, and could not be certain whether delivery systems such as dart guns, or deadly substances such as cobra venom had been issued to the field.

b. Authorization.—The destruction of the documents regarding MKULTRA made it difficult to determine at what level specific projects in the program were authorized. This problem is not solely a result of the document destruction, however. Even at the height of MKULTRA the IG noted that, at least with respect to the surreptitious administration of LSD, the “present practice is to maintain no records of the planning and approval of test programs.” 82

While it is clear that Allen Dulles authorized MKULTRA, the record is unclear as to who authorized specific projects such as that involving the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting non-volunteer human subjects. Even given the sensitive and controversial nature of the project, there is no evidence that when John McCone replaced Allen Dulles as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency he was briefed on the details of this project and asked whether it should be continued. 83 Even during the 1963 discussions on the propriety of unwitting testing, the DDP questioned whether it was “necessary to brief General Carter,” the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the Director’s “alter ego,” because CIA officers felt it necessary to keep details of the project restricted to an absolute minimum number of people. 84

In May of 1963, DDP Helms told the Inspector General that the covert testing program was authorized because he had gone to the Director, briefed him on it and “the Director indicated no disagreement and therefore the testing will continue.” 85 Such authorization even for noncontroversial matters is clearly less desirable than explicit authorization; in areas such as the surreptitious administration of drugs, it is particularly undesirable. Yet according to testimony

83 According to an assistant to Dr. Gottlieb, there were annual briefings of the DCI and the DDP on MKULTRA by the Chief of TSD or his deputy. However, a May 15, 1963 Memorandum for the Record from the Inspector General noted that Mr. McCone had not been briefed in detail about the program. Mr. McCone’s Executive Officer, Walter Elder, testified that it was “perfectly apparent to me” that neither Mr. McCone nor General Carter, then the DDCI, was aware of the surreptitious administration project “or if they had been briefed they had not understood it.” (Elder, 12/18/75, p. 13.) Mr. McCone testified that he “did not know” whether he talked to anyone about the project but that no one had told him about it in a way that “would have turned on all the lights.” (John McCone testimony, 2/3/76, p. 10.)
84 According to Elder’s testimony, “no Deputy Director, to my knowledge, has ever been briefed or was it ever thought necessary to brief them to the extent to which you would brief the Director.”
85 IG Memorandum for the Record. 5/15/63.

On the question of authorization of the covert testing program, Elder testified as follows:

“...But my reasonable judgment is that this was considered to be in the area of continuing approval, having once been approved by the Director.”

The theory of authorization carrying over from one administration to the next seems particularly inappropriate for less visible, highly sensitive operations which, unless brought to his attention by subordinates, would not come to the attention of the Director.
before the Committee, authorization through lack of agreement is even more prevalent in sensitive situations.66

The unauthorized retention of shellfish toxin by Dr. Nathan Gordon and his subordinates, in violation of a Presidential Directive, may have resulted from the failure of the Director to issue written instructions to Agency officials. The retention was not authorized by senior officials in the Agency. The Director, Mr. Helms, had instructed Mr. Karamessines, the Deputy Director of Plans, and Dr. Gottlieb, the Chief of Technical Services Division, to relinquish control to the Army of any chemical or biological agents being retained for the CIA at Fort Detrick. Dr. Gottlieb passed this instruction on to Dr. Gordon. While orders may be disregarded in any organization, one of the reasons that Dr. Gordon used to defend the retention was the fact that he had not received written instructions forbidding it.67

In some situations the existence of written instructions did not prevent unauthorized actions. According to an investigation by the CIA’s Inspector General TSD officers had been informed orally that Mr. Helms was to be “advised at all times” when LSD was to be used. In addition TSD had received a memo advising the staff that LSD was not to be used without the permission of the DDP, Frank Wisner. The experiment involving Dr. Olson went ahead without notification of either Mr. Wisner or Mr. Helms. The absence of clear and immediate punishment for that act must undercut the force of other internal instructions and regulations.

One last issue must be raised about authorization procedures within the Agency. Chemical agents were used abroad until 1959 for discrediting or disabling operations, or for the purpose of interrogations with the approval of the Chief of Operations of the DDP. Later the approval of the Deputy Director for Plans was required for such operations. Although the medical staff sought to be part of the approval process for these operations, they were excluded because, as the Inspector General wrote in 1957:

Operational determinations are the responsibility of the DDP and it is he who should advise the DCI in these respects, just as it is he who is responsible for the results. It is completely unrealistic to consider assigning to the Chief, Medical Staff, (what, in effect, would be authority over clandestine operations.)68

Given the expertise and training of physicians, participation of the Medical Staff might well have been useful.

Questions about authorization also exist in regard to those agencies which assisted the CIA. For instance, the project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting non-volunteer human subjects was conducted in coordination with the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. There is some question as to the Commissioner of Narcotics’ knowledge about the project.

66 Mr. Elder was asked whether the process of bringing forward a description of actions by the Agency in getting approval through the absence of disagreement was a common one. He responded, "It was not uncommon. . . . The more sensitive the project the more likely it would lean toward being a common practice, based on the need to keep the written record to a minimum."


In 1963, the Inspector General noted that the head of the BNDD had been briefed about the project, but the IG's report did not indicate the level of detail provided to him. Dr. Gottlieb testified that "I remember meeting Mr. Anslinger and had the general feeling that he was aware." Another CIA officer did not recall any discussion of testing on unwitting subjects when he and Dr. Gottlieb met with Commissioner Anslinger.

In a memorandum for the record in 1967 Dr. Gottlieb stated that Harry Giordano, who replaced Mr. Anslinger, told Dr. Gottlieb that when he became Commissioner he was "only generally briefed on the arrangements, gave it his general blessing, and said he didn't want to know the details." The same memorandum states, however, that there were several comments which indicated to Dr. Gottlieb that Mr. Giordano was aware of the substance of the project. It is possible that the Commissioner provided a general authorization for the arrangement without understanding what it entailed or considering its propriety. A reluctance to seek detailed information from the CIA, and the CIA's hesitancy to volunteer it, has been found in a number of instances during the Select Committee's investigations. This problem is not confined to the executive branch but has also marked congressional relationships with the Agency.

c. Internal Review.—The waiver of regulations and the absence of documentation make it difficult to determine now who authorized which activities. More importantly, they made internal Agency review mechanisms much less effective. Controversial and highly sensitive projects which should have been subject to the most rigorous inspection lacked effective internal review.

Given the role of the General Counsel and his reaction to the surreptitious administration of LSD to Dr. Olson, it would have seemed likely that he would be asked about the legality or propriety of any subsequent projects involving such administration. This was not done. He did not learn about this testing until the 1970's. Nor was the General Counsel's opinion sought on other MKULTRA projects, though these had been characterized by the Inspector General in the 1957 Report on TSD as "unethical and illicit."

There is no mention in the report of the 1957 Inspector General's survey of TSD of the project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD. That project was apparently not brought to the attention of the survey team. The Inspector who discovered it during the IG's 1963 survey of TSD recalls coming upon evidence of it inadvertently,

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88 Gottlieb, 10/18/75, p. 28.
89 The IG's report on MKULTRA in 1963 stated:
"The original charter documents specified that TSD maintain exacting control of MKULTRA activities. In so doing, however, TSD has pursued a philosophy of minimum documentation in keeping with the high sensitivity of some of the projects. Some files were found to present a reasonably complete record, including most sensitive matters, while others with parallel objectives contained little or no data at all. The lack of consistent records precluded use of routine inspection procedures and raised a variety of questions concerning management and fiscal controls."
rather than its having been called to his attention as an especially sensitive project.\(^2\)

Thus both the General Counsel and the Inspector General, the principal internal mechanisms for the control of possibly improper actions, were excluded from regular reviews of the project. When the project was discovered the Executive Director-Comptroller voiced strong opposition to it; it is possible that the project would have been terminated in 1957 if it had been called to his attention when he then served as Inspector General.

The Audit Staff, which also serves an internal review function through the examination of Agency expenditures, also encountered substantial difficulty with MKULTRA. When MKULTRA was first proposed the Audit Staff was to be excluded from any function. This was soon changed. However, the waiver of normal “contractual procedures” in MKULTRA increased the likelihood of “irregularities” as well as the difficulty in detecting them. The head of the Audit Branch characterized the MKULTRA procedures as “having allowed practices that produced gross administrative failures,” including a lack of controls within outside contractors which would “assure proper accountability in use of government funds.” It also diminished the CIA’s capacity to verify the accountings provided by outside firms.

\(d.\) Compartmentation and Jurisdictional Conflict Within the Agency.—As has been noted, the testing and use of chemical and biological agents was treated as a highly sensitive activity within the CIA. This resulted in a high degree of compartmentation. At the same time substantial jurisdictional conflict existed within the Agency between the Technical Services Division, and the Office of Medical Services and the Office of Security.

This compartmentation and jurisdictional conflict may well have led to duplication of effort within the CIA and to Agency policymakers being deprived of useful information.

During the early 1950’s first the BLUEBIRD Committee and then the ARTICHOKE Committee were instituted to bring together representatives of the Agency components which had a legitimate interest in the area of the alteration of human behavior. By 1957 both these committees had fallen into disuse. No information went to the Technical Services Division (a component supposedly represented on the ARTICHOKE Committee) about ARTICHOKE operations being conducted by the Office of Security and the Office of Medical Services. The Technical Services Division which was providing support to the Clandestine Services in the use of chemical and biological agents, but provided little or no information to either the Office of Security or the Office of Medical Services. As one TSD officer involved in these programs testified: “Although we were acquainted, we certainly didn’t share experiences.”\(^3\)

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\(^2\) Even after the Inspector came upon it the IG did not perform a complete investigation of it. It was discovered at the end of an extensive survey of TSD and the Inspector was in the process of being transferred to another post within the Agency.

\(^3\) Testimony of CIA officer, 11/21/75, p. 14.
QKHILLTOP, another group designed to coordinate research in this area also had little success. The group met infrequently—only twice a year—and little specific information was exchanged.44

Concern over security obviously played some role in the failure to share information, but this appears not to be the only reason. A TSD officer stated that the Office of Medical Services simply wasn't "particularly interested in what we were doing" and never sought such information.45 On the other hand, a representative of the Office of Medical Services consistently sought to have medical personnel participate in the use of chemical and biological agents suggested that TSD did not inform the Office of Medical Services in order to prevent their involvement.

Jurisdictional conflict was constant in this area. The Office of Security, which had been assigned responsibility for direction of ARTICHOKE, consistently sought to bring TSD operations involving psychochemicals under the ARTICHOKE umbrella. The Office of Medical Services sought to have OMS physicians advise and participate in the operational use of drugs. As the Inspector General described it in 1957, "the basic issue is concerned with the extent of authority that should be exercised by the Chief, Medical Staff, over the activities of TSD which encroach upon or enter into the medical field," and which are conducted by TSD "without seeking the prior approval of the Chief, Medical Staff, and often without informing him of their nature and extent."46

As was noted previously, because the projects and programs of TSD stemmed directly from operational needs controlled by the DDP, the IG recommended no further supervision of these activities by the Medical Staff:

It is completely unrealistic to consider assigning to the Chief, Medical Staff, what, in effect, would be authority over clandestine operations. Furthermore, some of the activities of Chemical Division are not only unorthodox but unethical and sometimes illegal. The DDP is in a better position to evaluate the justification for such operations than the Chief, Medical Staff.48 [Emphasis added.]

Because the advice of the Director of Security was needed for "evaluating the risks involved" in the programs and because the knowledge that the CIA was "engaging in unethical and illicit activities would have serious repercussions in political and diplomatic circles," the IG recommended that the Director of Security be fully advised of TSD's activities in these areas.

Even after the Inspector General's Report of 1957, the compartmentation and jurisdictional conflict continued. They may have had a sub-

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44 The one set of minutes from a QKHILLTOP meeting indicated that individuals in the Office of Medical Services stressed the need for more contact.
45 When asked why information on the surreptitious administration of LSD was not presented to the ARTICHOKE committee, Dr. Gottlieb responded: "I imagine the only reason would have been a concern for broadening the awareness of its existence."
stantial negative impact on policymaking in the Agency. As the Deputy Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff noted in 1958, due to the different positions taken by TSS, the Office of Security, and the Office of Medical Services on the use of chemical or biological agents, it was possible that the individual who authorized the use of a chemical or biological agent could be presented with “incomplete facts upon which to make a decision relevant to its use.” Even a committee set up by the DDP in 1958 to attempt to rationalize Agency policy did not have access to records of testing and use. This was due, in part, to excessive compartmentation, and jurisdictional conflict.

C. COVERT TESTING ON HUMAN SUBJECTS BY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUPS: MATERIAL TESTING PROGRAM EA 1729, PROJECT THIRD CHANGE, AND PROJECT DERBY HAT

EA 1729 is the designator used in the Army drug testing program for lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). Interest in LSD was originally aroused at the Army's Chemical Warfare Laboratories by open literature on the unusual effects of the compound. The positive intelligence and counterintelligence potential envisioned for compounds like LSD, and suspected Soviet interest in such materials, supported the development of an American military capability and resulted in experiments conducted jointly by the U.S. Army Intelligence Board and the Chemical Warfare Laboratories.

These experiments, designed to evaluate potential intelligence uses of LSD, were known collectively as “Material Testing Program EA 1729.” Two projects of particular interest conducted as part of these experiments, “THIRD CHANGE” and “DERBY HAT,” involved the administration of LSD to unwitting subjects in Europe and the Far East.

In many respects, the Army’s testing programs duplicated research which had already been conducted by the CIA. They certainly involved the risks inherent in the early phases of drug testing. In the Army’s tests, as with those of the CIA, individual rights were also subordinated to national security considerations; informed consent and follow-up examinations of subjects were neglected in efforts to maintain the secrecy of the tests. Finally, the command and control problems which were apparent in the CIA’s programs are paralleled by a lack of clear authorization and supervision in the Army’s programs.

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411

"USAINTC staff study, “Material Testing Program, EA 1729,” 10/15/59, p. 4. This same USAINTC study cited A 1952 (several years prior to initial U.S. interest in LSD-25) report that the Soviets purchased a large quantity of LSD-25 from the Sandoz Company in 1951, reputed to be sufficient for 50 million doses." (Ibid., p. 18.)

Generally accepted Soviet methods and counterintelligence concerns were also strong motivating factors in the initiation of this research:

“A primary justification for field experimentation in intelligence with EA 1729 is the counter-intelligence or defense implication. We know that the enemy philosophy condones any kind of coercion or violence for intelligence purposes. There is proof that his intelligence service has used drugs in the past. There is strong evidence of keen interest in EA 1729 by him. If for no other purpose than to know what to expect from enemy intelligence use of the material and to, thus, be prepared to counter it, field experimentation is justified.” (Ibid, p. 34)
1. Scope of Testing

Between 1955 and 1958 research was initiated by the Army Chemical Corps to evaluate the potential for LSD as a chemical warfare incapacitating agent. In the course of this research, LSD was administered to more than 1,000 American volunteers who then participated in a series of tests designed to ascertain the effects of the drug on their ability to function as soldiers. With the exception of one set of tests at Fort Bragg, these and subsequent laboratory experiments to evaluate chemical warfare potential were conducted at the Army Chemical Warfare Laboratories, Edgewood, Maryland.

In 1958 a new series of laboratory tests were initiated at Edgewood. These experiments were conducted as the initial phase of Material Testing Program EA 1729 to evaluate the intelligence potential of LSD, and included LSD tests on 35 volunteers. As part of these tests, three structured experiments were conducted:

1. LSD was administered surreptitiously at a simulated social reception to volunteer subjects who were unaware of the purpose or nature of the tests in which they were participating;
2. LSD was administered to volunteers who were subsequently polygraphed; and
3. LSD was administered to volunteers who were then confined to “isolation chambers”.

These structured experiments were designed to evaluate the validity of the traditional security training all subjects had undergone in the face of unconventional, drug enhanced, interrogations.

At the conclusion of the laboratory test phase of Material Testing Program EA 1729 in 1960, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) authorized operational field testing of LSD. The first field tests were conducted in Europe by an Army Special Purpose Team (SPT) during the period from May to August of 1961. These tests were known as Project THIRD CHANCE and involved eleven separate interrogations of ten subjects. None of the subjects were volunteers and none were aware that they were to receive LSD. All but one subject, a U.S. soldier implicated in the theft of classified documents, were alleged to be foreign intelligence sources or agents. While interrogations of these individuals were only moderately successful, at least one subject (the U.S. soldier) exhibited symptoms of severe paranoia while under the influence of the drug.

The second series of field tests, Project DERBY HAT, were conducted by an Army SPT in the Far East during the period from August to November of 1962. Seven subjects were interrogated under DERBY HAT, all of whom were foreign nationals either suspected of dealing in narcotics or implicated in foreign intelligence operations. The purpose of this second set of experiments was to collect additional data on the utility of LSD in field interrogations, and to evaluate any different effects the drug might have on “Orientals.”

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2. Inadequate Coordination Among Intelligence Agencies

On October 15, 1959, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center prepared lengthy staff study on Material Testing Program EA 1729. The stated purpose of the staff study was: "to determine the desirability of EA 1729 on non-US subjects in selected actual operations under controlled conditions." It was on the basis of this study that operational field tests were later conducted.

After noting that the Chemical Warfare Laboratories began experiments with LSD on humans in 1955 and had administered the drug to over 1,000 volunteers, the "background" section of the study concluded:

There has not been a single case of residual ill effect. Study of the prolific scientific literature on LSD-25 and personal communication between US Army Chemical Corps personnel and other researchers in this field have failed to disclose an authenticated instance of irreversible change being produced in normal humans by the drug.

This conclusion was reached despite an awareness that there were inherent medical dangers in such experimentation. In the body of this same study it is noted that:

The view has been expressed that EA 1729 is a potentially dangerous drug, whose pharmaceutical actions are not fully understood and there has been cited the possibility of the continuance of a chemically induced psychosis in chronic form, particularly if a latent schizophrenic were a subject, with consequent claim or representation against the U.S. Government.

An attempt was made to minimize potential medical hazards by careful selection of subjects prior to field tests. Rejecting evidence that the drug might be hazardous, the study continued:

The claim of possible permanent damage caused by EA 1729 is an unproven hypothesis based on the characteristic effect of the material. While the added stress of a real situation may increase the probability of permanent adverse effect, the resulting risk is deemed to be slight by the medical research personnel of the Chemical Warfare Laboratories. To prevent even such a slight risk, the proposed plan for field experimentation calls for overt, if possible, or contrived-through-ruze, if necessary, physical and mental examination of any real situation subject prior to employment of the subject.

This conclusion was drawn six years after one death had occurred which could be attributed, at least in part, to the effects of the very drug the Army was proposing to field test. The USAINTC staff, however, was apparently unaware of the circumstances surrounding Dr. Olson's death. This lack of knowledge is indicative of the

103 Ibid., p. 4.
104 Ibid., p. 25.
105 Ibid.
general lack of interagency communication on drug related research. As the October 1959 study noted, "there has been no coordination with other intelligence agencies up to the present."^{106}

On December 7, 1959, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI, apparently a General Willems) was briefed on the proposed operational use of LSD by USAINTC Project Officer Jacobson, in preparation for Project THIRD CHANCE. General Willems expressed concern that the project had not been coordinated with the FBI and the CIA. He is quoted as saying "that if this project is going to be worth anything it [LSD] should be used on higher types of non-U.S. subjects" in other words "staffers." He indicated this could be accomplished if the CIA were brought in. The summary of the briefing prepared by a Major Mehovsky continues: "Of particular note is that ACSI did not direct coordination with CIA and the FBI but only mentioned it for consideration by the planners."^{107}

After the briefing, four colonels, two lieutenant colonels and Major Mehovsky met to discuss interagency cooperation with CIA and FBI. The group consensus was to postpone efforts toward coordination:

Lt. Col. Jacobson commented that before we coordinate with
CIA we should have more factual findings from field experi-
mentation with counterintelligence cases that will strengthen
our position and proposal for cooperation. This approach
was agreed to by the conferees.^{108}

Had such coordination been achieved, the safety of these experiments
might have been viewed differently and the tests themselves might
have been seen as unnecessary.

3. Subordination of Individual Rights to National Security Considerations

Just as many of these experiments may have been unnecessary, the
nature of the operational tests (polygraph-assisted interrogations of
 drugged suspects) reflects a basic disregard for the fundamental
human rights of the subjects. The interrogation of an American
soldier as part of the THIRD CHANCE 1961 tests is an example of
this disregard.

The "trip report" for Project THIRD CHANCE, dated Septem-
ber 6, 1961, recounts the circumstances surrounding and the results of
the tests as follows:

[The subject] was a U.S. soldier who had confessed to theft
of classified documents. Conventional methods had failed to
ascertain whether espionage intent was involved. A significant
new admission by subject that he told a fellow soldier of the
theft while he still had the documents in his possession was
obtained during the EA 1729 interrogation along with other
variations of Subject's previous account. The interrogation
results were deemed by the local operational authority satis-
factory evidence of Subject's claim of innocence in regard to
espionage intent.^{109}
The subject apparently reacted very strongly to the drug, and the interrogation, while productive, was difficult. The trip report concluded:

(1) This case demonstrated the ability to interrogate a subject profitably throughout a highly sustained and almost incapacitating reaction to EA 1729.
(2) The apparent value of bringing a subject into the EA 1729 situation in a highly stressed state was indicated.
(3) The usefulness of employing as a duress factor the device of inviting the subject’s attention to his EA 1729-influenced state and threatening to extend this state indefinitely even to a permanent condition of insanity, or to bring it to an end at the discretion of the interrogators was shown to be effective.
(4) The need for preplanned precautions against extreme paranoiac reaction to EA 1729 was indicated.
(5) It was brought to attention by this case that where subject has undergone extended intensive interrogation prior to the EA 1729 episode and has persisted in a version repeatedly during conventional interrogation, adherence to the same version while under EA 1729 influence, however extreme the reaction, may not necessarily be evidence of truth but merely the ability to adhere to a well rehearsed story.110

This strong reaction to the drug and the accompanying discomfort this individual suffered were exploited by the use of traditional interrogation techniques. While there is no evidence that physical violence or torture were employed in connection with this interrogation, physical and psychological techniques were used in the THIRD CHANCE experiments to exploit the subjects’ altered mental state, and to maximize the stress situation. Jacobson described these methods in his trip report:

Stressing techniques employed included silent treatment before or after EA 1729 administration, sustained conventional interrogation prior to EA 1729 interrogation, deprivation of food, drink, sleep or bodily evacuation, sustained isolation prior to EA 1729 administration, hot-cold switches in approach, duress “pitches”, verbal degradation and bodily discomfort, or dramatized threats to subject’s life or mental health.111

Another gross violation of an individual’s fundamental rights occurred in September 1962 as part of the Army’s DERBY HAT tests in the Far East. A suspected Asian espionage agent was given 6 micrograms of LSD per kilogram of body weight. The administration of the drug was completed at 1035 that morning:

At 1120, sweating became evident, his pulse became thready. He was placed in a supine position. He began groaning with expiration and became semicomatose.112

110 Ibid., pp. 17-18.
111 Ibid., p. 18.
For the next 28 minutes, the subject remained semicomatose.

At 1148, responses to painful stimuli were slightly improved. At 1155, he was helped to a sitting position. At 1200, he became shocky again and was returned to supine position. At 1212, he was more alert and able to sit up with help: At 1220, Subject was assisted to the interrogation table. At 1230, he began moaning he wanted to die and usually ignored questions. Rarely he stated “he didn't know.” At 1250, his phasic alertness persisted. He frequently refocused his eyes with eyelid assistance. He frequently threw his head back with eyes closed. At 1330, he was slightly more alert. He was forced-walked for 5 minutes. He physically would cooperate until he became shocky again (sweating, thready pulse, pale).\(^\text{113}\)

For the next three hours the subject remained in about the same condition. Continued attempts at interrogation yielded no relevant answers. Six hours after receiving the drug, the subject began giving relevant answers to questions. Eight and one-half hours after the initial dosage, the subject was polygraphed. The interrogation continued for seventeen and one-half hours after the drug was administered.

There was some psychological and medical screening of the individuals tested within the United States, in Europe, and in Asia. The proposal for the field experimentation in fact called for such examinations. The fact of prescreening did not eliminate the risk of injury; the availability of medical staff did, however, limit injury and may well have prevented the death of one or more of the subjects. As the medical corps member of the team which surreptitiously administered the LSD noted, “one subject ... did collapse after the interrogation and the presence of the medical officer was not only of value to the subject but to the interrogation team who were thus assured that an unnecessary untoward result would not occur.”\(^\text{114}\)

In the October 15, 1959, USAINTC staff study, moral and legal ramifications of covert administration of LSD in field conditions were considered.

It was always a tenet of Army Intelligence that the basic American principle of the dignity and welfare of the individual will not be violated. ... A more meticulous regard for the prohibition against violence or duress is taken in practice when the suspect is a US citizen or ally as against an actual or potential enemy, in peace as against war, and in respect to the nature of the crime. ... In intelligence, the stakes involved and the interests of national security may permit a more tolerant interpretation of moral-ethical values, but not legal limits, through necessity. ... Any claim

\(^{114}\) Ibid., p. D10-3.

against the US Government for alleged injury due to EA 1729 must be legally shown to have been due to the material. Proper security and appropriate operational techniques can protect the fact of employment of EA 1729.\textsuperscript{116}

On the basis of this evaluation, the study concluded that in view of "the stakes involved and the interests of national security," the proposed plan for field testing should be approved.

The surreptitious administration of drugs to unwitting subjects by the Army raises serious constitutional and legal issues. The consideration given these issues by the Army was wholly insufficient. The character of the Army's volunteer testing program and the possibility that drugs were simply substituted for other forms of violence or duress in field interrogations raises serious doubts as to whether national security imperatives were properly interpreted. The "consent" forms which each American volunteer signed prior to the administration of LSD are a case in point. These forms contained no mention of the medical and psychological risks inherent in such testing, nor do they mention the nature of the psychotrophic drug to be administered:

The general nature of the experiments in which I have volunteered have been explained to me from the standpoint of possible hazards to my health. It is my understanding that the experiments are so designed, based on the results of animals and previous human experimentation, that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the experiment. I understand further that experiments will be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and medical suffering and injury, and that I will be at liberty to request that the experiments be terminated at any time if in my opinion I have reached the physical or mental state where continuation of the experiment becomes undesirable.

I recognize that in the pursuit of certain experiments transitory discomfort may occur. I recognize, also, that under these circumstances, I must rely upon the skill and wisdom of the physician supervising the experiment to institute whatever medical or surgical measures are indicated. [Emphasis added.]\textsuperscript{114}

The exclusion of any specific discussion of the nature of LSD in these forms raises serious doubts as to their validity. An "understanding . . . that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the experiment" without full knowledge of the nature of the experiment is an incomplete "understanding." Similarly, the nature of the experiment limited the ability of both the subject to request its termination and the experimenter to implement such a request. Finally, the euphemistic characterization of "transitory discomfort" and the agreement to "rely on the skill and wisdom of the physician" combine to conceal inherent risks in the experimentation and may be viewed as dissolving the experimenter of personal responsibility for damaging aftereffects. In summary, a "volunteer" program in which subjects are not fully informed of potential hazards to their persons is "volunteer" in name only.


\textsuperscript{114} Sample volunteer consent form.
This problem was compounded by the security statements signed by each volunteer before he participated in the testing. As part of this statement, potential subjects agreed that they would:

... not divulge or make available any information related to U.S. Army Intelligence Center interest or participation in the Department of the Army Medical Research Volunteer Program to any individual, nation, organization, business, association, or other group or entity, not officially authorized to receive such information.

I understand that any action contrary to the provisions of this statement will render me liable to punishment under the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 19

Under these provisions, a volunteer experiencing aftereffects of the test might have been unable to seek immediate medical assistance.

This disregard for the well-being of subjects drug testing is inexcusable. Further, the absence of any comprehensive long-term medical assistance for the subjects of these experiments is not only unscientific; it is also unprofessional.

4. Lack of Normal Authorization and Supervision

It is apparent from documents supplied to the Committee that the Army’s testing programs often operated under informal and nonroutine authorization. Potentially dangerous operations such as these testing programs are the very projects which ought to be subject to the closest internal scrutiny at the highest levels of the military command structure. There are numerous examples of inadequate review, partial consideration, and incomplete approval in the administration of these programs.

When the first Army program to use LSD on American soldiers in “field stations” was authorized in May 1955, the Army violated its own procedures in obtaining approval. Under Army Chief of Staff Memorandum 385, such proposals were to be personally approved by the Secretary of the Army. Although the plan was submitted to him on April 26, 1956, the Secretary issued no written authorization for the project, and there is no evidence that he either reviewed or approved the plan. Less than a month later, the Army Chief of Staff issued a memorandum authorizing the tests. 20

Subsequent testing of LSD under Material Testing Program EA 1729 operated generally under this authorization. When the plans for this testing were originally discussed in early 1958 by officials of the Army Intelligence Center at Fort Holabird and representatives of the Chemical Warfare Center at Edgewood Arsenal, an informal proposal was formulated. This proposal was submitted to the Medical Research Directorate at Edgewood by the President of the Army Intelligence Board on June 3, 1958. There is no evidence that the plan was approved at any level higher than the President of the Intelligence Board or the Commanding General of Edgewood. The approval at Edgewood appears to have been issued by the Commander’s-Adjutant. The Medical Research Laboratories did not submit the plan to the Surgeon General for approval (a standard procedure) because

19 Sample Volunteer Security Statement.
the new program was ostensibly covered by the authorizations granted in May 1956.

The two projects involving the operational use of LSD (THIRD CHANCE and DERBY HAT) were apparently approved by the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (General Willems) on December 7, 1960. This verbal approval came in the course of a briefing on previous drug programs and on the planned field experimentation. There is no record of written approval being issued by the ACSI to authorize these specific projects until January 1961, and there is no record of any specific knowledge or approval by the Secretary of the Army.

On February 4, 1963, Major General C. F. Leonard, Army ACSI, forwarded a copy of the THIRD CHANCE Trip Report to Army Chief of Staff, General Earl Wheeler. Wheeler had apparently requested a copy on February 2. The report was routed through a General Hamlett. While this report included background on the origins of the LSD tests, it appears that General Wheeler may only have read the conclusion and recommendations. The office memorandum accompanying the Trip Report bears Wheeler’s initials.

5. Termination of Testing

On April 10, 1963, a briefing was held in the ACSI’s office on the results of Projects THIRD CHANCE and DERBY HAT. Both SPT’s concluded that more field testing was required before LSD could be utilized as an integral aid to counterintelligence interrogations. During the presentation of the DERBY HAT results, General Leonard (Deputy ACSI) directed that no further field testing be undertaken. After this meeting the ACSI sent a letter to the Commanding General of the Army Combat Developments Command (CDC) requesting that he review THIRD CHANCE and DERBY HAT and “make a net evaluation concerning the adoption of EA 1729 for future use as an effective and profitable aid in counterintelligence interrogations.” On the same day the ACSI requested that the CDC Commander revise regulation FM 30–17 to read in part:

... in no instance will drugs be used as an aid to interrogations in counterintelligence or security operations without prior permission of the Department of the Army. Requests to use drugs as an investigative aid will be forwarded through intelligence channels to the OACSI, DA, for approval. ... Medical research has established that information obtained through the use of these drugs is unreliable and invalid. ...

It is considered that DA [Army] approval must be a prerequisite for use of such drugs because of the moral, legal, medical and political problems inherent in their use for intelligence purposes.

115 Ibid., pp. 135, 137, 138.
116 Mehovsky Fact Sheet, 12/9/60.
117 Memorandum from Leonard to Wheeler, 2/4/63.
118 SGS memorandum to Wheeler through Hamlett, 2/5/63.
119 Ibid.
120 Maj. F. Barnett, memorandum for the record, 8/12/63.
121 Yamak memorandum for the record, 7/16/63.
122 Ibid.
The subsequent adoption of this regulation marked the effective termination of field testing of LSD by the Army.

The official termination date of these testing programs is rather unclear, but a later ACSI memo indicates that it may have occurred in September of 1963. On the 19th of that month a meeting was held between Dr. Van Sims (Edgewood Arsenal), Major Clovis (Chemical Research Laboratory), and ACSI representatives (General Deholm and Colonel Schmidt). "As a result of this conference a determination was made to suspend the program and any further activity pending a more profitable and suitable use." 129

D. COOPERATION AND COMPETITION AMONG THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AGENCIES AND BETWEEN THESE AGENCIES AND OTHER INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS

1. Relationships Among Agencies Within the Intelligence Community

Relationships among intelligence community agencies in this area varied considerably over time, ranging from full cooperation to intense and wasteful competition. The early period was marked by a high degree of cooperation among the agencies of the intelligence community. Although the military dominated research involving chemical and biological agents, the information developed was shared with the FBI and the CIA. But the spirit of cooperation did not continue. The failure by the military to share information apparently breached the spirit, if not the letter, of commands from above.

As noted above, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence was briefed on the proposed operational testing of LSD under Project THIRD CHANCE, and expressed concern that the project had not been coordinated with FBI and CIA. Despite this request, no coordination was achieved between the Army and either of these agencies. Had such cooperation been forthcoming, this project may have been evaluated in a different light.

The competition between the agencies in this area reached bizarre levels. A military officer told a CIA representative in confidence about the military's field testing of LSD in Europe under Project THIRD CHANCE, and the CIA promptly attempted to learn surreptitiously the nature and extent of the program. At roughly the same time Mr. Helms argued to the DDCI that the unwitting testing program should be continued, as it contributed to the CIA's capability in the area and thus allowed the CIA "to restrain others in the intelligence community (such as the Department of Defense) from pursuing operations." 130

The MKNAOMI program was also marked by a failure to share information. The Army Special Forces (the principal customer of the Special Operations Division at Fort Dietrick) and the CIA rather than attempting to coordinate their efforts promulgated different requirements which varied only slightly. This apparently resulted in some duplication of effort. In order to insure the security of CIA operations, the Agency would request materials from SOD for operational use without fully or accurately describing the operational requirements. This resulted in limitations on SOD's ability to assist the CIA.

129 Undated ACSI memorandum, p. 2.
130 Memorandum from the DDF to the DCI, 11/9/64, p. 2.
2. Relationships Between the Intelligence Community Agencies and Foreign Liaison Services

The subjects of the CIA’s operational testing of chemical and biological agents abroad were generally being held for interrogation by foreign intelligence or security organizations. Although information about the use of drugs was generally withheld from these organizations, cooperation with them necessarily jeopardized the security of CIA interest in these materials. Cooperation also placed the American Government in a position of complicity in actions which violated the rights of the subjects, and which may have violated the laws of the country in which the experiments took place.

Cooperation between the intelligence agencies and organizations in foreign countries was not limited to relationships with the intelligence or internal security organizations. Some MKULTRA research was conducted abroad. While this is, in itself, not a questionable practice, it is important that such research abroad not be undertaken to evade American laws. That this was a possibility is suggested by an ARTICHOKE memorandum in which it is noted that working with the scientists of a foreign country “might be very advantageous” since that government “permitted certain activities which were not permitted by the United States government (i.e., experiments on anthrax, etc.).” 131

3. The Relationships Between the Intelligence Community Agencies and Other Agencies of the U.S. Government

Certain U.S. government agencies actively assisted the efforts of intelligence agencies in this area. One form of assistance was to provide “cover” for research contracts let by intelligence agencies, in order to disguise intelligence community interest in chemical and biological agents.

Other forms of assistance raise more serious questions. Although the CIA’s project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD was conducted by Bureau of Narcotics personnel, there was no open connection between the Bureau personnel and the Agency. The Bureau was serving as a “cut-out” in order to make it difficult to trace Agency participation. The cut-out arrangement, however, reduced the CIA’s ability to control the program. The Agency could not control the process by which subjects were selected and cultivated, and could not regulate follow-up after the testing. Moreover, as the CIA’s Inspector General noted: “the handling of test subjects in the last analysis rests with the [Bureau of Narcotics] agent working alone. Suppression of knowledge of critical results from the top CIA management is an inherent risk in these operations.” 132 The arrangement also made it impossible for the Agency to be certain that the decision to end the surreptitious administration of LSD would be honored by the Bureau personnel.

The arrangement with the Bureau of Narcotics was described as “informal.” 133 The informality of the arrangement compounded the problem is aggravated by the fact that the 40 Committee has had vir-

131 ARTICHOKE Memorandum, 6/13/52.
133 Ibid. This was taken by one Agency official to mean that there would be no written contract and no formal mechanism for payment. (Elder, 12/18/75, p. 31.)
apparent unwillingness on the part of the Bureau's leadership to ask for details, and the CIA's hesitation in volunteering information. These problems raise serious questions of command and control within the Bureau.

4. Relationships Between the Intelligence Community Agencies and Other Institutions and Individuals, Public and Private

The Inspector General's 1963 Survey of MKULTRA noted that "the research and development" phase was conducted through standing arrangements with "specialists in universities, pharmaceutical houses, hospitals, state and federal institutions, and private research organizations" in a manner which concealed "from the institution the interests of the CIA." Only a few "key individuals" in each institution were "made witting of Agency sponsorship." The research and development phase was succeeded by a phase involving "physicians, toxicologists, and other specialists in mental, narcotics, and general hospitals and prisons, who are provided the products and findings of the basic research projects and proceed with intensive testing on human subjects." 134

According to the Inspector General, the MKULTRA testing programs were "conducted under accepted scientific procedures . . . where health permits, test subjects are voluntary participants in the programs." 135 This was clearly not true in the project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD, which was marked by a complete lack of screening, medical supervision, opportunity to observe, or medical or psychological follow-up.

The intelligence agencies allowed individual researchers to design their project. Experiments sponsored by these researchers (which included one where narcotics addicts were sent to Lexington, Kentucky, who were rewarded with the drug of their addiction in return for participation in experiments with LSD) call into question the decision by the agencies not to fix guidelines for the experiments.

The MKULTRA research and development program raises other questions, as well. It is not clear whether individuals in prisons, mental, narcotics and general hospitals can provide "informed consent" to participation in experiments such as these. There is doubt as to whether institutions should be unwitting of the ultimate sponsor of research being done in their facilities. The nature of the arrangements also made it impossible for the individuals who were not aware of the sponsor of the research to exercise any choice about their participation based on the sponsoring organization.

Although greater precautions are now being taken in research conducted on behalf of the intelligence community agencies, the dilemma of classification remains. These agencies obviously wished to conceal their interest in certain forms of research in order to avoid stimulating interest in the same areas by hostile governments. In some cases today contractors or researchers wish to conceal their connection with these agencies. Yet the fact of classification prevents open discussion and debate upon which scholarly work depends.

134 Ibid. p. 8.
135 Ibid. p. 10.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Deputy Director for Science and Technology
SUBJECT: Request for Guidance on Handling Recently Located MKULTRA Material

1. (U/ANUO) This memorandum is to advise you that additional MKULTRA documents have been discovered and to obtain your approval for follow-on actions required. Paragraph 7 contains a recommended course of action.

2. (U/ANUO) As a result of John Marks FOIA request (F-76-374), all of the MKULTRA material in OTS possession was reviewed for possible release to him. Following that review, the OTS material in the Retired Records Center was searched. It was during that latter search that the subproject files were located among the retired records of the OTS Budget and Fiscal Section. These files were not discovered earlier as the earlier searches were limited to the examination of the active and retired records of those branches considered most likely to have generated or have had access to MKULTRA documents. Those branches included: Chemistry, Biological, Behavioral Activities, and Contracts Management. Because Dr. Gottlieb retrieved and destroyed all the MKULTRA documents he was able to locate, it is not surprising that the earlier search for MKULTRA documents, directed at areas where they were most likely to be found, was unsuccessful. The purpose of establishing the MKULTRA mechanism was to limit knowledge of the sensitive work being performed to those with an absolute need to know. If those precepts had been followed, the recently found B&E files should have contained only financial and administrative documents. (In retrospect, I realize that...)

Declassified by 29 Jul 1977

29 Jul 1977
SUGGEST: Request for Guidance on Handling Recently Located MKULTRA Material

A serious error was made in not having BIF files and other seemingly innocuous files searched earlier. As it happens, most of the individual subproject folders contain project proposals and memoranda for the record, which in varying degrees, give a reasonably complete picture of the avenues of research funded through MKULTRA. For your information, the original memorandum setting up MKULTRA, signed by Mr. Dulles, is also among these documents. A copy of the memorandum is attached.

5. (U/NUD) At this writing, it does not appear that there is anything in these newly located files that would indicate the MKULTRA activities were more extensive or more controversial than indicated by the Senate Select (Church) Committee Report. If anything, the reverse is true, i.e., most of the newly located subprojects are innocuous. Thus, the overview of MKULTRA is essentially unchanged.

With two exceptions, the present find fills in some of the missing details.

4. (U/NUD) One of these exceptions is subproject number 45 which concerns an activity that should have been reported earlier. That project deals with the search for a knockout drug which was concomitant with, and a by-product of, cancer research at a major university. It is believed that an objective reading of that project would demonstrate the search for knockout materials and anesthetics were compatible activities. However, the research proposal stated that "chemical agents...will be subjected to clinic screening...on advanced cancer patients".

3. (CI) Subproject number 35 contains full details of CTA's contribution of $52,500 to the Building Fund. The Agency was then involved in drug research programs, many of which were being conducted by whose facilities were inadequate. In order to facilitate the ongoing research programs, it was decided to expedite the building program by contributing to it through a mechanism that was also being used to fund some of the research projects.
S U B J E C T: Request for Guidance on Handling Recently Located MKULTRA Material

The contribution could be controversial in that it was made through a mechanism making it appear to be a private donation. Private donations qualified for, and received, an equal amount of Federal matching funds. A letter from the Office of General Counsel dated 21 February 1971 attesting to the legality of this funding is in the file.

6. [U/ALOC] The Legislative Council has been made aware of the existence of these additional MKULTRA documents which are still under review and sanitization. The MARKS case is in litigation and we are committed to advise Mr. Marks of the existence of these files shortly, and to deliver the releasable material to his attorneys by 31 July. A letter from the Information and Privacy Staff to Mr. Marks' attorneys informing them of the existence of this material is in the coordination process and is scheduled to be mailed on 24 June.

7. [U/ALOC] There are now two actions that should be taken:

a. Release appropriately sanitized material to Mr. Marks' attorneys as required by FOIA litigation.

b. Inform the Senate Select Committee of the existence of the recently located records prior to informing Mr. Marks' attorneys.

It is recommended that you approve of both of these actions.

8. [U/ALOC] If additional details on the contents of this material are desired, the OIS officers most familiar with it are prepared to brief you at your convenience.

David S. Brandwein
Director
Office of Technical Service
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

During the course of 1975 when the Senate Committee, chaired by Senator Church, was investigating intelligence activities, the CIA was asked to produce documentation on a program of experimentation with the effect of drugs. Under this project conducted from 1953 to 1964 and known as "MK-ULTRA," tests were conducted on American citizens in some cases without their knowledge. The CIA, after searching for such documentation, reported that most of the documents on this matter have been destroyed. I find it my duty to report to you now that our continuing search for drug related, as well as other documents, has uncovered certain papers which bear on this matter. Let me hasten to add that I am persuaded that there was no previous attempt to conceal this material in the original 1975 exploration. The material recently discovered was in the retired archives filed under financial accounts and only uncovered by using extraordinary and extensive search efforts. In this connection, incidentally, I have personally commended the employee whose diligence produced this find.

Because the new material now on hand is primarily of a financial nature, it does not present a complete picture of the field of drug experimentation activity but it does provide more detail than was previously available to us. For example, the following types of activities were undertaken:

a. Possible additional cases of drugs being tested on American citizens, without their knowledge.

b. Research was undertaken on surreptitious methods of administering drugs.

c. Some of the persons chosen for experimentation were drug addicts or alcoholics.

d. Research into the development of a knockout or "K" drug was performed in conjunction with being done to develop pain killers for advanced cancer patients, and tests on such patients were carried out.
e. There is a possibility of an improper payment to a private institution.

The drug related activities described in this newly located material began almost 25 years ago. I assure you they were discontinued over 10 years ago and do not take place today.

In keeping with the President's commitment to disclose any errors of the Intelligence Community which are uncovered, I would like to volunteer to testify before your Committee on the full details of this unfortunate series of events. I am in the process of reading the fairly voluminous material involved and do want to be certain that I have a complete picture when I talk with the Committee. I will be in touch with you next week to discuss when hearings might be scheduled at the earliest opportunity.

I regret having to bring this issue to your attention, but I know that it is essential to your oversight procedures that you be kept fully informed in a timely manner.

Yours sincerely,

STANFIELD TURNER
APPENDIX C

DOCUMENTS REFERRING TO SUBPROJECTS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Project MKELNA, Subproject 2

1. Subproject 2 is being set up to provide a secure and efficient means to exploit in regard to the MKELNA program.

2. Dr. — is a practicing psychiatrist and a faculty member of the University. His past positions have included Chief Neuropsychiatrist at — and Chief of the Psychiatric Section at — and GDS experience during World War II. He has been of value in the general MKELNA field as an overall advisor and consultant, he has been of value in contacting individuals in the — area and in setting up projects there, and he has done work himself which has contributed to the MKELNA field. His professional activities and known connections with the — area and in setting up projects there, and he has done work himself which has contributed to the MKELNA field.

3. Subproject 2 would include:

a. Miscellaneous research and testing services in the general field of MKELNA.

b. Services as a contact and cut-out for projects in the MKELNA field, primarily those located in the — area.

c. Monitoring of selected projects in the MKELNA field, when located in the central — area.

d. Services as a general consultant and advisor in the MKELNA field.

4. The total cost of this project is not to exceed $4,650.00 for a period of one year.

5. This agreement is cleared through TOP SECRET on a contact basis.

DATE 5 JUL 1957

APPROVED:

Chemical Division/TSS
approved:

Chief, Chemical Division/ihh

program approved
and recommended:

Research Chairman
Date: May 5, 1962
Attachment:
Proposal

Research Director
Date: May 5, 1962

approved for
obligation of funds:

Original Only.

date 2 Jun 1977

date 2 Jun 1977
Objective: To study the possible synergistic action of drugs which may be appropriate for use in abolishing consciousness.

Situation: There is reason to believe that two or more drugs, used in combination, are more effective than single drugs. The combined effect of some drugs, such as combinations of barbiturates, are known. With other combinations, the degree of synergism is not known. If considerable synergism is found to exist, two possibilities must be considered: (1) that a particularly useful combination may be found, and (2) that a particular combination may be hazardous because of its effect on respiration or some other vital function. To minimize hazards, animal experiments should precede human experiments.

Proposal: Allocation of $1000 for animal experiments, to be drawn on as needed. That experiments be conducted informally at without a specific grant, and with appropriate cover.
PROPOSAL

Objective: To study methods for the administration of drugs without the knowledge of the patient. Preparation of a manual.

Method: A survey of methods which have been used by criminals for surreptitious administration of drugs. Analysis of the psychodynamics of situations of this nature.

Proposal: That $1000 be allocated for this purpose, funds to be requested as needed.
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Project MEULIRA, Subproject M 2

1. Subproject 25 is being initiated to provide a secure and efficient means of exploiting _______ with regard to the MEULIRA program.

2. _______ is a practicing psychiatrist in _______ and a faculty member of _______. He has been of value in the general MEULIRA project, serving as an advisor and consultant, contacting individuals in the _______ area, and carrying out his own research program.

3. Subproject 25 would include the following:
   (a) Miscellaneous research and testing services in the general field of MEULIRA.
   (b) Services as a contact and cutout for projects in the MEULIRA field, primarily those located in the _______ area.
   (c) Monitoring of selected projects in the MEULIRA field, when located in the _______ area.
   (d) Services as a general consultant and advisor in the MEULIRA field.
   (e) He would act as medical advisor and consultant to _______ and his _______ establishment.

   __________ will be reimbursed for his services and expenses upon receipt of an invoice at irregular intervals. When travel expenses are incurred through use of a common carrier, they will be documented and reimbursed in the usual manner; that is, consistent with standard Government allowances.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Project MMULTA, Subproject 16

1. Subproject 16 is a continuation of Subproject 3, which involved the establishment and maintenance of facilities for the realistic testing of certain research and development items of interest to CD/TSS and AFD/TSS. The facilities were set up under Subproject 3, and Subproject 16 is intended to provide for the continued maintenance of the facilities.

2. Subproject 3 was originally intended to provide funds for the maintenance of the facilities for one year; but it turns out that the costs of alterations, equipment, and initial supplies were underestimated in Subproject 3; hence the necessity to establish Subproject 16 at this time.

3. Subproject 16 will be conducted by a a C. Certain support activities will be provided by CD/TSS and AFD/TSS.

4. The estimated cost for a period of one year is $7,740.00.

APPROVED AND RECOMMENDED:

PROGRAM APPROVED

APPROVED FOR OBLIGATION OF FUNDS:

Date: 13 Oct 19-32

Research Director
May 25, 1913

...After our telephone conversation this morning, I went to the bank and opened an account - a regular checking - in the amount of $100.00 using the name [...] 

It seemed to me that for sake of safety - if, for example, anything should happen to me - it would still matter if I made this a joint account between [...] and myself. In case of my absence, illness or death you could recover the joint funds without any legal difficulties or mummy business.

The bank was a little wary about opening an account in the absence of "references" from another bank, and also found it hard to understand how I got by all these years without a bank account. However, I offered to provide an excellent reference in a government official, a man of high standing at the bank, and that seemed to placate the money-lenders. Therefore, I communicated with him, and he immediately wrote a reference letter to an official stationer, who also kindly added his well-known stamp and was pleased to offer his "simpler" recommendation.

If you think this is a good idea, I suggest you sign the Joint Account Agreement and the three signature cards included and return them to me.

And now that the account is opened I suggest you have funds deposited via Cashier’s check - or any other way that seems easiest - directly to the account [...].

I ordered checks printed with a special bank name, and have also ordered stationery bearing a special bank name. I considered this might facilitate payment of bills, etc., by mail.

I am surprised that with suspicions banks, landlords, utility companies, etc., you will understand that creating the Hyde-Evans personality in the form of a limited company is taking a little effort.

See you Monday, the 8th.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Project HKUL23U, Subproject 23

1. The scope of this project is intended to encompass all those activities now engaged in by the agency in its own facilities under the direction of CD/TS3. At the present time the various projects at this facility are being concluded and it is deemed desirable from the standpoint of security and efficiency to replace these projects with a single project more general in its approach.

2. The attached proposal from Dr. indicates the extent of the investigations that his facilities will allow him to carry out on the materials developed in the three projects referred to in paragraph 1, as well as certain other materials of interest to CD/TS3. Dr. also serves as a general consultant to this division and provides cover and cut-out facilities to the Agency.

3. The total cost of this project for a period of one year will not exceed 2,700,000.

4. Dr. has been granted a Top Secret Clearance by the Agency and is fully capable of protecting the security of the Government's interest in such matters as this.

Chemical Division, TS3
APPROVED:

Chief, Chemical Division, TS3
APPROVED FOR OBLIGATION OF FUNDS:

[Redacted]

Serial No. Date: 25 Mar. 1972

Attachments: Proposal
The present investigation is concerned with chemical agents which are effective in modifying the behavior and function of the central nervous system.

1. It is proposed to study a variety of known drugs in this pharmacological class that are in present day use and to synthesize new chemical agents or to modify existing ones as occasion may demand.

2. The various chemical agents investigated or synthesized will be tested on animals to determine their acute and chronic toxicity. Their pharmacological effects will be studied by a variety of assay techniques, such as blood pressure determinations, bronchial dilatation recording, endocrine effects, etc. Complete animal facilities will be maintained for this purpose and pathologic study will be carried out on the affected organs when the animals are sacrificed.

3. Preliminary clinical investigation will be carried out on the more promising chemical agents, and appropriate laboratory procedures will be performed, such as blood counts, urinalysis, etc., to determine the effectiveness and the side reactions of the drugs under investigation.

4. Adequate reports will be submitted of the findings at quarterly intervals.

5. Proposed budget:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Synthesis of pure cholinesterase</td>
<td>$7,500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research medical associate</td>
<td>$5,500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacological assistant</td>
<td>$5,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical assistant</td>
<td>$4,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Histology technician</td>
<td>$2,400.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinical technician</td>
<td>$3,600.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical consultant</td>
<td>$1,200.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total salaries for personnel: $30,700.00

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other Expenditures</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Animals, animal maintenance &amp; facilities</td>
<td>$4,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical &amp; laboratory supplies, expendable</td>
<td>$4,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous permanent equipment</td>
<td>$2,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel, medical meetings, etc.</td>
<td>$2,000.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total other expenditures: $12,000.00

TOTAL: $42,700.00
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Increase in the Scope of Subproject 23, Project MKUZTRA

1. Due to a considerable increase in the scope of the work undertaken by the Chemical Division at the direction of TSS/CD under Subproject 23, Project MKUZTRA, the $42,700.00 sum originally obligated for this work is insufficient to cover the year's costs. It is therefore proposed to add $15,000.00 to that already obligated under this Subproject.

2. The total cost of this Subproject for the period 28 January 1954 to 28 January 1955 will thus amount to $57,700.00.

3. The increase in scope responsible for this proposal consists of the development and partial financing of two new sources of biologically active compounds of interest in the program TSS/CD is carrying out.

Chemical Division, TSS

APPROVED FOR OBLIGATION OF FUNDS:

Research Director
Date: 04/17/54

APPROVED:

Chief, Chemical Division, TSS

The additional compounds are derivatives of phenazine not available from any other sources.
25 August 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Authorization for Payment of Certain Expenses Under Project MKULTRA, Subproject 23

1. In order to carry on the work of the above Subproject, it was necessary to test the effects of certain chemical substances when administered to human beings. Certain of the anticipated effects involved mental functions which precluded the use of mental defectives for this particular study.

2. In view of these circumstances the project engineer, with verbal approval from his chief, authorized the contractor to pay the hospitals expenses of certain persons suffering from incurable cancer for the privilege of studying the effects of these chemicals during their terminal illnesses. The total funds expended in this fashion amounted to $658.05 and full value was received.

3. It is requested that the Chief, TSS indicate his knowledge and approval of this particular expenditure for audit purposes.

APPROVED: TSS/Chemical Division

APPROVED: Chief, TSS/Chemical Division

Distribution: Orig. - TSS/CD
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Project KCUI/ERA, Subproject 35

1. While the Director's statutory authority to expend funds for confidential purposes is not limited by law, we believe that a gift of Government funds as such would exceed the intent of the Congress in granting that power. However, where a gift is made for the express purpose of producing something of value to this Agency which cannot otherwise be obtained and there is a reasonable expectation that the value may be received, the gift may in effect be an expenditure for proper official purposes.

2. In Subproject 35, it is stated that the donation in question would achieve certain ends desired by TSS. There seems to be no question that those ends would be advantageous, so the main questions appear to be whether they could not be attained by more direct, normal methods, and, if not, whether the return is necessary and reasonable in relation to the donation.

3. We are in no position to review the requirements of TSS or to appraise the advantages that would result from this project. We do not comment, therefore, on the value received if the project results in the benefits foreseen. We feel we should comment on factors affecting the probability of achieving those ends. In a legal sense, there is little or no control. Once the funds are donated, the individual, his foundation, or the hospital could conceivably refuse to work for us or allow us the use of the facilities.

4. Practically, the control seems to be established as well as circumstances permit. Certainly, as long as the individual is alive and in his present position, we have every reason to expect his complete cooperation in the future as in the past, unless through some act or fault of our own he is alienated. Even in the event of his death or incapacity, there appears to be a reasonable
5. It should be noted that there are two circumstances which require consideration in a final determination. As stated in Section V, our contribution, by appearing to be from a private source, would increase the matching Government contribution by a similar amount which would not be the case if it were known that this was in fact a Government contribution also. Secondly, it is the stated policy of the hospital to charge the Government and commercial organizations 60 per cent overhead on research contracts, whereas nonprofit foundations pay only direct costs but no overhead. Because of the ostensible source, our projects will not be charged overhead. This could be construed as morally wrongful to the hospital, as normally we would pay the 60 per cent overhead charge for projects performed directly for us, but I believe this can be offset, at least to the amount of our donation, and perhaps by the further amount by which the other Government contributions are increased by our donation. In any case, if the project is a proper one and must be performed in this manner, security dictates these circumstances and they, therefore, do not present a legal obstacle as such.

6. We raised the question whether funds for the hospital construction could not be obtained from other normal charitable sources. It appeared that there was a strong possibility that the individual concerned could raise adequate funds from private resources, but it was the position of TSS that if this were the case we would not obtain the commitment from the individual and the degree of control which this project is designed to achieve.

[Signature]

LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel
8 April 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, DD/R/TSS

SUBJECT: Amendment to Subproject 35 of Project IXULTRA

We have noted your memorandum of 6 April 1955 to the Director requesting an increase of $250,000 for the TSS R&D budget for this Project. This request does not affect in any way the comments in my memorandum of 21 December 1954.

General Counsel

[Redacted] by authority of: CL BY 187475

Copy # 1 of 1 copy
A portion of the Research and Development Program of TSS/Chemical Division is devoted to the discovery of the following materials and methods:

1. Substances which will promote illogical thinking and impulsiveness to the point where the recipient would be discredited in public.

2. Substances which increase the efficiency of meditation and perception.

3. Materials which will prevent or counteract the intoxicating effect of alcohol.

4. Materials which will promote the intoxicating effect of alcohol.

5. Materials which will produce the signs and symptoms of recognized diseases in a reversible way so that they may be used for malingering, etc.

6. Materials which will render the induction of hypnosis easier or otherwise enhance its usefulness.

7. Substances which will enhance the ability of individuals to withstand privation, torture and coercion during interrogation and so-called "brain-washing".

8. Materials and physical methods which will produce amnesia for events preceding and during their use.

9. Physical methods of producing shock and confusion over extended periods of time and capable of surreptitious use.

10. Substances which produce physical disablement such as paralyzation of the legs, acute anemia, etc.
11. Substances which will produce "pure" euphoria with no subsequent let-down.

12. Substances which alter personality structure in such a way that the tendency of the recipient to become dependent upon another person is enhanced.

13. A material which will cause mental confusion of such a type that the individual under its influence will find it difficult to maintain a fabrication under questioning.

14. Substances which will lower the ambition and general working efficiency of men when administered in undetectable amounts.

15. Substances which promote weakness or distortion of the eyesight or hearing faculties, preferably without permanent effects.

16. A knock out pill which can surreptitiously be administered in drinks, food, cigarettes, etc., which will be safe to use, provide a maximum of amnesia, and be suitable for use by agent types on an ad hoc basis.

17. A material which can be surreptitiously administered by the above routes and which in very small amounts will make it impossible for a man to perform any physical activity whatever.

The development of materials of this type follows the standard practice of such ethical drug houses as •••••. It is a relatively routine procedure to develop a drug to the point of human testing. Ordinarily, the drug houses depend upon the services of private physicians for the final clinical testing. The physicians are willing to assume the responsibility of such tests in order to advance the science of medicine. It is difficult and sometimes impossible for TSS/OD to offer such an inducement with respect to its products. In practice, it has been possible to use outside cleared contractors for the preliminary phases of this work. However, that part which involves human testing at effective dose levels presents security problems which cannot be handled by the ordinary contractor.
The proposed facility offers a unique opportunity for the secure handling of such clinical testing in addition to the many advantages outlined in the project proposal. The security problems mentioned above are eliminated by the fact that the responsibility for the testing will rest completely upon the physician and the hospital. This will allow the personal to supervise the work very closely to make sure that all tests are conducted according to the recognized practices and embody adequate safeguards.
1. Subproject 35 as approved by the DCI on 15 January 1955 contemplated a financial contribution of $125,000 to the Agency for the purpose of enabling it to participate in the construction of a new research wing to cost $5,000,000 exclusive of furnishings and equipment. Agency funds will be transmitted through the cut-out which will result in one-sixth of the space in the new research wing being made available for Agency-sponsored research involving covert biological and chemical techniques of warfare.

2. At that time (15 January 1955) encouragement indicated a willingness to contribute $500,000 to the construction fund. The building fund was to have been raised as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>Contributed by CIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>Donation from CIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$125,000</td>
<td>to be supplied by CIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,250,000</td>
<td>Matching funds under Public Law 221 equal to the amount of the two above contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3,000,000</td>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Since it now appears that the expected contribution by CIA will not be forthcoming, permission is requested to increase the Agency’s contribution by $250,000 which will result in a financial situation as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>Contributed by CIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>Donation from CIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$375,000</td>
<td>supplied by CIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>Matching funds under Public Law 221 equal to the amount of the two above contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. The Agency’s contribution would thus total $375,000. This investment, together with the equal sum resulting from matched funds, is fully justified in the opinion of TSS for reasons which will be explained by Chief, TSS, and Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, Chief, TSS/Chemical Division. The scope of subproject 35 has not changed since the Director originally approved a request by TSS for permission to spend $125,000 of available funds.
Funds for this purpose through the controls and procedures established for MINULTRA. At the time subproject 35 was set up within the scope of the TSS R&D program, security considerations and cover arrangements were carefully reviewed and the Office of General Counsel assisted in legal determinations. With the exception of funding arrangements, no changes in the program have since been made.

5. Funds to cover the previously approved sum of $125,000 are available within the TSS budget for FY 55 and have been set aside. The TSS budget, however, lacks funds with which to cover the supplemental sum of $250,000, and it is requested that the TSS budget be increased by this amount. Supplementary funds available for subproject 35 can definitely be obligated by the end of FY 55.
AMENDMENT TO SUBPROJECT 35, PROJECT MKULTRA

For the Purpose of Establishing a Cover Organization for Highly Sensitive Projects in the Field of Biological, Chemical and Radiological Warfare

I. Background of Subproject 35.

In January 1955 approval was given by the DCI to Subproject 35 of Project MKULTRA. The documents which lead to this approval (including comments of the OGC) are attached herewith as Tabs 2, A and 3.

Project MKULTRA is the framework of procedures and controls under which research projects in certain highly sensitive fields are carried out by TSS. A description of the background of Project MKULTRA may be found on page 1 of Tab A.

Subproject 35 establishes cover under which the Chemical Division of DD/P/TSS would conduct certain sensitive projects in the fields of biological and chemical warfare and consists of a proposed arrangement whereby the Agency covertly contributes funds to assist in the construction of a new research wing. Contribution of these funds is to be made through the cut-out so that the contribution would remain unwitting of Agency participation in the building program. Projects would later be carried out by the Chemical Division using the facilities of the new research wing, and Agency employees would be able to participate in the work without the University or the Hospital authorities being aware of Agency interest. Subproject 35 contemplated the contribution of Agency funds to assist in the construction of facilities. Future research work would be carried out through the cut-out and would be separately funded under existing procedures and controls.

II. Building Fund.

The University will require $3,000,000 for the six-story addition to the hospital exclusive of the cost of land, heating and power supply which are being provided by the University. Under Public Law 221, Subappropriation
663, dated 26 August 1954, funds are available to match funds raised for this purpose by the University.

When Subproject 35 was first prepared, it was hoped and expected that the funds required would be provided as follows: The University has allocated $1,000,000 to this project and will assume upkeep and staffing obligations. The Agency agreed that if the Agency would provide $250,000 with a grant of $125,000, the Fund would match this amount and make a total donation of $250,000 to the University Building Fund. At that time, discussions with other funds indicated that the Fund would contribute $500,000 to the building project on the basis that radiological research would be conducted in the new wing and that the construction of the new facilities was of interest to that Agency. In summary, the financial situation was to have been as follows:

$1,000,000 - B
250,000 - Donation from Fund (of which $125,000 was supplied by CIA)
1,250,000 - Matched Funds under Public Law 221
500,000 - B

$3,500,000 - TOTAL - B

It was recognized that the Federal contribution of $1,250,000 under Public Law 221 would be seemingly inflated by reason of the inclusion of the CIA contribution in that of Public Law 221. It was felt that the value to the Agency was such that this inflation of the Federal contribution was more than justified by the importance of the overall project and that furthermore, the inclusion of the CIA contribution in that of Public Law 221 was the best means of maintaining security.

III. B

The original informal commitment by the part of B was first obtained through verbal discussions with C, which were followed up by an exchange of correspondence between the DCI and C. Unfortunately at that time C was fully occupied with the controversy concerning the subordinates and continued contact with C subordinates resulted in a decision that C could not or would not contribute to the Building Fund, but would be willing to support an annual research program amounting to $50,000 to $75,000. It is not

Copy # 1 of 1 copy
known whether this change in policy was suggested to him or whether it originated with him. Be that as it may, when the change in policy became apparent, it was evident that additional funds would be required to complete the hospital construction.

IV. Suggested Funding.

It is now suggested that the $3,000,000 required for the hospital wing be provided as follows:

- $1,000,000
- 500,000 - Donation from (including $375,000 supplied by CIA)
- 1,500,000 - Matched Funds from Public Law 221
- $3,000,000 - TOTAL

The donation from would thus consist of the original $125,000 to be supplied by CIA plus the sum of $125,000 to be provided by the Fund and a supplemental CIA contribution of $250,000. Originally Subproject 35 requested permission to make a contribution of $125,000 to the building fund and approval was given. This approval is enclosed herewith as Tab 2. The purpose of this amendment to Subproject 35 is to request permission to contribute an additional $250,000 to the building construction fund through and . It should be noted that the total Government contribution to the hospital fund still remains unchanged at $1,875,000. The increase in the size of the contribution by the Fund is not out of keeping with other operations of and will not arouse undue comment because of its magnitude. The originally approved contribution has not as yet been transmitted to and neither the original contribution nor the supplement would be paid to until funds adequate to complete the project are made available. This condition was specified by the DCI in approving the original contribution.

V. Source of CIA Funds.

Funds to cover the initially approved sum of $125,000 are available and have been segregated for this purpose within the TSS FY 1955 Budget for Research and Development. Insufficient funds remain in the TSS budget to cover the supplementary sum of $250,000, and it is therefore requested that the TSS budget be increased by this amount and that the increase be made available to Subproject 35 of Project MKULTRA.
VI. Comments by the Office of General Counsel

Tab 3 is a memorandum from the General Counsel to the DCI dated 21 December 1954, commenting on Subproject 35, and stating in part that there are no fundamental legal objections if the probable benefits are considered a fair return for this expenditure. The amendment to the Subproject contemplates only an increase in funds and in no way changes any other aspect of the project. The project has been referred back to the GCC even though no change in its structure is contemplated, and Tab 4 contains his comments.

VII. Justification.

The advantages and benefits accruing to the Agency outlined in Tab A are felt by TSS to provide adequate and complete justification for the expenditure of the additional sum herein requested which brings the total CIA contribution to $375,000. The most important of these advantages and benefits may be summarized as follows: (Fuller explanations may be found in Tab A).

a. One-sixth of the total space in the new hospital wing will be available to the Chemical Division of TSS, thereby providing laboratory and office space, technical assistants, equipment and experimental animals.

b. Agency sponsorship of sensitive research projects will be completely deniable.

c. Full professional cover will be provided for up to three biochemical employees of the Chemical Division.

d. Human patients and volunteers for experimental use will be available under controlled clinical conditions within the full supervision of the Agency.

Subproject 35 was originally conceived in October and November of 1954, and the ensuing six months have indicated that increasing emphasis and importance are being placed on the Chemical Division's work in this field. The facilities of the hospital and the ability to conduct controlled experiments under safe clinical conditions using materials with which any Agency connection must be completely deniable will augment and complement other programs recently taken over by TSS, such as...
It was originally thought that at least 18 months would elapse after the building funds had been raised before the facilities would be finished and could be occupied by TSS. This lengthy delay has now been overcome. When [redacted] has raised the $500,000 which his Fund will ostensibly contribute, he will then be allowed to use existing space in the present hospital in order that he may build up the organization which will later occupy the new wing. This means that TSS will be able to begin to take advantage of this cover situation within a matter of months instead of waiting for a year and a half.

VIII. Security.

Security matters and details are being co-ordinated with the TSS Liaison and Security Officer. Security of transmittal of the funds and cover arrangements are described in Tab A and remain unchanged.

IX. Agreement with [redacted]

The agreement with [redacted] is described in Tab A, and the extent of his co-operation and the control over his actions remain unchanged.

X. Resultant Financial Saving.

The total contribution of $375,000 by CIA will result in an additional $375,000 in matching funds provided under Public Law 221. It is felt that the expenditure of these total funds is justified by the importance of the programs which will be pursued at the new facility. Even though the CIA contribution is increased under this amended project, the total of Federal funds remains unchanged. The use of this facility will allow work to proceed under conditions of cover and security which would be impossible to obtain elsewhere without an expenditure of equivalent or greater funds. In addition, by funding individual projects for this facility through the [redacted] no charge will be incurred for overhead expense. If research projects [redacted] are openly sponsored by the U.S. Government, it is customary to pay an overhead rate equivalent to 60% of salaries. However, if a non-profit fund, such as [redacted] sponsors research, the funds granted for the work are customarily used only to pay for salaries, equipment and supplies, but not overhead. The Agency thus buys considerably more research through [redacted] than would be the case if no cut-out were used.
Hereewith the file on KEULNA, Sub-project 35, with our comments on the legal aspects. While there is no legal control and there are certain incidental considerations, there is no fundamental legal objection if the probable benefits are considered a fair return for this expenditure.

General Counsel

22 December 1951
(DATE)
SUBPROJECT 35 - PROJECT MKULTRA

For the purpose of establishing a cover organization for highly sensitive projects in the field of covert Biological, Chemical and Radiological Warfare

I. Background of Project MKULTRA.

In 1953 the DCI approved Project MKULTRA which established procedures and controls under which research projects in certain highly sensitive fields could be carried out by TSS without the necessity of signing the usual contracts. The approved procedures apply over-all Research and Development budget, and no additional funds are required. Controls established in the Project Review Committee approval of the Research and Development program (other than the signing of a contract) remain unchanged, and special provisions for audit are included. All files are retained by TSS.

These procedures and controls were approved since it is highly undesirable from a policy and security point of view that contracts be signed indicating Agency or Government interest in this field of endeavor. In great many instances the work must be conducted by individuals who are not and should not be aware of Agency interest. In other cases the individuals involved are unwilling to have their names on a contract which remains out of their control in our files. Experience has shown that qualified, competent individuals in the field of physiological, psychiatric and other biological sciences are very reluctant to enter into signed agreements of any sort which would connect them with this activity since such connection might seriously jeopardize their professional reputations.

When Project MKULTRA was approved, it was not contemplated that it would be used for the establishment of cover. Over forty individual research and development projects have been established under this framework and have been carried out extremely successfully, both from technical and administrative points of view. The experience gained in handling these projects has emphasized that establishment of better cover both for the projects and for associated Agency scientists is of utmost importance. Subproject 35 would establish such cover.
II. Background of the Fund

The [redacted] was incorporated in [redacted]. It has a Board of Directors of six members, one of whom is [redacted], who acts as Executive Director of the Fund. [redacted] has solicited funds from various individuals to finance a program of basic research in the chemotherapy of cancer, asthma, hypertension, psychosomatic disorders and other chronic diseases. Since [redacted], it has co-operated with the Chemical Division of [redacted] and acted smoothly and efficiently, both as a cut-out for dealing with contractors in the fields of covert chemical and biological warfare, and as a prime contractor for certain areas of biological research. Projects presently being handled for the Agency by the Fund are administered under the controls and procedures previously approved for MKULTRA.

III. Background of [redacted]

[redacted] is internationally known as a [redacted] in the field of [redacted] research and is [redacted] in the past he has been associated in a research capacity with both the [redacted] and [redacted]. During the war he served as a [redacted] in the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery in the Navy. Since then he has maintained a consulting relationship to the Navy medical research program. [redacted] is TOP SECRET cleared and witting of Agency sponsorship of the programs carried out by the Fund as are two other members of the Fund's Board of Directors.

IV. [redacted] Fund

[redacted] has been actively engaged in a campaign to raise funds for the purpose of erecting a new clinical research wing on the existing building six stories high, 320 feet long and 50 feet wide. Two-thirds of the space will be research laboratories and offices while 100 research beds will occupy the remainder. Participation in the fund-raising campaign outlined below will result in his having control of one-sixth of the total space in addition to the base

[redacted]

Copy # 1 of 2 copies

Filed 11/27; CL BK 187475

11 June 1977
ment and general out-patient facilities. In this effort, has secured the enthusiastic support of the medical faculty and the officers of the University who have carried the preliminary arrangements forward to the maximum extent of their resources.

V. Financial Situation.

The University will require about $3,000,000 for the story addition. This sum is exclusive of the cost of land and the heating and power supply which are already available at the site. At the present time under Public Law 221, funds are available to match funds raised by the University. The University has allocated $1,000,000 to this project and will assume upkeep and staffing obligations. has agreed that if CIA will provide a grant of $125,000, will match this amount and make a total donation of $250,000 to the University Building Fund. This Agency's contribution will be made under the condition that it will be refunded if construction does not take place.

TSS has discussed this situation with and has encouraged to donate $500,000 to the building project on the basis that will be conducted in the new wing. though aware of our interest in the building, is unwitting of our specific fields of research and individual projects. In summary, the financial situation would be as follows:

$1,000,000 - Donations from 
250,000 - Donation from CIA 
1,250,000 - Matched funds from Public Law 221 
500,000 - CIA 
$3,000,000 - TOTAL

Although it is recognized that the Federal contribution of $1,250,000 under P. L. 221 is seemingly inflated by reason of the inclusion of the CIA contribution in that of actually the value to the CIA is $250,000 and not just $125,000, the amount of CIA's contribution; furthermore, the inclusion of the CIA contribution in that of is the best method of maintaining security.
VI. Difficulties Faced by TSS.

It has been generally recognized for some time that the external research activities of the Chemical Division of TSS in the field of covert biological, chemical and radiological warfare are sorely in need of proper cover. Although Project MKULTRA provides excellent administrative and financial cover for projects, it does not afford cover for scientific or technical personnel. MKULTRA has been used for dealing through [deleted] as a cut-out and for working directly with individuals or private companies. The use of MKULTRA in the future will be increasingly limited due to:

(a) The increasing number of people who, albeit properly cleared, are aware of the Agency connection with [deleted] — B

(b) The feeling by [deleted] that the Agency — C employees contacting him (Drs. Gottlieb, [deleted], etc.) have no cover of any sort and consequently expose him to unnecessary and highly undesirable personal risk; and

(c) The widespread intra-Agency awareness of the nature of the relationship between the Fund and the Agency.

Another serious problem faced by TSS/CD as a result of lack of suitable cover is the difficulty in planning careers for technical and scientific personnel in the biological field. A long-range career concept of activities in this field inevitably includes proper cover for the individual concerned. The availability of research facilities at [deleted] will offer an excellent opportunity — B to solve many of the above problems, and [deleted] is willing — C and able to make any reasonable arrangements to suit our needs. Up to three Chemical Division employees can be integrated into [deleted] C program for work in the new hospital wing on the Agency's research projects. Although career planning was not a consideration when planning the procedures and controls established by Project MKULTRA, nevertheless this particular subproject, in addition to its primary objective, will be of very great secondary help.
in simplifying and eliminating many of the very awkward and dangerous conditions facing certain Chemical Division employees.

VII. Advantages and Benefits Accruing to TSS.

The contemplated arrangements will result in many advantages and benefits, including the following:

(a) One-sixth of the total space in the new research wing is to be available to TSS, and in turn, will be available to the Chemical Division of TSS. This will provide laboratory and office space, technical assistants, equipment and experimental animals for use by Chemical Division personnel in connection with specific future projects.

(b) The cost of Chemical Division projects which are to be carried out under this cover will be covered by funds made available through Project MKULTRA, and projects will be subject to the procedures and controls established for MKULTRA. The funds will be passed through in the past, in turn will either pay expenses directly or transfer the money to the University for this purpose. Each project will be individually funded based on its particular budget, and there will be no other continuing or recurring charges for items such as space, facilities, etc.

(c) The Agency's sponsorship of sensitive research projects would be completely deniable since no connection would exist between the University and the Agency.

(d) Excellent professional cover would be provided for up to three bio-chemical employees of the Chemical Division of TSS. This would allow open attendance at scientific meetings, the advancement of personal standing in the scientific world, and as such, would constitute a major efficiency and
morale booster.

(e) Human patients and volunteers for experimental use will be available under excellent clinical conditions with the full supervision of —

(f) There would be available the equivalent of a hospital safehouse.

(g) It is expected that the output of useful results of the Chemical Division in the bio-chemical field will be greatly improved through the more efficient use of technical personnel who would be able to spend more of their time on actual laboratory work.

(h) —

(i) Excellent facilities would be provided for recruiting new scientific personnel since members of the Chemical Division working under this cover will be in daily contact with members of the Graduate School of the University.

(j) The regular University library and reprint service will be available as a source of technical information.

VIII. Funding

It is proposed that $125,000 be granted to —

If approval is granted, TSS will arrange for payment to be made under the procedures and controls of MKULTRA. These funds would come out of the presently approved TSS Research and Development budget for FY 1955 and no new funds are involved. The funds would be transferred as a grant to —

In turn, — will match these funds with an equal amount and donate a total of $250,000 to the University as outlined in paragraph V. The sum of $125,000 would be entirely in the nature of a grant and would in due
course be merged with the entire $3,000,000 raised for the construction of the wing. The Agency would retain no residual interest in the building or title to any equipment or facilities purchased with this money.

This single grant will constitute the Agency's entire participation in the new hospital wing, and there will be no recurring obligations in the form of annual support of the hospital or additional grants. Transmission of Agency funds to will be made through previously established cover.ch. will be shown as having been received from books. In the event of death, will continue in being and any activities under this project will be continued through and will be unaffected by his death.

IX. Memorandum of Agreement.

A memorandum of agreement will be signed with outlining to the greatest extent possible the arrangements under which the hospital space under his control will be made available to Chemical Division personnel and the manner in which cover will be provided and other benefits obtained. No contract will be signed since would be unable to reflect any of the Agency's contractual terms in his arrangements with the University when makes the donation in question. The memorandum of agreement will be retained in TSS.

X. Security.

All security matters and details are being coordinated with the TSS/Liaison and Security Office.
XI. Resultant Financial Saving.

The $125,000 to be contributed by CIA plus the $125,000 in matching funds provided under P.L. 221 to the Building Fund will be more than offset in a few years by the savings which will result from use of this non-profit fund. If a research project at [redacted] or other educational non-profit institution is sponsored by the U.S. Government, it is customary for the Government to pay for salaries, equipment, supplies, etc., and for overhead as well. In the case of a non-profit foundation such as [redacted] sponsors research at a non-profit institution, the funds granted for the work are customarily used to pay for salaries, equipment, and supplies but not for overhead. The Government dollar thus buys considerably more research through [redacted] than would be the case if no cut-out were used.

XII. Legal Matters.

This matter has been discussed with [redacted] of the Office of General Counsel, and he is fully aware of all details surrounding this grant.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Trip Report, Visit to Vienna, 7 April 1953

1. The purpose of this trip was to make arrangements for closing out the project. The company had been given ample previous notice that such was likely to be the intent of the visit, and he prepared himself accordingly.

2. It was explained to me that it would not be possible to carry over funds beyond the end of the current fiscal year. Therefore all work would have to be completed and all payments made prior to 30 June. This deadline appeared acceptable to him, and it was agreed that I would make my final visit there to receive reports and attend to final details on 16 June. He did not have a current financial report, but he estimated that funds currently on hand would be about sufficient for remaining expenditures. He agreed to send the society within the next 10 days a more exact statement of current balance and estimated remaining expenditures. I tried to impress on him strongly that transfer of additional funds and/or return of unexpended funds must be completed well before the end of the fiscal year.

3. Of the 30 cases called for in the original design 13 have been completed (but only 4 have been transcribed from the tapes). In addition there are 8 cases in progress (of which two are already in interview and 6 are worked up to the point of having the lists of questions prepared). It was agreed that to meet the deadline we would have to limit the design to these 26 cases.

4. It is apparent that he is so involved in the administrative problems of the project that he is not paying any attention to the results. Since to date only 4 cases have been transcribed there is no way of telling what is coming out of it. I assume there were no dramatic reactions, because the interviewers would have let him know about them had they emerged. It is possible, however, that our own analysis of the data may dredge up something of value, although I am dubious on this point.

5. He gave me his usual long involved talk on the difficulties he had encountered which account for the delays. He also talked at some
length about his "experiments" with hypnosis, some aspects of which are mildly hair-raising. Finally he made quite a pitch for continuing some such project as this next year, "with realistic, specific deadlines."

I told him we would discuss possibilities after the present project was completed and we had a chance to closely examine the take.
The experiment designed to test the effectiveness of certain medication in causing individuals to release guarded information has been completed in accordance with the original experimental design, with the exception that 25 instead of 30 cases were used. This matter was discussed in more detail in my letter of July 15. Abstracts on all 25 cases, transcriptions of the interviews, Wechsler-Bellevue Intelligence Tests given at the hospital and previously given at this clinic, post-experimental rankings and evaluation sheets, and a schedule covering the drug administration have all been submitted to you under separate cover.

Enclosed is a financial statement which represents the final accounting of the funds allocated by you for use in this project. If, for your purpose, you require a more detailed summary of what specific professional services were performed or more detail with reference to travel expenses or any other item, kindly let me know.

You will note, in this connection, that Dr. ___ was compensated in an amount exceeding that paid to Dr. _. This was occasioned by the fact that Dr. ___ spent much time checking the files and records at the Prison selecting cases that might be suitable for our purpose. It was from the cases selected by him that the subjects used in the experiment were finally chosen.

I have been instructed to write a check to the Society for the balance in the account as of today. I would like to
delay this matter for a few days. Several checks have been written during recent days, and I would like to be sure they cleared the bank before closing out the account. You will receive a check in the amount of $1356.26 early next week.

If there is any additional information required, I will be happy to cooperate.

Executive Director

Enc.
The research project will be carried out at the [REDACTED], which is located at [REDACTED]. The hospital has one thousand, one hundred and thirty-five (1,135) beds. At the present time there are one hundred and forty-two (142) non-psychotics classified as criminal-normal psychopaths. There are four full-time psychiatrists and varying numbers of medical interns; two psychologists; four social workers; nurses and attendants. The superintendent of the hospital is [REDACTED], a sitting member of the research team. The institution comes under the direction of the [REDACTED]; the research project is normally approved by the Co-ordinator of Research of the State Department of Mental Health. [REDACTED] will secure this approval. [REDACTED] will take space available and it is possible for the research team to sleep at the hospital while carrying out their investigation.

The subjects will be selected from the one hundred and forty-two (142) criminal-normal psychopaths on whom there is adequate previous investigation including police reports, physical, psychiatric and psychologic examinations and social histories. The age range of the
subjects varies from twenty to seventy years and there is a wide variation of intelligence levels and social backgrounds.

The following men are suggested for the research team:

- A psychologist who has had extensive experience in examining criminals, has written extensively on psychopathic sexual deviations; is an authority on polygraph and interrogation methods.

- For over thirty years, a psychiatrist who has spent his life in the treatment of the criminal insane and maintains the only institution for the care and treatment of the criminal-sociopathic.

- A psychiatrist who has a large private practice. At the present time he is exclusively devoting his time to psychoanalysis. He has had extensive experience examining criminals. As a Navy psychiatrist he has had extensive experience in the field of oriental psychiatry and traumasque, etc. He has also done drug interrogation with criminals and has engaged in narcoanalysis and hypnotherapy.
a psychiatrist who is on the staff of  and maintains a private practice in the field of psychiatry. has had wide experience in dealing with criminals going back some twenty-five years, including drug interrogation.

a physician for the past twenty-five years, has been has had extensive experience dealing with all sorts of criminals and has engaged in drug interrogation. Besides his city position, he also maintains a private practice in the field of general medicine.

has suggested one of the psychiatrists from his staff who is interested and has used drugs in the treatment of patients and has also used hypnosis with mental patients. The research assistants have not been selected as yet but might well include psychologists or nurses now attached to . The secretary will be present secretary who will do all the necessary stenographic work in addition to her present duties.

EXPERIMENTAL MODEL

Three terms of two center professional men each will be selected.

One team working with the selected group of patients will use straight interrogation, hypnosis and hypnosis and THC and hypnosis and a
Tetrahydrocannabinol acetate derivative. Another team working on another group of subjects will use straight interrogation, LSD with interrogation and a tetrahydrocannabinol acetate derivative and interrogation. Later the third team with another group of subjects will use straight interrogation and a combination of LSD and a tetrahydrocannabinol acetate derivative.

A meeting of all the members of the research project will be brief on the drugs to be used and all of the pharmacological and medical knowledge gained so far in the use of these drugs.

In selecting groups of subjects for experimentation, the following objectives will be sought:

1) Subjects will be selected who have denied allegations of various kinds that can be checked or strongly assumed on the basis of previously established records.

2) As far as possible, the actual research on administering drugs will not be aware of the drug he is administering and placebos will be interspersed with drug administration.

3) Precautions will be taken to neutralise age, intelligence, physical condition, social background and any other controllable factor in selecting groups. Administration of drugs will be done both openly and surreptitiously.

4) Sound recordings will be made of the interrogation and written reports will be obtained in other cases.
Due care will be exercised in equating methods of
interrogation as far as this can be done. The results
of interrogation with drugs and other techniques will
be checked against existing records and qualitative and
quantitative reports will be evaluated. Accurate and
uniform reports will be kept and reports will be sub-
mitted on the basis of interim progress and complete
projects.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Project MAULTRA, Subproject 42

1. Subproject 42 is to be continued for the same purposes as when originally established: to support covert and realistic field trials of certain research and development items of interest to TSD, and to maintain the physical facilities required for these trials.

2. In the past year a number of covert and realistic field trials have been successfully carried out. The results of these experiments have provided factual data essential to establishing protocols for a number of contemplated operations. A continuation of covert and realistic field trials are necessitated by the production of new materials in TSD programs, particularly in areas requiring detailed knowledge of the effectiveness and efficiency of delivery systems. Additional trials are also necessitated by the need for better controlled "field-type" experiments.

3. The estimated cost of the project is $5,000.00 for a period of six months. Charges should be made against Allotment 1125-1350-3502.

4. Accounting for funds and equipment under this subproject has been established on a detailed basis with the auditor and will continue as in the past.
is approved for TOP SECRET by the Agency and operates under cover for purposes of this subproject.

TSD/Research Branch

APPROVED FOR OBLIGATION OF FUNDS:

Date:_________________

Distribution:
Original only.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Project HKULTRA, Subproject 42

1. Subproject 42 is being established to provide for the continued support of the facilities, and as such, is a continuation of Subproject 14. Under Subproject 42, it is intended that the facilities be moved to a new location. These facilities, in the new location, will continue to provide a means for the realistic testing of certain R and D items of interest to CD/TSS and APD/TSS.

2. Subproject 42 will be conducted by Mr. A seaman. Certain support activities will be provided by CD/TSS and APD/TSS.

3. The estimated cost for a period of one year is $3,300.00, starting 1 March 1955.

Seymour Gottlieb
Chief
TSS/Chemical Division

APPROVED FOR OBLIGATION OF FUNDS: $3,300.00
Research Director
Date: 27 Jan. 1955

APPROVED FOR ADDITIONAL OBLIGATION OF FUNDS: ($2,699.34)
Research Director
Date: June 27, 1955

Original Only.
1. The scope of this project is intended to encompass all those activities now engaged in by the SUBBM38, in its own facilities under the direction of TSS, Chemical Division. These activities will take the form of three lines of biochemical investigation; namely, the curare-like effect of certain thiols, the preparation of hydrogenated quinolines and indole alkaloids, and the continued study of diphenolic compounds. In addition to the above investigations, the present biological testing and essaying techniques will be elaborated and broadened to include cardiovascular and antitumor effects of compounds resulting from the above programs.

2. The attached proposal from the SUBBM38 indicates the extent of the investigations that his facilities will allow him to carry out on the materials developed in the three lines of research referred to in paragraph 1, as well as certain other materials of interest to TSS/CD. SUBBM38 also serves as a general consultant to this Division and provides cover and cut-out facilities to the Agency.

3. The total cost of this project for a period of one year will not exceed $100,000.00. At the present time, the sum of $40,000.00 is being committed, the balance of the total to be committed at a later date.

The attached proposal has been granted a TOP SECRET clearance by the Agency, and is fully capable of protecting the security of the Government's interest in this matter.

TSS, Chemical Division

APPROVED FOR OBLIGATION OF FUNDS:

Chief, TSS/Chemical Division

Research Director

Date: 24 Mar 55

APPROVED FOR ADDITIONAL APPROPRIATION OF $27,000:

Research Director

Date: 21 Jan 55

Attachments:
Proposal
Original Only.
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Project-MULIRA, Subproject 45

1. The scope of this project is intended to encompass all those activities engaged in by the under the direction of TSS/CD. These activities take the form of three lines of biochemical investigation, namely, the Curare-like effect of certain thiols, the preparation of hydrogenated quinolines and indole alkaloids and a program of investigation of toxic cerebral states. This last investigation will include bio-assay and chemical analysis of various body fluids of animals in which cerebral toxemias have been produced. It is the aim of this program to endeavor to understand the mechanism of such states as toxic delirium, uremic coma, and cerebral toxicity from poisoning. In order to continue the established "cover" activities of the and to make available a pool of subjects for testing purposes, the and the effects of compounds resulting from the above program will be evaluated.

2. The attached proposal from indicates the extent of the investigations that his facilities will allow him to carry out on the materials developed in the three lines of research referred to in paragraph one, as well as certain other materials of interest to TSS/CD. also serves as a general consultant to this Division and provides cover and cut-out facilities to the Agency.

3. The total cost of this project for a period of one year will not exceed $100,000. Charges should be made against allotment 6-2502-10-001.

4. has been requested to submit a summary accounting or a copy of the annual audit report be made available for the sponsor's inspection. Also, it has been requested that any unexpended funds shall be returned to the Agency.

5. Title to any permanent equipment purchased by funds granted shall be retained by the Agency in lieu of higher overhead rates.

* other than its activities as a cut-out
6. It was mutually agreed that documentation and accounting for travel expenses which are normally reimbursable by the Government shall conform to the accepted practices of the Government.

7. [Redacted] agreed to comply with the requirements of the Memorandum of Agreement.

APPROVED:

[Signature]

Chief, TSG/Chemical Division

APPROVED FOR OBLIGATION OF FUNDS:

[Signature]

Chief, TSG/Chemical Division

Research Director

Date: 28-7-74

Attachment: Proposal

Distribution: Original Only
The research to be undertaken during the twelve month period for which financial support is requested will be devoted to the continued analysis of the neural and endocrine mechanism of stress and the chemical agents that influence it. The screening procedures are based largely upon a further analysis of phases of stress and the influences of this physiologic behavior complex upon both body and skin temperatures as detailed in the accompanying report.

The chemical synthesis of new compounds will be continued at the and under the supervision of . These chemical agents will be screened for their capacity to provoke stress or to suppress the stress reaction in the acute or chronic phases. Animal testing will include pharmacologic screening and proper toxicity studies of these compounds as heretofore.

Chemical agents that have been found active and within a suitable toxicity range will be subjected to clinical screening on appropriate patients, the initial screening being carried out on advanced cancer patients. The amount of money devoted to chemical synthesis, however, has been further reduced. Chemical compounds available from biologic sources as well as those synthesized in the project will be screened, particularly those that are active in either raising or lowering body temperature.

As heretofore any agents which prove to be of interest...
animal tumors and on cancer patients. This cancer phase of the project will be considered a by-product of the major objective, which will be directed to the problem of stress.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Continuation of MKULTRA, Subproject No. 49

1. The scope of this subproject includes all those activities now engaged in by TSS/CD under the direction of TSS/CD with the exception of those cutout functions specifically mentioned in connection with other MKULTRA subprojects. In general, the research effort under this subproject will continue along the lines laid down in previous years. These involve the synthesis and pharmacological and clinical evaluation of compounds of those chemical families known to have application in the psychochemical and "K" fields. During the past year important progress has been made in the area related to stressor compounds and the relationship of these materials to the physiological pathways through which both stress and the reaction to it are mediated in human beings.

As is indicated in the attached proposal, the work of the past year has progressed to the point where more definitive experiments on the stress reaction can be carried out. Primarily this was brought about by the characterization of several new materials which produce stress reaction in humans and the application of some new clinical methods of measuring the extent of the disturbance produced. During the next year proportionally more effort will be expended on the problem of the development of new
It is desirable in this direction and because a new approach to the problem has been worked out.

2. **also serves as a general consultant to the Agency, provides services of a sensitive nature on an ad hoc basis, and serves as a cut-out in procurement problems.**

3. The total cost of this project for a period of one year will not exceed $71,500.00. Charges should be made against Allotment 0525-1009-4902.

4. **has been requested to submit a summary accounting or a copy of the Fund's annual audit report for the sponsor's inspection. Also, it has been requested that any unexpended funds shall be returned to the Agency.**

5. **Title to any permanent equipment purchased by funds granted shall be retained by, in lieu of higher overhead rates.**

6. It was mutually agreed that documentation and accounting for travel expenses which are normally reimbursable by shall conform with the accepted practices of the Fund.
MEMORANDUM FOR:  THE RECORD  

SUBJECT:  Continuation of NEUTRA, Subproject No. 83  

1. The scope of this subproject includes all those activities now engaged in by under the direction of NE/83 with the exception of those cutout—functions specifically mentioned in connection with other NEUTRA subprojects. In general, the research effort under this subproject will continue along the lines laid down in previous years. These involve the synthesis and pharmacological and clinical evaluation of compounds of those chemical families known to have application in the psychochemical and "X" fields. During the coming year it is planned to concentrate more directly on the more practical aspects of the "knockout" problem. Enough new potent substances have become available lately to make such a change in emphasis worthwhile. In connection with this change it should be noted that certain findings made in project at which cannot be further exploited at that facility will be pursued in the future. For this reason it may be necessary to supplement the findings of this subproject from time to time during the year due to increases of scope.

2. also serves as a general consultant to the Agency, provides services of a sensitive nature on an ad hoc basis, and serves as a cutout in procurement problems.
3. The total cost of this project for a period of one year will not exceed $40,000.00. Charges should be made against Allotment 2125-1390-3902.

C has been requested to submit a summary accounting or a copy of the Fund's annual audit report for the sponsor's inspection. Also, it has been requested that any unexpended funds shall be returned to the Agency.

5. Title to any permanent equipment purchased by funds granted shall be retained by B in lieu of higher overhead rates.

6. It was mutually agreed that documentation and accounting for travel expenses which are normally reimbursable shall conform with the accepted practices of the Fund.

Chief
TND/Research Branch

APPROVED FOR OBLIGATION OF FUNDS:

Research Director

Date

Attachment: Proposal and Budget
Distribution: Original only
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD  
SUBJECT: MXULTRA, Subproject 149  

1. This subproject is being established for the purpose of supporting realistic tests of certain development items and delivery systems of interest to TSD/EB.  

2. During the course of development it is sometimes found that certain very necessary experiments or tests are not suited to ordinary laboratory facilities. At the same time, it would be difficult if not impossible to conduct such tests as operational field tests. This project is designed to provide a capability and facilities to fill this intermediate requirement.  

3. The activities under this subproject will be conducted by Mr., an individual in the import and export business in. He holds a TOP SECRET Treasury Department clearance and a SECRET Agency approval. He is completely witting of the aims and goals of his activities.  

4. Mr. possesses unique facilities and personal abilities which makes him invaluable in this kind of testing operation. Mr. because of his peculiar talents and
capabilities as well as his excellent connections with all of the local law enforcement agencies, will provide a unique and essential capability. Because Mr. [redacted] is no longer resident of the [redacted] area, it is necessary that a suitable replacement be provided in order that a capability for continuance of our activities be maintained.

5. The estimated cost of the project is $10,000.00 for a period of one year. Charges should be made against Allotment Number 4125-1390-3902. Reimbursement will be made for services rendered.

6. Accounting for funds advanced and any equipment under this subproject will be in accordance with accounting procedures established by the [redacted].

7. A memorandum of agreement along lines established by previous audit recommendations in like situations will be executed.

[Signature]
Chief
TSD/Biological Branch.

Distribution:
Original only
SUBJECT: Request for Support of Research on the Mechanism of Brain Concussion

1. This is a request for financial support for research on the mechanism of brain concussion for the period 1 Feb 1956 to 1 Feb 1957.

2. The resonance-cavitation theory upon which this research is to be based has been presented in the proposal submitted to the dated 27 March 1954.

3. The program as originally submitted estimated the duration of the program to be from three to five years requesting a total of $72,109 for the initial year.

4. At the request of the a reduced budget was submitted.

5. , amounting to $24,925, was then awarded to the to support this program from 1 Feb 1955 to 1 Feb 1956.

6. The progress made to date under the above contract can be summarized as follows:

A. RESEARCH FACILITIES

   The following research facilities have been established for the investigation of the very diverse aspects of the problems being studied:

   a. A total of 2500 square feet of laboratory and office space equipped with much of the diversified machinery and apparatus necessary for research in this field.

   b. Blast Range

      A blast range has been established located approximately of the main laboratory. This area is owned by the and is closed to the public. Three blast test-series have been run to date.

   c. Arrangements have been made with the for use of their human cadavers. A test area has been assigned for this
B. PERSONNEL

Both full-time technical personnel and part-time professional research personnel have been acquired and indoctrinated relative to their specific function.

C. TECHNICAL PROGRESS

Following is the technical progress made under the current contract:

a. Specialized instrumentation and numerous testing techniques have been developed to obtain the desired dynamic data.

b. Considerable data has now been obtained supporting the resonance-cavitation theory of brain concussion.

c. Preliminary acceleration threshold data has been obtained for a fluid-filled glass simulated skull.

d. Data has been obtained on the nature and the magnitude of pressure fluctuations within a glass simulated skull subject to either impact or sound waves propagated in air.

e. Initial studies have been made on the simulated glass skull attempting to establish the cavitation patterns for various types of impact.

7. The proposed method and program plan remain the same as stated in the original proposal, except for the temporary deletion of the immersion blast study.

8. The current level of activity on this project can be indicated by the most recent billing to the GSI for the month of November, which amounted to $4,034.61.

9. In the interest of efficiency and economy it is requested that at least this level of activity be maintained for the coming year.

WARNING NOTICE
SECRET INTELLIGENCE
AND METHODS INVOLVED
10.1 Trotter, W. defines brain concussion as, "an essentially transient state due to head injury which is of instantaneous onset, manifests widespread symptoms of purely paralytic kind, does not as such comprise any evidence of structural cerebral injury, and is always followed by amnesia for the actual moment of the accident."

10.2 The implication of the underlined portion of the above statement is that if a technique were devised to induce brain concussion without giving either advance warning or causing external physical trauma, the person upon recovery would be unable to recall what had happened to him. Under these conditions the same technique of producing the concussion could be re-used many times without disclosure of its nature.

10.3 First, considering the possibilities of direct impact to the head or body, it should be possible from the findings of this research program to determine the following:
   a. Optimum design of impacting devices.
   b. Optimum points of impact on skull or body for the specific effects desired.
   c. Intensity of the blow for the effect desired.

10.4 In regard to the potential impacting devices, there are certain design requisites that are apparent at this time:
   a. The impact should be delivered without advance warning.
   b. The area of impact and force distribution should be such that surface trauma does not occur.
   c. The intensity of the impacting force and its duration should be such as to obtain the desired effect.
   d. The device should be as small and as silent as possible.

10.5 The specific impacting devices might take the form of any of the following:
   a. A pancake type black-jack giving a high peak impact force with a low unit surface pressure.
   b. Concealed or camouflaged spring-loaded impacting devices that trigger upon contact with the head.

(Original and sole copy 1965)
A projectile type impactor such as an air gun
using a small shot fired as a bullet.

An explosive pad detonated in contact with the
head or the body.

Let us now consider the possibilities of exciting the resonance
cavitation directly without impact. There is considerable evidence
that resonance cavitation can be induced directly in the following
ways:

10.6

a. A blast wave propagated in air. (Blast Concussion)
b. Physical excitation with a mechanical driver
   or horn, tuned to the resonant frequency of
   the head.

10.7

A single blast pressure wave propagated in air must have considerable
intensity in order to produce brain concussion, however, there is
considerable evidence (Carver & Dinsley) that modification of the
pressure wave can produce profound effects.

10.8

Excitation of the resonance cavitation by using a tuned driver
at this time appears to be well within the realm of possibility.
The neurotic-like manifestations normally associated with blast
concussion could possibly be induced by this method. Use of
this method, however, would require actual physical contact with
the drivers.

10.9

Excitation of the resonance cavitation by tuned sound waves also
appears to be a reasonable possibility. Concentration of the sound-
field at some remote point could be effected with acoustical lenses
and reflectors. The blast duration would be in the order of a
tenth of a second. Masking of a noise of this duration should not
be too difficult.

11.0

It would possibly be advantageous to establish the effectiveness
of both of the above methods as a tool in brain-wash therapy.
A full knowledge of the method and the resulting sequela should be
of aid to any person forced to submit to such treatment.

12.0

Possibly the most significant potential aspect of this study would
be in the development of practical means of giving a person immunity,
even though temporary, to brain concussion. One technique that appears
to have potentialities involves the introduction of a small quantity
of gas, approximately 1 cc, into the spinal cord. This gas bubble
would then normally migrate to the ventricles located at the centrum
of the brain. The ability of this bubble to expand under dynamic
loading would be most effective in preventing resonance cavitation
from occurring.

(Original and sole copy: rggg)

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MKSEARCH was the name given to the continuation of the MKULTRA program. Funding commenced in FY 1966, and ended in FY 1972. Its purpose was to develop, test, and evaluate capabilities in the covert use of biological, chemical, and radioactive material systems and techniques for producing predictable human behavioral and/or physiological changes in support of highly sensitive operational requirements.

OFTEN/CHICKWIT

In 1967 the Office of Research and Development (ORD) and the Edgewood Arsenal Research Laboratories undertook a program for doing research on the identification and characterization of drugs that could influence human behavior. Edgewood had the facilities for the full range of laboratory and clinical testing. A phased program was envisioned that would consist of acquisition of drugs and chemical compounds believed to have effects on the behavior of humans, and testing and evaluating these materials through laboratory procedures and toxicological studies. Compounds believed promising as a result of tests on animals were then to be evaluated clinically with human subjects at Edgewood. Substances of potential use would then be analyzed structurally as a basis for identifying and synthesizing possible new derivatives of greater utility.

The program was divided into two projects. Project OFTEN was to deal with testing the toxicological, transmisivity and behavioral effects of drugs in animals and, ultimately, humans. Project CHICKWIT was concerned with acquiring information on new drug developments in Europe and the Orient, and with acquiring samples.

There is a discrepancy between the testimony of DOD and CIA regarding the testing at Edgewood Arsenal in June 1973. While there is agreement that human testing occurred at that place and time, there is disagreement as to who was responsible for financing and sponsorship. (See hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Senate Human Resources Committee, September 21, 1977.)
Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

During Admiral Turner's 3 August 1977 testimony before your Committee and the Senate Human Resources Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research, you asked whether any Agency employees had been terminated because of their participation in MKULTRA Subproject 3. Admiral Turner indicated he did not believe any employee had been terminated, but would have Agency records searched on this question. Our records have been searched and the results confirm the Director's testimony that no such actions were taken.

Sincerely,

George L. Cary
Legislative Counsel
QKHILLTOP DEFINITION

QKHILLTOP was a cryptonym assigned in 1954 to a project to study Chinese Communist brainwashing techniques and to develop interrogation techniques. Most of the early studies are believed to have been conducted by the Cornell University Medical School Human Ecology Study Programs. The effort was absorbed into the MKULTRA program and the QKHILLTOP cryptonym became obsolete. The Society for the investigation of Human Ecology, later the Human Ecology Fund, was an outgrowth of the QKHILLTOP.